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                                                 CHAPTER ONE 
                                                 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The issue of the relationship between the principles of universal jurisdiction and personal 
immunities has ignited a lot of debate in modern international law. This is mainly because of 
the uncertainty caused by inconsistencies in state practice with regards to universal 
jurisdiction.1 It is therefore not clear as to what extent the immunities enjoyed by Heads of 
State  and other high ranking state officials can be used as a bar to the prosecution of these 
individuals for international crimes such as genocide and war crimes. 
 This uncertainty is also caused by the contradictions in the structure of the two principles. 
Universal jurisdiction seeks to promote accountability for certain international crimes, 
regardless of the position of the alleged perpetrator, thereby assuming that sovereignty is no 
longer absolute in instances of heinous international crimes. The principle of personal 
immunities on the other hand seeks to exempt certain individuals such as Heads of State, on 
the basis of their official standing, from being held accountable before foreign courts, even 
for international crimes.2 This suggests that sovereignty remains absolute regardless of the 
nature of the offence.  
In recent years, the exercise of universal jurisdiction by European states against African state 
officials has often resulted in tensions between European states and African states. African 
                                                 
1 See M-Cherif Bassiouni ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and 
Contemporary Practice’ (2001) 42: 1 Virginia J of Int L 81, 83 explaining that the relationship between 
universal jurisdiction and other principles of law is not clear because it is rarely used by national courts. See also 
C Gevers & P Vrancken ‘Jurisdiction of States’ in H Strydom (ed) International Law (2016) 234,236 explaining 
that ‘…there are numerous difficulties specifically associated with identifying the relevant jurisdiction rules 
under international law.’ This is because there is no specific treaty on the subject of the exercise of jurisdiction 
by states so the rules are governed by customary international law.   
2 See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v Belgium hereinafter Arrest Warrant Case), explaining that the case 
‘…was about balancing two divergent interests in modern international (criminal) law: the need for international 
accountability for such crimes as torture…and the principle of sovereign equality of states which presupposes a 
system of immunities.’ para 5.  
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states have claimed that the exercise of universal jurisdiction over African state officials by 
European states is an abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction and that when European 
states exercise universal jurisdiction against African state officials they disregard the 
sovereignty of the African states in question and the immunities that the state officials ought 
to enjoy at international law. According to the AU, this evokes memories of colonialism.3  
African misgivings towards the application of international criminal law have also been 
directed at the distinct, but closely related, efforts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
to prosecute African leaders for alleged human rights violations. The deterioration of the 
relationship between African states and the ICC can be traced back to the indictment of the 
incumbent Sudanese President Omar al Bashir in 2009 and the confirmation of proceedings 
against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto in 2012. African 
states under the auspices of the African Union (AU) have claimed that the ICC is violating 
the immunity of African leaders by indicting sitting African Heads of State; that the Court is 
unfairly targeting only African leaders and that it is neo-colonial.4  
 A study of the relationship between these two principles of universal jurisdiction and 
personal immunities in the African context and the attitude of African states towards the work 
of the ICC in Africa is of both academic and practical relevance. In recent years, European 
states have exercised universal jurisdiction against African state officials, leading to increased 
tensions between African states and European states.5 In addition some incumbent and former 
African Heads of State have been indicted, tried or convicted. As stated above, the ICC 
indicted Sudanese President Omar al Bashir in 2009 and confirmed charges against the 
incumbent Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto in 2012.6 The 
                                                 
3 AU-EU Expert Report on Universal Jurisdiction (Brussels 2009) para 37. 
4 For a detailed overview of African misgivings towards the work of the ICC in Africa see generally C Jalloh 
‘Regionalising International Criminal Law?’ (2009) 9:3 Int Criminal LR 445; J van der Vyver ‘Prosecuting the 
President of Sudan: A dispute between the African Union and the International Criminal Court’ (2011)11 
African Human Rights LJ 683; G Naldi & D Magliveras ‘The International Criminal Court and the African 
Union: A Problematic Relationship’ in C Jalloh & I Bantekas (eds) The International Criminal Court and Africa 
(2017). 
5 See generally C Jalloh ‘Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription? A Preliminary Assessment of the 
African Union Perspective on Universal Jurisdiction’ (2010) 21 Criminal LF 1. 
6 The Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09 Pre Trial Chamber Decision on the Prosecution’s 
application for a warrant of arrest; The Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kogsey and Joshua 
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former Liberian President Charles Taylor was tried and convicted by the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone for war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2012, and in 2016 the 
Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) sitting in Senegal tried and convicted former 
Chadian leader Hissene Habre for crimes against humanity.7 This was a landmark trial in that 
it was the first instance in which a domestic court in Africa had exercised jurisdiction based 
on the universality principle.8 These indictments and trials have had serious legal, policy and 
political implications for state sovereignty on the African continent.  
A number of legal scholars have asserted that there is a doctrinal link between the principles 
of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities, and the doctrine of state sovereignty.9 One 
of the main purposes of the thesis is to critically examine the differences in conception of the 
sovereignty doctrine between African and European states respectively. The thesis submits 
that the tensions between African states and European states regarding the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction against African state officials by European states, and the concerns 
expressed by African states regarding efforts by the ICC to prosecute African leaders for 
alleged human rights violations, are a result of the different ways in which African states and 
European states have historically obtained, and enjoyed the protection of, the principle of 
sovereignty. It is asserted that this tension can best be understood through a critical analysis 
of Antony Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of international law.10 
                                                                                                                                                        
Arap Sang ICC 01/09-02/11-373 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to article 61 (7) a and b of 
the Rome Statute (23/01/2012). 
7 Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor  SCSL-03-1-T Judgment of 20/5/2012; J Perrez-Leon-Acevedo ‘The 
conviction of Hissene Habre by the Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese Courts: Bringing justice 
in cases of human rights violations in Africa’  Africlaw (30/6/2016) available at 
https://africlaw.com/2016/06/30/the-conviction-of-hissene-habre-by-the-extraordinary-chambers-in-the-
senegalese (accessed 27/6/2018). 
8 See S Hogestol ‘The Habre Judgment at the Extraordinary African Chambers: A Singular victory in the Fight 
against Impunity’ (2016) 34:3 Nordic J of HR 147. 
9 See for example C Ryngaert ‘The Concept of Jurisdiction in International Law’ in A Orakhelashvili (ed) 
Research Handbook on Jurisdiction and Immunities in International Law (2015) 50. 
10 See generally A Anghie Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 2007 (hereinafter 
Anghie 2007).  
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It has been asserted that the principle of universal jurisdiction has been on the decline 
generally following the repeal of universal jurisdiction legislation in Belgium in 2003.11 It 
shall be argued in the thesis that despite the assertion that universal jurisdiction is on the 
decline generally, it is very much alive in Africa as evidenced by the adoption of enabling 
legislation by African states starting with South Africa in 2002.12 The thesis shall submit that 
there is a paucity of scholarship on the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa due to the 
historically Eurocentric focus of international law. With respect to immunities, it has 
similarly been asserted that when African states seek to reassert the immunity of their Heads 
of State and state officials, they are deviating from the norm as the principle of immunities is 
on the decline.13 The thesis shall assert that contrary to the argument that immunities are on 
the decline generally, immunities are still available but they are being stripped from African 
leaders and remain in place for politically powerful states including European states. One 
way of understanding this discrepancy is to place it in the context of the different ways in 
which African states and European states have historically enjoyed sovereignty. 
 
1.2  BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Universal jurisdiction is the exercise of jurisdiction over a crime by a state which has no 
territorial links with the crime itself, the victims or the alleged perpetrator.14 The Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in The Lotus Case ruled that, in the absence of a 
prohibitive rule, international law permits states to exercise jurisdiction over acts occurring 
outside their territories.15 One of the purposes of universal jurisdiction is to ensure that certain 
                                                 
11 See for example A Cassese ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality? A Plea for a Sensible Notion of Universal 
Jurisdiction’2003 (1) J of Int Criminal Justice 585, N Arajarvi ‘Looking Back from Nowhere: Is There a Future 
for Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes?’2011 (6) Tilburg LR 5,29. 
12 See the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 0f 2002 as amended 
by the Judicial Matters Act of 2005 (hereinafter ICC Act). 
13 See for example Jalloh ‘Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription?’49; and generally A Bianchi Immunity 
v Human Rights: The Pinochet Case’1999 (10) European J of Int L 237. 
14 The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs) 
2001 principle 1(1). 
15 PCIJ Series A no 10(1927). The Lotus case is generally considered to be the leading authority on the subject 
of jurisdiction (J Dugard International Law A South African Perspective 4th ed 2011 147).This is 
notwithstanding that it has been criticised by a number of scholars who suggest that the dictum in Lotus has 
been modified by subsequent practice (Gevers & Vrancken ‘Jurisdiction of States’236-238). 
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international crimes do not go unpunished due to territorial limitations in jurisdiction.16 The 
generally agreed list of crimes over which universal jurisdiction can be exercised include 
piracy; slave trading; war crimes; crimes against humanity; genocide and torture.17 
Personal immunities are immunities which are accorded to high ranking state officials such as 
diplomats, Heads of State and foreign affairs ministers by virtue of the office which they 
occupy.18 The principle of personal immunities operates to exempt these individuals from the 
civil and criminal jurisdiction of foreign courts, and operates only for as long as they continue 
to hold office.19 The basis for conferring personal immunities is found in both treaty and 
customary international law.20 The rules pertaining to diplomatic immunity are outlined in the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961), and the customary international law 
position pertaining to both diplomatic and Heads of State immunities was outlined by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Arrest Warrant Case.21 The court explained that  
in international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain 
holders of high- ranking office in a state such as the Head of State, Head of Government and 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other states, both civil and 
criminal.22 
                                                 
16 See M Du Plessis and S Bosch ‘Immunities and Universal Jurisdiction-the World Court Steps in (or on?)’ 
(2003) 28 SAYIL 242, and judge Van den Wyngaert’s dissenting opinion in Arrest Warrant para 46. 
17 For an overview of the generally agreed list of crimes see A Colangelo ‘The Legal Limits of Universal 
Jurisdiction’ (2006-2007) 47:1 Virginia J of Int L 149, 151; A Addis ‘Imagining the International Community: 
The Constitutive Dimension of Universal Jurisdiction’ (2009) 31 Human Rights Q 129,136; The Princeton 
Principles of Universal Jurisdiction principle 2; R O’Keefe International Criminal Law (2015) 23. 
18 D Akande & S Shah ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts’ 
(2011) 21: 4 European J of Int L 815,818. 
19 Ibid 825. 
20 J Brohmer ‘Diplomatic Immunity, Head of State Immunity, State Immunity: Misconceptions of a Notorious 
Human Rights Violator’ (1999) 12 Leiden J of Int L 361, 363. 
21 See article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) which provides that a diplomatic 
agent shall enjoy immunity from both the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state; and the Arrest 
Warrant Case para 51.  
22 See para 51. 
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The rationale behind the principle of personal immunities is that of functional necessity i.e. to 
ensure that Heads of State and diplomats can carry out their duties effectively, and travel 
without the fear of being arrested or harassed in a foreign country.23 
As has been explained above, the two principles of universal jurisdiction and immunities are 
both doctrinally linked to the doctrine of state sovereignty. Sovereignty has been defined as 
the power of a state to exercise its functions of statehood within its territorial boundaries, 
independent of interference from other states. It also refers to the rights of a state at 
international law, including its right to claim immunity for its officials from the jurisdiction 
of foreign courts.24 This thesis asserts that Antony Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of 
international law and the sovereignty doctrine is key to understanding the tensions between 
African states and European states regarding the exercise of universal jurisdiction by 
European states against African state officials, and the attitude of African states towards 
efforts by the ICC to prosecute African leaders for alleged human rights violations.  
According to Anghie, there is a historical link between colonialism and sovereignty, and it is 
the colonial encounter of the 19th century which shaped international law.25 During the 
colonial confrontation non-European communities were considered to be uncivilised and 
therefore non-sovereign. On this basis they were excluded from the realm of international law 
and the principles of international law such as that of immunities did not apply to them.26 At 
the dawn of decolonisation, the newly independent non-European states sought to enforce the 
doctrine of sovereignty in order to avoid any post-colonial interference from their former 
colonisers.27 The thesis argues in this vein that African states are still sensitive to their 
colonial past and that is why they have claimed that  universal jurisdiction as exercised by 
                                                 
23 See Arrest Warrant Case para 53-54; Akande & Shah ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, 
and Foreign Domestic Courts’818; M Tunks ‘Diplomats or Defendants? Defining the Future of Head of Head of 
State Immunity’ (2002) 52 Duke LJ 651, 656 explaining that, ‘…immunity from foreign jurisdiction has been 
recognized throughout human history as an essential tool in conducting foreign affairs. Head of State immunity 
allows a nation’s leader to engage in his official duties, including travel to foreign countries, without fearing 
arrest, detention or other treatment inconsistent with his role as the head of a sovereign state.’ 
24 A Cassese International Law in a Divided World 1986 130. 
25 Anghie 2007 3. See also A Anghie ‘Towards a Postcolonial International Law’ in P Singh & B Mayer (eds) 
Critical International Law (2014) 123,130. 
26 Anghie 2007 55-56. 
27 Ibid 7-8. See also G Abi-Saab ‘The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law: An 
Outline’1962 Howard LJ 95,103. 
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European states ,and the work of the ICC in Africa are neo-colonial. Although colonialism is 
now a thing of the past, the colonial encounter remains central to the development of 
international law.28 
An examination of domestic legislative instruments on universal jurisdiction in selected 
European countries, and the regional and domestic instruments of selected African states on 
universal jurisdiction highlights that universal jurisdiction has gone through two different 
cycles in its application. The first cycle was the rise of the principle in Europe in the late 
1990s, followed by its decline in 2003 when Belgium repealed its legislation on universal 
jurisdiction following political pressure from powerful states whose officials had been subject 
to investigation based on the legislation. The repeal of the Belgian legislation was also a 
result of the judgment in the Arrest Warrant case. The thesis shall examine the domestic 
instruments in Belgium; Spain; Germany; Netherlands and the United Kingdom (England and 
Wales) as it is considered that the application of universal jurisdiction in these selected 
countries best mirrors the rise and decline of the principle in Europe. 
The second cycle was the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa beginning in 2002 when 
South Africa became the first African country to enact legislation domesticating the 
provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC.29 When Belgium repealed its universal jurisdiction 
legislation in 2003, many scholars declared that this signalled the ‘death’ of universal 
jurisdiction. Despite the significance of instruments such as the AU Model Law on Universal 
Jurisdiction30 and domestic universal jurisdiction legislation such as that passed in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in 2016,31 and the recent trial of Hissene Habre by the 
Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal, there has been scholarly silence on the rise of 
universal jurisdiction on the African continent. There is therefore a gap in the available 
knowledge on the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa.  
In this regard, this thesis seeks to contribute new knowledge by critically examining the rise 
of universal jurisdiction in Africa since 2002.The AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction, 
                                                 
28 A Anghie ‘The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Post-Colonial Realities’ (2006) 27:5 Third 
World Quarterly 739,748-749. 
29 dSee the ICC Act. 
30 See the AU (Draft) Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes (2012). 
31 Law implementing the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 2016 (Democratic Republic of 
Congo). 
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and the domestic legislative instruments on universal jurisdiction enacted by South Africa; 
Kenya; Uganda and Mauritius shall be critically reviewed.32 The thesis argues that the Model 
Law was adopted to provide an alternative to universal jurisdiction as practised by Western 
states, and the jurisdiction of the ICC. It is pertinent to note at this point that notwithstanding 
the relevance and significance of the Democratic Republic of Congo legislation to the thesis, 
a detailed overview is not included. This is because of the difficulties encountered in 
obtaining information pertaining to the instrument. The question to be asked is why there is a 
rise in universal jurisdiction in Africa at a time when African states have criticised the 
application of the principle by European states against African state officials. It shall be 
argued that the push for universal jurisdiction by the AU is an attempt by the regional body to 
reaffirm the sovereignty of its member states which they were historically denied, and avoid 
universal jurisdiction as practised by Western States, and the jurisdiction of the ICC.  
 African states have expressed concern that the exercise of universal jurisdiction against 
African state officials by European states and the indictment of African Heads of State by the 
ICC disregard the immunities that the state officials and Heads of State ought to enjoy at 
international law. A number of scholars have argued that by reclaiming absolute immunity, 
African states are deviating from the trend in customary international law to deny immunity 
from prosecution in instances of the most heinous international crimes.33 An examination of 
the history of the principle of immunities however shows that contrary to the narrative that 
immunities are no longer absolute; they have always been a part of international law. Due to 
the history of subjugation of African states by European states during the colonial encounter 
as explained by Anghie, African states have historically not been able to claim immunities for 
their subjects. As Gevers and Vrancken have explained, European states used to claim 
immunity for their subjects when they travelled to non-European ‘territories’.34 This immunity 
was however de facto immunity as the non-European ‘territories’ were excluded from the 
                                                 
32 ICC Act (South Africa) ibid; International Crimes Act 16 of 2008 (Kenya, hereinafter ICA); International 
Criminal Court Act 27 of 2010 (Uganda, hereinafter ICC Act); International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2011 
(Mauritius, hereinafter ICC Act). 
33 See for example B Chok ‘Let the Responsible be Responsible: Judicial Oversight and Over-optimism in the 
Arrest Warrant Case and the fall of the Head of State Immunity Doctrine in International and Domestic Courts’ 
(2015) 30:3 American Univ Int LR 489; Jalloh ‘Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription? A Preliminary 
Assessment of the African Union Perspective on Universal Jurisdiction’ 49. 
34  See Gevers & Vrancken ‘Jurisdiction of States’ 261. 
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realm of international law and therefore had no legal standing to grant immunity to the 
European subjects.35  
It shall be argued in the thesis that when African states claim immunities for their officials 
and Heads of State, they are simply claiming immunities which have always been available at 
international law but which they were unable to claim due to their colonial history. It shall be 
asserted that the reason why efforts by African states to reclaim immunities for their Heads of 
States and officials have been criticised is because of the international criminal law narrative 
which treats colonialism as being peripheral to the discipline. Efforts by African states to 
reclaim immunities therefore ought not to be dismissed as just political rhetoric, but they 
should be considered holistically in light of the impact that colonialism continues to have on 
present day international law. 
It ought to be emphasised that the focus of the study is on domestic immunities and universal 
jurisdiction. However, this thesis also considers the immunity question before the ICC 
because although the jurisdiction of the ICC is distinct from that of domestic courts, the 
questions arising from efforts by the ICC to prosecute African leaders for alleged human 
rights violations are closely related to those arising from the application of the principles of 
universal jurisdiction and immunities by domestic courts. The discussion of the reaction by 
African states to the work of the ICC in Africa is therefore not a diversion from the focus of 
the study; but it highlights the importance of the thesis. This is particularly true in respect of 
the confusion over immunity at the ICC. 
It is submitted that the tensions between African states and the ICC regarding the immunity 
issue make the question of immunity under domestic law, particularly with respect to the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction; more important in international law. This is because efforts 
by African states to avoid the jurisdiction of the ICC have resulted in a turn back to domestic 
prosecutions by African states as evidenced by the adoption of universal jurisdiction 
legislation by a number of African states; and to regional justice mechanisms through the 
proposed African Court of Justice and Human Rights which will have a criminal chamber 
with jurisdiction to try international crimes.36 The trial of Hissene Habre by the EAC sitting 
                                                 
35 Ibid, explaining that ‘In most instances, this restriction on jurisdiction did not amount to immunity proper as 
the ‘territories’ concerned were not considered to be sovereign.’ 
36 See generally C Murungu ‘Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights’2011 (9) J of Int Criminal Justice 1067. 
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in Senegal is a good example of the turn away from the ICC and the turn to domestic and 
regional justice mechanisms by African states. This heightens the relevance and importance 
of the study of the issue of the relationship between universal jurisdiction and immunity, and 
state sovereignty. 
 At the recent 30th AU Summit of Heads of States and Government held in Addis Ababa in 
January 2018, the AU Assembly agreed to request the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for 
an advisory opinion on the issue of Head of State immunity before the ICC.37 Earlier in 2012, 
the AU requested the Commission to consider seeking an advisory opinion of the ICJ on the 
matter.38 The 2012 proposal did not get much support and no further action was taken in this 
regard. The request for an ICJ advisory opinion by the AU takes place against the backdrop 
of an increasingly deteriorating relationship between the AU and the ICC following the 
indictment of Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir in 2009 and the confirmation of charges 
against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto in 2012.The  charges 
against Kenyatta and Ruto were withdrawn in December 2014 and April 2016 respectively 
due to insufficient evidence, but the arrest warrants against Al Bashir remain a contentious 
issue.39 
The contradictory nature of the provisions of the Rome statute regarding the immunity of 
state officials before the ICC has contributed significantly to the tensions between the AU 
and the ICC. Article 27 (2) provides for the irrelevance of immunities before the ICC, whilst 
article 98 (1) provides that the Court must first obtain the cooperation of a third state for the 
waiver of immunity before proceeding with a request for arrest and surrender.40 This has 
                                                 
37 Decision on the International Criminal Court Assembly/AU/Dec.672 (XXX) para 5 (ii). 
38 Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the Assembly Decisions on the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) Assembly/AU/Dec.397 (XVIII) para 10; D Akande ‘The African Union’s 
Response to the ICC’s Decision on Bashir’s Immunity: Will the ICJ Get another Immunity Case’ EJIL Talk 
(8/2/2012) available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-african-unions-response-tto-the-iccs-decisions-on-bashirs-
immunity-will-the-icj-get-another-immunity-case/ (accessed 27/6/2018). 
39 See The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC 01/09-02/11 Notice of Withdrawal of Charges (5/12/2014); 
The Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang ICC 01/09-01/11 Charges Vacated (5/4/2016). 
40 See article 27 (2) and article 98 (1) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) 2187 
U.N.T.S 1990.For  a detailed overview of the contradiction between the two provisions  see C Gevers 
‘Immunity and the Implementation Legislation in South Africa; Kenya and Uganda’ in K Ambos& O 
Maunganidze (eds)Power and Prosecution : Challenges and Opportunities for International Criminal Justice in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (2012)  85,94-105; P Gaeta & P Labuda ‘Trying Sitting Heads of State: The African Union 
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given rise to the question as to whether Al Bashir is immune from the jurisdiction of the ICC, 
and whether states are obliged to arrest and surrender him in cooperation with the ICC, as 
Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute.  
In 2009, the AU Assembly adopted a decision that no AU member state would cooperate 
with the ICC regarding the warrant of arrest that had been issued against Al Bashir, on the 
basis of article 98 (1).41 The ICC  has rendered  a number of decisions of non-cooperation  
against African   countries following their failure to arrest Al Bashir when he visited their 
territories ,on the basis that article 98 (1) of the Rome statute  does not negate the obligation 
on state parties to arrest and surrender Al Bashir to the ICC.42 The jurisprudence of the ICC in 
this regard has not been consistent as the Court gave different reasons in the court decisions, 
with the result that there is still uncertainty with respect to immunities before the Court 
generally and the immunities of Al Bashir and the obligation of states to arrest and surrender 
him in cooperation with the Court specifically.43 
It is regrettable that the ICC has failed to provide clarity on the relationship between article 
27 and 98 of the Rome statute, and this has further heightened the tension between the AU 
and the ICC regarding Heads of State immunity. The resulting tensions have led to significant 
developments in international criminal law in Africa. Notably, African states under the 
auspices of the AU have taken steps to regionalise international criminal law through the 
proposed African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which will have a criminal chamber 
with jurisdiction to try international crimes.44 A number of scholars have argued that the 
proposed Court is a response by African states to the perceived unfair targeting of African 
                                                                                                                                                        
versus the ICC in the Al Bashir and Kenyatta Cases’ in C Jalloh & I Bantekas (eds)The International Criminal 
Court and Africa (2017). 
41 Decision on the Meeting of African State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) Assembly/AU/Dec 245 (XIII) July 2009 para 10. 
42 Decision on non-cooperation by Malawi (15/11/2011) ICC-02/05-09-139; Decision on non-cooperation by 
Chad (13/12/2011) ICC-02/05-01/09-140; Decision on non-cooperation by the DRC (9/4/2014) ICC-02/05-
01/09-195; Decision on non-cooperation by South Africa (6/7/2017) –ICC-02/05-01/09-302. 
43 See generally A Knottnerus ‘The Immunity of Al Bashir: The Latest Turn in the Jurisprudence of the 
ICC’EJIL Talk (15/11/2017) available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-immunity-of-al-bashir-the-latest-turn-in-
the-jurisprudence (accessed 27/6/2018). 
44 See article 3 (1) of the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights (adopted 27/6/2014). 
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officials by the ICC.45 Whilst the establishment of the proposed Court is commendable in that 
it might help in addressing the concerns raised by African states that the ICC practices double 
standards and unfairly targets African leaders, there are a number of issues that need to be 
addressed before the proposed Court can be a viable alternative to the ICC.46 A detailed 
examination of these issues is however beyond the scope of this thesis and for this reason 
they shall not be explored. 
In   June 2014, the AU Assembly adopted the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.47 The amendment contains a 
provision giving immunity to Heads of State and other senior state officials from the 
jurisdiction of the proposed court.48 It is submitted that the immunity provision was a response 
by the AU to the perceived disregard of the immunities of the leaders and state officials of 
African states. 
Du Plessis has asserted that the immunity provision was triggered by the confirmation of 
proceedings against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto by the 
ICC in 2012.He notes that prior to this development, the draft Protocols on the proposed 
                                                 
45 See for example M Du Plessis ‘Implications of the AU Decision to give the African Court Jurisdiction over 
International Crimes’ Institute for Security Studies Paper 235 June 2012 3; C Murungu ‘Towards a Criminal 
Chamber in the African Court of Justice and Human Rights’ (2011) 9 J of Int Criminal Justice 1067,1068. 
46 See C Gevers ‘Back to the Future? Civil Society and the ‘turn to complementarity’  (2016) 1 Acta Juridica  
95,138 arguing that ‘In principle, the ‘turn to complementarity in Africa, by placing the impetus on African 
states to initiate their own international prosecutions should work against this double standard…’See also H  
Woolaver ‘International and Domestic Implications of South Africa’s Withdrawal from the ICC’ EJIL Talk 
24/2/2017 available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/international-and-domestic-implications-of-south-africas-
withdrawal-from-the-icc (accessed 27/6/2018) ,noting that ‘…there are significant caveats that must be 
addressed before the African Court can be a viable alternative to the ICC, including the severe lack of resources 
at the Court, the unclear scope of the proposed international criminal jurisdiction…’For a detailed overview of 
the perceived shortcomings of the proposed Court see Du Plessis ibid. 
47 See the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights (2014). 
48 See article 46A bis of the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (2014) which provides that ‘No charges shall be commenced or confirmed before the 
Court against any serving AU Head of States or Government or anybody acting or entitled to act in that 
capacity, or other senior officials based on their functions, during their tenure of office.’ 
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court did not include immunity provisions.49 The inclusion of the immunity provision in the 
2014 amendment was a result of the 2013 AU Assembly Decision on Africa’s Relationship 
with the ICC50 which resolved that the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto must be stopped.51 The 
inclusion of Article 46A bis was therefore motivated by the AU’s resolve to reclaim 
immunity for Heads of State and officials of its member states in order to counter the 
perceived disregard of their immunities by the ICC, and at the same time avoid the 
jurisdiction of the ICC.52  
In a move that clearly shows continuing African misgivings towards international criminal 
justice as administered by the ICC South Africa, Gambia and Burundi in 2016 announced 
their intentions to withdraw from the Rome statute of the ICC.53 In the aftermath of the three 
countries notifying the UN of their intentions to withdraw, the Sudanese President   Al Bashir 
then urged African countries to follow suit and withdraw from the Rome statute.54 Although 
                                                 
49  M Du Plessis ‘Shambolic, Shameful and Symbolic: Implications of the African Union’s Immunity for African 
Leaders’ Institute for Security Studies Paper 278 Nov 2014 9. 
50 See the Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec.1 Oct 2013. 
51 See para 10 of the 2013 Decision stating that the AU Assembly had decided ‘(ii) That the trials of President 
Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Samoei Ruto who are the current serving leaders of the republic 
of Kenya, should be suspended until they complete their terms of office…(xi) That President Uhuru Kenyatta 
will not appear before the ICC until such a time as the concerns raised by the AU and its Member States have 
been adequately addressed by the UN Security Council and the ICC.’ 
52 See Du Plessis ‘Shambolic, Shameful and Symbolic’ (note 49 above) 9-10. 
53  Burundi was the first country to initiate proceedings to withdraw from the Rome statute following an 
overwhelming vote by Parliament in favour of the withdrawal, with only two parliamentarians voting against the 
move (see Mail and Guardian Africa 19/10/2016 ‘Burundi: Pierre Nkurunzinza signs law withdrawing 
Country’s ICC membership’ available at www.mgafrica.com/.../2016-10-19-burundi-pierre-nkurunzinza-sign-
law-withdrawing-coun  (accessed 27/6/2018). South Africa’s Instrument of Withdrawal was signed by the 
country’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation on the 19th of October 2016 (see Sunday Times 
24/10/2016 ‘Withdrawal from the ICC:A Sad Day for South Africa and Africa’ available at 
www.timeslive.co.za/.../Withdrawal-from-the-ICC-a-sad-day-for-South-Africa-and-Africa (accessed 
27/6/2018).Gambia declared its intention to withdraw a few days after South Africa (see Independent 
26/10/2016) ‘Gambia pulls out of ‘racist’ ICC amid fears of a mass African Exodus’ available at 
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/gambia-international-criminal-court-south-africa-burundi-
withdrawal-rome-statute-a7381336.html  accessed 27/6/2018). 
54 See News24 (22/10/2016) ‘Sudan’s Bashir urges ICC African members to quit  ‘colonial’ court’ available at 
www.news24.com/Africa/News/Sudans-bashir-urges-members-to-quit-colonial-court-20161022 
(accessed27/5/2018).Gambia however withdrew its notice of intention to withdraw following a change of 
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South Africa and Gambia later revoked the intention to withdraw, the withdrawal of Burundi 
from the ICC took effect on the 27th of October 2017.55  
The South African Minister for Justice explained that South Africa would closely cooperate 
with other African countries to strengthen continental mechanisms including the African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights. One of the reasons the minister gave for South Africa’s 
intended withdrawal was that the ICC Act contradicts the provisions of the Diplomatic 
Immunities and Privileges Act (2001)56 which provides for the immunities and privileges of 
diplomats and other foreign state officials. This is because both the Rome statute and its 
implementing domestic legislation, the ICC Act, require the arrest and surrender of a person 
who is wanted by the court but who may be immune from such arrest under customary 
international law.57 South Africa’s attempted withdrawal was arguably motivated by earlier 
domestic judgments of the North Gauteng High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal 
regarding South Africa’s failure to arrest Al Bashir when he visited South Africa for an AU 
Summit in June 2015. Both the North Gauteng High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal 
ruled that South Africa had breached its obligations under the Rome Statute and the ICC Act 
                                                                                                                                                        
government (see News 24 14/2/2017 ‘UN: Gambia formally reverses withdrawal from ICC’ available at 
https://www.news24.com/.../News/un-gambia-formally-reverses-withdrawal-from-iccaccessed 27/6/2018).South 
Africa also revoked its intention to withdraw following a court ruling that the  withdrawal process was 
unconstitutional and invalid (see Mail and Guardian 8/03/2017 ‘South Africa revokes ICC Withdrawal’ 
available at https://mg.co.za/article/2017-03-08-south-africa-revokes-icc-withdrawal accessed 27/6/2018).In 
December 2017 South Africa however indicated that it was still considering withdrawing from the Rome 
Statute(see Opening Statement by South Africa’s Minister of Justice at the 16th Session of the Assembly of State 
Parties of the International Criminal Court 4-14-December 2017 available at 
www.justice.gov.za/m_statements/2017/20171208-ICC.html (accessed 27/6/2018). 
55 See New York Times (27/10/2017) ‘Burundi Quits International Criminal Court’ available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/27/world/...burundi-international-criminal-court-htm(accessed 27/6/2018). 
56 See Section 4 of the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 31 of 2001. 
57 See the full statement by the minister on 21/10/2016, available at www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-
formally-withdrawing-icc (accessed 27/6/2018).See also DA V Minister of International Relations and 
Cooperation and Others 2017 (3) SA 212 (GP) para 65 where the Court explained that ‘The primary reason 
advanced by the national executive for delivering the notice of withdrawal is that the Rome Statute impedes its 
role in diplomatic and peacekeeping efforts on the continent as it is required to arrest, on its soil, sitting Heads 
of State against whom the ICC has issued warrants of arrest’.  
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by not arresting Al Bashir.58 Following the High Court Judgment, the government indicated 
that it would consider withdrawing from the Rome Statute.59 
In light of these developments, it is imperative that a solution should be found to the impasse 
between the AU and the ICC on the immunity issue to avoid the further deterioration of the 
relationship between the AU and the ICC, and avoid possible withdrawals from the Rome 
Statute by African states other than Burundi. A number of options have been suggested in this 
regard, including that there should be a Decision from the ICC’s Appeals Chamber which 
would bring finality to the matter; that the state parties to the ICC should indicate their 
interpretation of the application of article 27 and 98; and that the ICJ should render an 
advisory opinion on the issue of Head of State immunity before the ICC.60 It shall be 
submitted in the concluding Chapter to the thesis that the solution to the tensions between 
African states and the ICC regarding the immunity question, and between African states and 
European states regarding the application of the principles of universal jurisdiction and 
immunities, lies at multiple levels.  
In addition to the proposals made by scholars regarding the immunity question before the 
ICC, the thesis shall assert that African states can regionalise international criminal law by 
addressing the concerns raised regarding the proposed African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights to make it a viable alternative to the ICC; and that the AU should adopt a model law 
on immunities as it did when it adopted the AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction in 
2012. As stated above, it has been argued that the proposed court is desirable in that it will 
address the allegations of double standards by Western states and the ICC.61 It has also been 
argued that the proposed criminal chamber would improve access to justice on the African 
                                                 
58 See Southern African Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 
(27740/2015) [2015] ZAGPPHC 402; Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & Others v Southern 
African Litigation Centre 2016(3) SA 317 (SCA). 
59 See Statement on the Cabinet Meeting of 24 June 2015 in which it was announced that the cabinet had 
resolved to review South Africa’s continued participation in the Rome Statute (available at 
www.dirco.gov.za/docs/cabinet0624.htm  (accessed 27/6/2018). 
60  See for example Knottnerus ‘The Immunity of Al Bashir: The Latest Turn in the Jurisprudence of the ICC’; D 
Akande ‘An International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the ICC Head of State Immunity Issue’ EJIL 
Talk 31/3/2016 available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/an-international-court-of-justice-advisory-opinion-on-the-
icc-head-of-state-immunity-issue/ (accessed 27/6/2018). 
61 See Gevers ‘Back to the Future? Civil Society and the ‘turn to complementarity’ in Africa and some critical 
concerns’138. 
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continent due to its proximity to victims of human rights violations.62 It shall therefore be 
recommended that the AU should address the concerns raised in respect to the proposed 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights so that it can effectively focus on domestic and 
regional application of international criminal law. 
The trial and conviction of former Chadian leader Hissene Habre by the EAC sitting in 
Senegal has demonstrated to the world that Africa is capable of finding African solutions to 
African problems.63 A purely domestic and regional approach to international criminal law in 
Africa is therefore possible if the concerns related to Africa’s readiness to implement the 
proposed African Court of Justice and Human Rights are addressed.  
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The historical origins, evolution of and meaning of the doctrine of state sovereignty is a 
subject which has been canvassed by a number of scholars. As has been mentioned above, 
this thesis asserts that the reason why the exercise of universal jurisdiction by European states 
and the work of the ICC in Africa leads to tensions between African states and European 
states is because the two sides have a different understanding of the doctrine of state 
sovereignty. It has been explained by Perrez that sovereignty is arguably the most important 
doctrine of international law as nearly all international law principles are based on it.64 
Ferreira-Snyman and Bodley have also asserted that sovereignty is a fundamental aspect of 
international law.65 The doctrine of state sovereignty has been defined in different ways by the 
different scholars who have canvassed this subject.66 The most concise definition has arguably 
been given by Cassese, who said, 
                                                 
62 C Mabunda ‘The Pros and Cons of the Criminal Jurisdiction of the Proposed African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights’ Africa Institute of South Africa Briefing no 98 Nov 2013. 
63 See Hogestol ‘The Habre Judgment at the Extraordinary African Chambers’. 
64 See Perrez Cooperative Sovereignty from Independence to Interdependence in the Structure of International 
Environmental Law 1. See also Anghie 2007 316, asserting that ‘…sovereignty is…the foundational concept of 
our discipline.’ 
65 M Ferreira-Snyman ‘The Evolution of State Sovereignty: A Historical Overview’ (2006) 12):2 Fundamina 1; 
A Bodley ‘Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law: The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia’ (1998-1999) 3 New York Univ J of Intl L & Politics 417,418. 
66 For a definition of the doctrine of state sovereignty see H Kelsen ‘Sovereignty and International Law’ (1960) 
48:4 The Georgetown J of Int L 627; J Crawford The Creation of States in International Law 1979 26; Bodley 
ibid. 
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Sovereignty, in addition to granting each State a set of powers relating to the territory under its 
jurisdiction, includes the following sweeping rights; first, that of claiming respect for the State’s 
territorial integrity and political independence by other States; second, that of claiming sovereign 
immunity for state representatives acting in their official capacity…67  
The issue of the rise and decline of the notion of absolute sovereignty has ignited 
considerable debate in international law. One group of scholars has argued that the notion of 
absolute sovereignty is now obsolete due to the rise of international criminal law which 
places an emphasis on individual accountability for human rights violations.68 On the other 
hand, other scholars argue that sovereignty is an absolute concept which cannot be limited.69  
It shall be submitted in the thesis that the notion of absolute sovereignty of states is indeed 
waning as evidenced by the exercise of universal jurisdiction against African state officials 
by European states; the indictment of Sudanese President Omar al Bashir by the ICC and the 
confirmation of charges against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William 
Ruto by the same court. 
Although there is vast literature available on the meaning and historical evolution of the 
doctrine of state sovereignty, it is submitted that there is a gap in the available literature on 
the relationship between international criminal law and state sovereignty. As has been rightly 
observed by Gevers, there is a complex relationship between international criminal law and 
state sovereignty.70 The thesis shall attempt to address this gap in Chapter Two by examining 
the different ways in which European states and African states have historically obtained, and 
enjoyed the protection, of the principle of sovereignty and how this has resulted in them 
having a different understanding of the sovereignty doctrine. It shall be asserted that African 
states and European states respectively apply the doctrine of state sovereignty differently as a 
result of the colonial and racial history of international law, and that these differences are 
manifest in the application of the principles of universal jurisdiction and immunities. 
The main jurisprudential theories on the development of the doctrine of state sovereignty: the 
natural law theory, the positivist theory and the Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL) theory have been covered by a number of scholars. Francisco de Vitoria’s De Indis 
                                                 
67 See Cassese International Law in a Divided World (1986)130. 
68  See for example Ferreira-Snyman (note 61 above) 12-13; Bodley (note 61 above) 417. 
69 See for example M Dixon Textbook on International Law 7ed (2013) 161. 
70 C Gevers ‘International Criminal Law and Individualism: An African Perspective’ in C Schwöbel (ed) Critical 
Approaches to International Criminal Law (2014) 221. 
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Novitre Inventis (hereinafter De Indis) is considered to be the most significant to the thesis in 
examining the relevance of the natural law theory to the development of the sovereignty 
doctrine.71 De Indis enables us to trace the primitive development of the sovereignty doctrine 
through the colonial encounter, and it validates Anghie’s argument that the colonial 
encounter was central to the development of the sovereignty doctrine. Moreover it highlights 
that non-European sovereignty has always been deficient.72 Vitoria whilst arguing that the 
Indians could not be classified as ‘animals’ and that the ius gentium should apply to them as 
it does to the Spanish people, goes on to articulate the reasons to justify why they cannot be 
regarded as sovereign.73 
Anghie has given an elaborate account of the positivist theory on the development of the 
sovereignty doctrine in his illuminating book Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law which is arguably the most authoritative text on the colonial origins of 
international law.74 Anghie explains how the positivist jurists of the 19th century sought to 
develop a doctrine of sovereignty that would account for relations between European states 
which were considered to be civilised and therefore sovereign, and the non-European states 
which were considered to be uncivilised therefore non-sovereign.75 Literature from the 19th 
century is indicative of the role that colonialism played in shaping international law. As 
observed by Anghie, positivist jurists used demeaning and racial language to emphasise the 
backwardness of non-Europeans.76 This was one of the methods employed by positivist jurists 
to justify the colonial encounter.77 Texts by positivist scholars including Henry Wheaton, John 
                                                 
71 See F de Vitoria De Indis et de Iure Belli Relectionis 1917 (E Nys Ed, J Bate trans –a collection of de 
Vitoria’s lectures De Indis Novitre Inventis (On the Indians Lately Discovered) and De Jure Bellis Hispanorum 
in Barbaros (On the Law of War Made by the Spaniards on the Barbarians)116. 
72 Anghie 2007 5, arguing that ‘The colonial confrontation, however, particularly since the nineteenth century 
when colonialism reached its apogee, was not a confrontation between two sovereign states, but rather between 
a sovereign state and a non-European society that was deemed by jurists to be lacking in sovereignty-or else, at 
best only partially sovereign.’ 
73 Vitoria De Indis 127 (arguing that the Indians possessed human reason hence they cannot be classified as 
‘animals’) and 181 (arguing that it was justified for the Spaniards to wage war on the Indians if they resisted 
Spanish occupation of their territory, because they were not sovereign). 
74 Note 10 above. 
75 Ibid 32-100. 
76 Ibid 40 foot note 19. 
77 Anghie ‘The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Post-Colonial Realities’ 745. 
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Westlake, Thomas Lawrence and James Lorimer all highlight the subjugation of non-
European states by European states during the colonial encounter.78 
In this regard, the thesis aims to introduce new knowledge by examining how despite 
colonialism having come to an end and all states now being free to participate equally as 
subjects in the international legal order, the colonial encounter continues to play a role in the 
development of international law. This shall be done through an examination of the reaction 
by African states to universal jurisdiction as practiced by Western states and efforts by the 
ICC to prosecute African leaders for alleged human rights violations. 
Scholars belonging to the TWAIL school of thought have also dealt extensively with the 
history of the development of the sovereignty doctrine. The significance of TWAIL to the 
study is that it considers the role that colonialism has played in the shaping of international 
law, a theory that has arguably been best advanced by Anghie.79 Anghie asserts that 
colonialism played a central role in the shaping of international law, particularly the 
sovereign doctrine, and that in order to understand the present day structure of international 
law, it is important to understand how the colonial confrontation of the 19th Century 
continues to impact upon relations between the former colonisers and the former colonies.80 A 
number of scholars share the same view as Anghie in this regard and these include Abi-Saab; 
Mutua and Gathii.81 The thesis critically reviews the arguments advanced by Anghie, and 
places these arguments within the context of the application of the sovereignty doctrine in 
Africa as seen through the lens of the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction and 
that of personal immunities, and the reaction by African states to efforts by the ICC to 
prosecute African leaders. 
The subject of the exercise of jurisdiction based on the universality principle has also been 
covered by a vast number of scholars. For instance Bassiouni, O’Keefe, Ryngaert, Coombes, 
                                                 
78 See H Wheaton Elements of International Law 1866; J Westlake Chapters on the Principles of International 
Law 1866; J Lorimer The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise on the Jural Relations of Separate 
Political Communities 1883; T Lawrence The Principles of International Law 1894. 
79 See Anghie 2007. 
80 Ibid 3 
81 See generally Abi-Saab ‘The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law: An Outline’; M 
Mutua ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’ (1994-1995) 16 Michigan J of Int L 1113; 
J Gathii ‘Twail: A Brief History of its Origins, its Decentralised Network and a Tentative Bibliography’ (2011) 
3 Trade, Law & Development J 25. 
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Arajarvi, and Gevers and Vrancken have extensively dealt with the meaning, scope and 
rationale of the principle of universal jurisdiction.82 A number of aspects of universal 
jurisdiction including its origins and doctrinal basis, the crimes over which it can be exercised 
and whether or not the presence of an accused is required in the country exercising universal 
jurisdiction are controversial.83 Kontorovich has asserted that the reason why universal 
jurisdiction is subject to controversy is because it transcends state sovereignty.84 Despite the 
controversy surrounding universal jurisdiction however, the legality of its exercise is no 
longer subject to dispute. As observed by Gevers and Vrancken, 
State practice over the past decade-and in particular the implementation of legislation by a 
number of states in respect of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court-suggests that 
the exercise of universal jurisdiction is in principle permissible under international law.85 
The rise of universal jurisdiction in Europe from the 1990s, and its decline in 2003 when 
Belgium repealed its universal jurisdiction legislation has been canvassed by a number of 
scholars. There is vast literature available on the domestic legislative instruments of 
European countries.86 A lot has also been written on the repeal of the Belgian law on universal 
jurisdiction in 2003, and on the reform of the universal jurisdiction legislation in Spain in 
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2009 and the 2014 reform which effectively removed universal jurisdiction from the Spanish 
legal system. Reydams critically analysed the repealed Belgian legislation and argued that the 
repeal was a welcome development due to the controversy surrounding it.87 Commentators 
writing on the universal jurisdiction legislation reform in Spain expressed the view that the 
reform is retrogressive for the fight against impunity. Fernandez argued that the reform is a 
setback to the fight against impunity and that it has diminished the hopes of victims of human 
rights violations of getting justice.88 
Notwithstanding the abundance of literature available on the rise and decline of universal 
jurisdiction in Europe, it is submitted that there is a gap in the available literature on why the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction against African state officials by African states has led to 
tensions between African states and European states. Scholars who have addressed the issue 
of African misgivings towards universal jurisdiction as practiced by European states have not 
looked at it from the perspective of the differences in understanding of the sovereignty 
doctrine between African states and European states. The general trend has been to analyse 
whether the claims made by African states can be justified. For instance, Jalloh has argued 
that the claim by African states that they have been singularly targeted in the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction by European states is not entirely true because European courts have 
exercised universal jurisdiction against state officials from outside the African continent.89 
When Belgium repealed its law on universal jurisdiction in 2003, a number of scholars 
expressed the view that the repeal of the Belgian law signalled the total demise of universal 
jurisdiction and wrote ‘obituaries’ for the principle. Cassese, for example, asserted that ‘[i]t 
would seem that the principle of universal jurisdiction over international crimes is on its last 
legs, if not already in its death throes.’90 Similarly, Arajarvi asked: ‘All things considered, 
what usage may be left for universal jurisdiction? It is time to look back and return to the 
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roots…Absolute universal jurisdiction over international crimes is on the way to meet its 
maker.’91 
This thesis submits that contrary to the assertions that the repeal of the Belgian legislation 
signalled the demise of the principle, universal jurisdiction has been on the rise in Africa 
since 2002 when South Africa became the first African country to enact legislation 
domesticating the provisions of the Rome Statute.92 The scholarly silence on the rise of 
universal jurisdiction in Africa is arguably as a result of the Eurocentric nature of 
international law. It is submitted that universal jurisdiction is considered to be legitimate only 
when it is exercised by Western States. Despite the significance of the AU Model Law on 
universal jurisdiction, and domestic legislation on universal jurisdiction such as legislation 
passed by African states including South Africa; Uganda; Kenya; Mauritius; Senegal and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, literature on the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa is 
scant, with only a few scholars paying attention to this development. 
In this respect, Dube’s article is arguably the most comprehensive analysis on the rise of 
universal jurisdiction in Africa.93 Dube argues that the AU Model Law was adopted as a result 
of African states’ misgivings towards universal jurisdiction as practised by Western states, 
and towards efforts by the ICC to prosecute African leaders for alleged human rights 
violations.94 Katz, Du Plessis and Stone have provided a detailed overview of South Africa’s 
ICC Act.95 Okuta has analysed the Kenyan legislation on universal jurisdiction.96 The 
Senegalese legislation enabling the Senegalese courts to exercise universal jurisdiction over 
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international crimes has been reviewed by Niang.97 Dube’s work is however considered to be 
the most comprehensive because to date, no other scholar has reviewed the provisions of the 
AU model Law on Universal Jurisdiction. 
There is therefore a paucity of literature with regards to the significance of the rise of 
universal jurisdiction in Africa. The scholars who have commented on the domestic 
legislative instruments in Africa have not examined the significance of the rise of universal 
jurisdiction in Africa in relation to the desire by African states to reassert their sovereignty 
and thereby avoid universal jurisdiction as practised by non-African states, and the 
jurisdiction of the ICC in Africa. It is this gap that the thesis seeks to address in Chapter Four. 
The meaning, rationale and scope of the principle of immunities have been widely covered by 
a number of scholars who have analysed both functional and personal immunity. These 
scholars include Cassese; Du Plessis and Bosch; Akande and Shah; Tunks; and Foakes.98 In 
line with the purpose of the thesis, the focus is on personal immunities. There is considerable 
debate as to whether personal immunities ought to apply before domestic courts where an 
individual is accused of having committed international crimes. This is notwithstanding that 
the ICJ outlined in Arrest Warrant that personal immunities apply before domestic courts 
even in the face of international crimes.99   
A number of scholars have asserted that personal immunities ought not to apply before 
domestic courts where an individual is facing charges of having committed international 
crime. Dugard and Abraham, for instance, have argued that it would not be sensible for a 
foreign head of state to be able to successfully plead personal immunity before the domestic 
courts of South Africa when they cannot do so before the ICC.100 Similarly, Bianchi has 
argued that when an individual has allegedly committed international crimes, personal 
                                                 
97 M Niang ‘The Senegalese Legal Framework for the Prosecution of International Crimes’ (2009) 7:5 J of Int 
Criminal Justice 1063. 
98 A Cassese ‘When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?’(2002) 13 European J of Int 
L 853; Du Plessis & Bosch ‘Immunities and Universal Jurisdiction-The World Court steps in (or on?)’;  Akande 
&  Shah ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts’; J Foakes 
‘Immunity for International Crimes? Developments in the Law on Prosecuting Heads of States in Foreign 
Courts’ Chatham House Briefing Paper (November 2011) available at www.chathamhouse.org (accessed 
27/6/2018). 
99 Arrest Warrant para 55. 
100 J Dugard & G Abraham ‘Public International Law’ (2002) Annual Survey of SAL 166. 
24 
 
immunities ought not to apply.101 However, another group of scholars has argued that personal 
immunities ought to apply even when an individual is alleged to have committed 
international crimes. Tunks and Kayitana have asserted that if personal immunities were to 
fall away when an individual is alleged to have committed international crimes, this would 
not have the effect of promoting accountability for atrocities. It would only hinder officials 
from travelling abroad and this would have a negative impact on interstate diplomacy.102 
Akande and Shah have given a number of examples where courts in Europe and America 
have upheld the personal immunities of Heads of State and senior state officials.103 As 
O’Keefe has rightly observed, state practice shows that there is no customary international 
law exception to the application of personal immunities before domestic courts.104 This is the 
same position that was enunciated in the Arrest Warrant case, which remains the leading 
authority on the subject of immunities of Heads of State and senior state officials. In this 
regard, this thesis argues that in line with the customary international law position on 
immunities as outlined in Arrest Warrant, personal immunities apply before domestic courts 
regardless of the gravity of the crime in question. 
The application of personal immunities before domestic courts in Europe is another area 
which has been widely canvassed by scholars. A review of the domestic legislative 
instruments on immunities in Europe shows that with the exception of the 1993 Belgian 
universal jurisdiction legislation, the other countries’ legislation provided for the immunity of 
Heads of State and state officials.105 Literature is however scant on the application of the 
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principle of immunities in Africa. The only comprehensive commentary on the enabling 
legislation on immunity in Africa is arguably that by Gevers. Gevers has given a detailed 
overview on immunity and the enabling legislation in South Africa, Kenya and Uganda both 
in respect to domestic prosecutions and arrest and surrender of suspects in cooperation with 
the ICC.106 This thesis shall attempt to address the gap in the available literature by critically 
reviewing the enabling legislation on immunities in the selected African countries mentioned 
above. 
African states have in recent years been making efforts to re-assert immunities for their 
Heads of State and state officials. This is evidenced by the fact that the AU Model Law on 
universal jurisdiction provides for the immunity of Heads of State and senior state officials in 
article 16.107  In the 2013 AU Assembly Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the 
International Criminal Court, the AU decided that in line with the customary international 
law position on immunities, and with the practice of national courts, no sitting African Head 
of State should be indicted by the ICC.108 In addition, the Protocol on Amendments to the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African court of Justice and Human Rights grants immunity to 
Heads of State and senior state officials before the proposed court.109 The AU has therefore 
been making efforts to re-assert immunities for the Heads of State and officials of its member 
states.  
Scholars who have commented on efforts by the AU to reaffirm the immunities of the Heads 
of State and state officials of member states have argued that African states are deviating 
from the norm as immunities have fallen. Jalloh, for instance, argues that African states 
should not rely on the notion of immunities when expressing their concerns regarding the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction against African state officials by European states, because 
there is a decline in the principle.110  Similarly, Chok has criticised the judgment of the 
majority in Arrest Warrant and argued that the doctrine of Head of State immunity has 
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declined on the basis that ‘…the international and domestic jurisprudence after Arrest 
Warrant suggests that head of state immunity doctrine has eroded.’111 
Contrary to the narrative that immunities have fallen, immunities have always been a part of 
international law and the principle is not on the decline. A critical review of ICC 
implementation legislation in the selected European states shows that in the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction by these states, African state officials make up the majority of those 
whose immunity was disregarded. Prosecutors in countries such as Germany used their 
prosecutorial discretion to determine that officials from European states and other politically 
powerful states such as China were immune from prosecution.112 Using the same prosecutorial 
discretion however, it was determined that officials from African states were not immune 
from indictment and arrest in Germany.113  
It is argued in the thesis that this is evidence of the double standard that arguably exists in the 
application of international criminal law. Immunities have not fallen universally, but state 
practice in Europe shows that immunities have arguably fallen only in respect to state 
officials from the politically weaker states, particularly those from Africa. This argument also 
applies to the ICC.  
A review of the literature available on the history of immunities shows that African 
sovereignty (when it has been granted) has always been deficient, as principles of 
international law including immunities did not apply to non-European states who were 
considered to be uncivilised and therefore not sovereign. Öszu’s ‘Ottoman Empire’ unpacks 
the history of the capitulations granted to European states by the Ottoman Empire, which was 
a partially recognised ‘state’.114 The evolution of the capitulatory grants from being voluntary 
privileges granted to European traders to being one sided treaties which were used as a means 
to subjugate the partially recognised ‘states’ is evidence that the colonial encounter was 
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central to the development of international law. As explained by Anghie, European states 
insisted on the capitulations because, 
For the European states, the local systems of justice were completely inadequate, and there was 
no question of submitting one of their citizens to these systems. Non-European states were thus 
forced to sign treaties of capitulation which gave European powers extra-territorial jurisdiction 
over the activities of their own citizens in these non-European states.115 
On the basis of the history of capitulations, the thesis submits that contrary to the narrative 
that immunities have declined, immunities have always been a part of international law, but 
due to the colonial history, non-European communities could not claim them because they 
were not regarded to be sovereign. Consequently the principles of international law were 
deemed to be inapplicable to them.116 When African states seek to re-assert immunities for 
their Heads of State and state officials they are therefore not deviating from the norm, but 
they are simply claiming immunities which have always been available at international law, 
but which they were unable to claim due to their colonial history. In this regard, it is 
submitted that there is a gap in the available literature in that scholars have not focussed on 
the role that colonialism continues to play in the development of international law, as seen 
through the lens of the application of the principle of immunities in Africa. One of the 
purposes of the thesis is to address this gap. 
As has been argued by Anghie, colonialism remains central to the development of 
international law although it has now been confined to history and all states can now 
participate freely as equal subjects of international law.117 This view is shared by Gevers and 
Megret. Gevers has argued that despite the international criminal law narrative that 
colonialism is a peripheral aspect of international law, it remains central to the discipline.118 
Megret has asserted that the colonial encounter remains central to the development of 
international law because it contributed towards the shaping of some of the fundamental 
doctrines.119 In this regard, the thesis asserts that the push for universal jurisdiction by African 
states, and efforts by African states to reclaim immunities for their Heads of State and state 
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officials are part of efforts by African states to reassert their sovereignty which they were 
previously deprived of, and that these developments ought to be understood against the 
background of Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of international law. 
1.4    KEY RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The key research objectives are as follows: 
1. To trace the history of colonialism and sovereignty, through an analysis of the different 
jurisprudential theories on sovereignty and colonialism i.e. natural law theory, positivism, 
and the TWAIL theory as advanced by Anghie. 
2. To examine how African states and European states historically obtained and enjoyed the 
protection of the principle of sovereignty in order to show why the two sides understand and 
invoke the doctrine differently. 
3. To critically examine African discontent with regards to universal jurisdiction as exercised 
by European states, and efforts by the ICC to prosecute African leaders.  
4. To critically examine the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa in the context of the 
conception of the doctrine of sovereignty by African states. 
5. To examine how the principle of immunities was historically used by European states to 
deprive African states of their sovereignty. 
1.5    RESEARCH DESIGN AND THEORY 
The thesis is a non-empirical desktop study, based on a critical literature review of the 
existing relevant sources of information. A literature review is an exercise in inductive 
reasoning which involves analysing a number of selected sources in order to develop a 
thorough understanding of a specific area of research.120 This type of study was considered to 
be best suited to this thesis as a comprehensive review of the literature would give a good 
understanding of the application of the principles of universal jurisdiction and personal 
immunities in Africa and Europe, and why the application of these principles has often led to 
misunderstandings between the two sides. 
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A review of the literature detailing the historical link between the colonial confrontation and 
the development of the doctrine of state sovereignty provides useful insight into how 
European and non-European states have historically enjoyed sovereignty differently, leading 
to differences in the way they understand and apply the doctrine. It also enables us to 
understand how the differences in understanding of the sovereignty doctrine by African states 
and European states has led to misunderstandings regarding the application of the principles 
of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities, and the indictments of African leaders by 
the ICC.  
The challenges associated with this research design include ‘…misunderstanding the source; 
selective interpretation to suit one’s viewpoint; poor organisation and integration of 
review.’121  These challenges can be overcome by a careful selection of sources based on the 
aim of the thesis, and relevance to the level of study. It is also important to ensure that the 
literature review is well integrated by organising the sources according to how best they 
answer the research questions posed in the thesis. 
The primary sources relevant to the study include the customary international law position 
with regards to diplomatic and Heads of State immunities as outlined in the Arrest Warrant 
Case by the International Court of Justice. The Arrest Warrant case remains the leading 
authority on the subject of immunities and it is referred to extensively in the thesis. As was 
stated above, the main purpose of the thesis is to interrogate why the application of the 
principles of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities, and the work of the ICC in 
Africa, has led to tensions between African states and European states, and to a deterioration 
of the relationship between African states and the ICC respectively. In this vein, the study 
shall critically review domestic legislation on universal jurisdiction and immunities in the 
selected European countries mentioned above i.e. Belgium; Spain; Germany; Netherlands and 
United Kingdom (England and Wales). 
The regional legislative instruments enacted by the AU which state the regional body’s 
commitment to fight impunity on the continent shall also be critically examined. This shall be 
done   in order to show that despite repeated commitments by the AU to combat impunity on 
the continent, the AU has since 2000 been making efforts to reaffirm the sovereignty of its 
member states through the reclaiming of immunities. The instruments examined in this regard 
are the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000); the African Union Protocol Relating to 
                                                 
121 Mouton ibid 180. 
30 
 
the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002); the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (2008); and the 
Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights (2014). 
To address the scholarly silence on the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa, the thesis shall 
examine the AU (Draft) Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction (2012) and the domestic 
legislative instruments on universal jurisdiction in South Africa; Uganda; Kenya; Senegal; 
and Mauritius.  The provisions of the respective instruments relating to immunity before 
domestic courts and arrest and surrender in cooperation with the ICC shall also be critically 
reviewed. Other primary sources relevant to the study are also reviewed, including the 
relevant court decisions; treaties and conventions. 
The secondary sources which shall be reviewed are the relevant AU Assembly decisions 
regarding the perceived abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction by European states 
and the perceived unfair targeting of African leaders by the ICC. These include the Decision 
on the Report of the Commission on the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction; the 
Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC); and the recent 
decision by the AU Assembly to request the ICJ to render an advisory opinion on the issue of 
Head of State immunity before the ICC (Decision on the International Criminal Court). 
Diplomatic statements by the AU, academic texts, and articles in journals and periodicals and 
online sources shall also be critically examined to show how African states and European 
states have historically experienced sovereignty differently; and to examine African states’ 
discontent regarding the application of the principles of universal jurisdiction and personal 
immunities by European states, and efforts by the ICC to prosecute African leaders. 
The principal research theory upon which this thesis is based is the Third World Approaches 
to International Law (TWAIL) theory as advanced by Antony Anghie. This theory is 
considered to be best suited to the thesis because it provides useful insight into the 
misunderstandings between African states and European states regarding the application of 
the principles of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities, and the attitude of African 
states towards the work of the ICC in Africa. Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of law 
enables us to interrogate why the application of the sovereignty doctrine, as seen through the 
lens of the application of the principles of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities, and 
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the reaction of African states to the jurisdiction of the ICC, leads to misunderstandings 
between African states and European states, and African states and the ICC. 
The theory is also pivotal to understanding the role that colonialism continues to play in the 
shaping of international law, despite the fact that it is now a thing of the past and all states are 
now free to participate as equal subjects in the international legal order. In order to fully 
comprehend the role that colonialism played in the shaping of international law and thereby 
understand why African states are still sensitive to their colonial past, resulting in them 
claiming that the ICC and universal jurisdiction as practiced by Western states are neo-
colonial, the thesis also critically examines other theories. These are the natural law theory 
and the positivism theory on the development of the sovereignty doctrine. 
1.6 CHAPTER OUTLINES 
Chapter One  
This chapter provides the background and outline of the research problem and explains the 
rationale for undertaking the study. It is explained that the discussion on the relationship 
between international criminal law and state sovereignty in Africa as seen through the lens of 
the application of the principles of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities; and the 
relationship between Africa and the ICC, is of ongoing practical and academic relevance. 
This is because the recent indictments and trials of African state officials and Heads of State 
have had profound legal, policy and political implications on state sovereignty in Africa. 
Chapter Two 
This chapter shall trace the history of colonialism and sovereignty, through an analysis of the 
different jurisprudential theories on sovereignty and colonialism i.e. natural law theory, 
positivism, and the TWAIL theory as advanced by Anghie. Through a critical examination of 
Francisco De Vitoria’s De Indis Novitre Inventis (On the Indians Lately Discovered), the 
chapter shall seek to show how non-European states were historically denied their 
sovereignty.  
An analysis of the positivist theory highlights that the sovereignty doctrine developed as an 
attempt by the positivist jurists such as James Lorimer and Henry Wheaton to legitimise the 
colonial confrontation. Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of international law shall be 
examined at length and it shall be asserted that the reason why African states view universal 
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jurisdiction as exercised by European states, and the work of the ICC in Africa as neo-
colonial, is because African states and European states have historically enjoyed sovereignty 
differently. They therefore understand and apply the doctrine differently. 
Chapter Three 
Chapter three shall examine the first cycle of universal jurisdiction i.e. the rise and decline of 
the principle in Europe. The domestic legislative instruments on universal jurisdiction in 
Belgium; Spain; Netherlands; Germany; and the United Kingdom (England and Wales) shall 
be critically reviewed. It shall be submitted in this chapter that the application of the principle 
of universal jurisdiction in the selected European countries is indicative of the existence of a 
double standard in the application of international criminal law. The majority of individuals 
against whom European states have exercised universal jurisdiction are from Africa. 
 The chapter shall also explain why the relationship between universal jurisdiction and 
personal immunities remains uncertain, and assert that the misunderstandings between 
African states and European states regarding the application of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction ought to be understood against the background of Anghie’s theory on the colonial 
origins of international law. 
Chapter Four  
This chapter shall examine the second cycle of universal jurisdiction, the rise of universal 
jurisdiction in Africa. The regional instruments adopted by the AU which address the 
commitment by the regional body to combat impunity, starting from the Constitutive Act of 
2002 shall be examined. The purpose of examining these instruments, which do not provide 
for the exercise of universal jurisdiction by member states, is to highlight the AU’S 
commitment to reassert the sovereignty and independence of member states, as the rise of 
universal jurisdiction in Africa arguably takes place against the background of these 
instruments. 
The chapter shall also examine the AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction, and the 
domestic legislative instruments on universal jurisdiction for South Africa; Uganda; Kenya; 
Senegal; and Mauritius. It shall be asserted that the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa is 
part of efforts by African states to reassert their sovereignty and strengthen their regional 
justice mechanisms in order to avoid the jurisdiction of the ICC, and universal jurisdiction as 
practised by non-African states. 
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Chapter Five 
Chapter Five shall critically examine the historical evolution of the principle of immunities 
and its application by European states. The history of the principle of immunities shall be 
traced through a critical analysis of the Ottoman Empire capitulations, to show that non-
European sovereignty, when it has been granted, has always been deficient, and that during 
the colonial encounter the principles of international law including immunities did not apply 
to non-European states as they were effectively considered to be non-sovereign.  
The chapter shall also examine the application of the principle of immunities in Europe, 
through a critical analysis of the domestic legislative instruments providing for immunity in 
the selected European countries mentioned above. It shall be argued that contrary to the 
narrative that the principle of immunities has fallen universally, immunities have fallen only 
in respect of officials from the politically weaker states. A critical review of the application of 
the principle of immunities shows that African state officials make up the majority of those 
whose immunity has been disregarded in the exercise of universal jurisdiction by European 
states, and it shall be submitted that this is indicative of the double standard that arguably 
exists in the application of international criminal law. 
Chapter Six 
This chapter shall examine the application of the principle of immunities in Africa both at the 
regional and domestic level. The immunity provisions in the AU Model Law and the Protocol 
on amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African court of Justice and Human 
Rights shall be critically reviewed, followed by the immunity legislation in the selected 
African countries mentioned above.  
The chapter shall seek to answer the question why African states are making efforts to re-
assert immunities for their Heads of State and state officials, at a time when the principle of 
universal jurisdiction is on the rise in the continent. It shall be submitted that the reclaiming 
of immunities by African states is not a deviation from the norm as asserted by some 
scholars, but that African states are simply claiming the immunities which have always been 
available at international law, but which they were unable to claim due to their colonial 
history.  
The chapter shall also attempt to address the scholarly silence on the impact that colonialism 
has had on the shaping of international law, as seen through the lens of the application of the 
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principle of immunities in Africa. It shall be argued that the push for immunities by African 
states ought to be understood against the background of Anghie’s theory on the colonial 
origins of international law. 
Chapter Seven 
The concluding chapter shall give a summary of the research findings. It shall be asserted 
that: 
- African sovereignty has always been deficient; 
- The end of colonialism did not mean the end to colonial relations; 
- The rise of universal jurisdiction and the reclaiming of immunities by African 
states are part of efforts to reassert their sovereignty; 
- There is evidence of a double standard in the application of international criminal 
law. 
The chapter shall also make proposals on the way forward regarding African states’ 
misgivings towards the exercise of universal jurisdiction against African state officials by 
European states, and efforts by the ICC to indict African leaders. It shall be proposed that 
African states should focus on domestic and regional application of international criminal 
law, notwithstanding that the concerns that have been raised regarding the proposed African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights ought to be addressed first. It shall also be proposed that 
the AU should adopt a Model Law on immunities, and that Sudan and either South Africa or 
Kenya, whose courts have ruled that President Al Bashir is not immune from arrest and 
surrender in cooperation with the ICC; could register a dispute with the ICJ by consent 
regarding the issue of Al Bashir’s immunities. In this regard, it shall be argued that the recent 
decision by the AU Assembly to request the ICJ to render an advisory opinion on the matter 
is commendable in that it is evidence that despite their misgivings towards the ICC, African 
states are still committed to the international criminal justice project. The focus has 
seemingly shifted from threats to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the ICC to efforts to 
finding solutions to the problems regarding the Court. 
It shall be asserted that the recent successful trial and conviction of the former Chadian leader 
Hissene Habre by the Extraordinary African Chambers sitting in Senegal is evidence that 
African states are capable of dealing with impunity on the continent without interference 
from non-African states. The thesis shall conclude that the ‘dynamic of difference’ which was 
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prevalent during the colonial confrontation will always be a part of international law and that 
in assessing the validity of the concerns raised by the African states; consideration ought to 
be given to the colonial and racial nature of the history of international law. 
POSTSCRIPT 
This chapter shall examine South Africa’s perspective on immunities before the ICC through 
a detailed analysis of the Bashir Case pertaining to his immunity from arrest and surrender to 
the ICC. The chapter shall also examine the changing attitude of South Africa from being an 
ardent supporter of the ICC at its inception, to an attitude which shows growing discontent 
with the Court as evidenced by its attempted withdrawal from the Court in 2016.It shall be 
argued that because of South Africa’s influential position on the African continent, it must 
adopt a clear policy on the domestic application of international criminal law.  
The detailed examination of South Africa’s perspective on immunities before the ICC is 
considered relevant to the thesis because as explained above, the confusion regarding the 
issue has significantly contributed to the turn to domestic and regional justice mechanisms by 
African states. In addition, the policies adopted by South Africa in the application of 
international law have a significant policy and political impact on the rest of the African 
continent. 
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                                               CHAPTER TWO 
            SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION  
The issue that this thesis seeks to interrogate is why the application of international criminal 
law, particularly the principles of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities, and the 
distinct, but closely related, efforts by the International Criminal Court to prosecute African 
leaders for human rights violations, has led to tensions between African states and European 
states. The thesis asserts that there is a doctrinal link between the principles of universal 
jurisdiction and personal immunities, and state sovereignty. The main reason why the 
principles of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities have been applied differently by 
African states and European states, leading to tensions between the two is because African 
states have a different understanding of the doctrine of state sovereignty from that of 
European states. 
Most of the concerns that have been raised by African states with respect to the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction against African state officials by European states have been centred on 
the doctrine of state sovereignty, with African states claiming that when European states 
exercise universal jurisdiction against African state officials they disregard the sovereignty 
that African states ought to enjoy at international law.122 African states have also expressed 
concern at the perceived unfair targeting and disregard of the immunities of African leaders 
by the ICC, and claimed that the court is neo-colonial.123 It is submitted that the tensions 
between African states and European states stem from the different ways in which the two 
sides have historically enjoyed the doctrine of sovereignty, leading to a difference in the way 
they understand and invoke it. In this regard, these tensions can best be understood through a 
                                                 
122 AU-EU Expert Report on Universal Jurisdiction para 37. 
123 For an assessment of African states’ misgivings towards the work of the ICC in Africa see generally Jalloh 
‘Regionalizing International Criminal Law?’ 
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critical examination of Anghie’s theory on the historical link between colonialism and 
sovereignty.124 
Anghie has argued that the colonial confrontation of the 19th Century was central to the 
development of international law, including the fundamental doctrine of state sovereignty. 
According to him, 
colonialism was central to the constitution of international law in that many of the basic 
doctrines of international law –including, most importantly, sovereignty doctrine-were forged 
out of the attempt to create a legal system that could account for relations between the European 
and non-European worlds in the colonial confrontation.125 
An understanding of the historical link between colonialism and the doctrine of state 
sovereignty, as put forward by Anghie, is important because it provides a useful insight into 
why the doctrine of sovereignty is viewed differently by African and European states. Gevers 
has rightly observed by that there is a complex relationship that exists between sovereignty 
and international criminal law.126 This relationship is arguably complicated by the differences 
in understanding of the doctrine of state sovereignty between Western states and the less 
developed states, in this context the African states. When Western states apply international 
criminal law, they purportedly do so in the interests of justice and in order to ensure that 
there is no impunity.127 To African states however, the application of international criminal 
law, especially the principle of universal jurisdiction by European states against African state 
officials, is meant to disregard their sovereignty.128  
                                                 
124 See Anghie 2007 32-100. 
125 Anghie 2007 3. See also Anghie ‘Towards a Post-Colonial International Law’ 12. For a similar view see 
generally Mutua ‘Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry’; M Craven ‘Colonialism and 
Domination’ in B Fassbender & A Peters (eds) The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law 
(2012) 862. 
126   Gevers ‘International Criminal Law and Individualism: an African Perspective’ 221. 
127 See AU-EU Expert Report on Universal Jurisdiction para 39. 
128 The discussion on the history of colonialism and sovereignty shall highlight that colonialism denied African 
communities their sovereignty. However, with decolonisation, the newly independent African states sought to 
reinforce their sovereignty in order to guard against post-colonial interferences from their former colonisers. 
According to Evans, ‘…state sovereignty remains a passionate article of faith, particularly in the countries of 
the developing world.’ See G Evans ‘1648-The Post-Westphalian State System and Universal Challenges’ An 
Introductory speech delivered at a conference by the World Forum Organisation and the Commission on 
Globalisation (Brussels,18-20 June 2003) available at www.tomspencer.info/america/cog/Speeches.pdf 
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This chapter shall trace the history of colonialism and sovereignty, through an analysis of the 
different jurisprudential theories on sovereignty and colonialism i.e. natural law theory, 
positivist theory, and the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) theory on 
the colonial origins of international law as advanced by Anghie. This shall be done in order 
to understand which theory best captures the reaction by African states to the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction by European states and to efforts by the ICC to bring African leaders to 
account for alleged human rights violations.  
This analysis is of practical and academic relevance for a number of reasons. African 
discontent with regards to universal jurisdiction as exercised by European states, and to the 
work of the ICC in Africa appears to be growing now more than ever before. Recently 
African states under the auspices of the AU have expressed this discontent through a number 
of decisions passed by the AU Assembly. In these decisions, African states expressed their 
concern that universal jurisdiction was being abused by European states, and that the ICC 
was unfairly targeting African leaders.129 On 12th October 2013, the AU held an extraordinary 
summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia to discuss the possible mass withdrawal of AU member 
states from the Rome statute of the ICC.130 Although this summit did not result in the actual 
withdrawal of AU member states from the Rome statute, the General Assembly did pass a 
decision reiterating AU concerns regarding the perceived misuse of indictments against 
sitting African Heads of State.131 
As was stated in Chapter One South Africa, Gambia and Burundi announced their intention 
to withdraw from the ICC in October 2016.Burundi formally withdrew from the Rome 
Statute in October 2017. It shall be asserted in this chapter that African discontent with the 
ICC, and with the application of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities, which has 
now manifested in the intended withdrawal from the Rome statute by some African 
                                                                                                                                                       
(accessed 28/6/2018).See also B Deng ‘The Evolving Concept and Institution of Sovereignty: Challenges and 
Opportunities’ Africa Institute of SA(AISA) Policy brief no 28 June 2010 2. 
129 For a detailed account of the Decisions of the AU General Assembly see generally D Tladi ‘The African 
Union and the ICC: The battle for the soul of International Law’ (2009) 34 SAYIL 57. For an assessment of 
African concerns regarding the perceived abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction by African states, see 
generally Jalloh ‘Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription?’ 
130 See S Derso ‘The AU’s Extraordinary Summit Decisions on Africa-ICC Relationship’ EJIL Talk 
(28/10/2013) available at www.ejiltalk.org/the-aus-extraordinary-summit-decisions-on-africa-icc-relationship/ 
(accessed 28/6/2018). 
131 See AU Assembly Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
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countries, and the actual withdrawal by Burundi, is because African states are still very 
sensitive to the issue of colonialism.132 It shall be argued in the chapter that Anghie’s theory 
on the historical link between colonialism and sovereignty is the one which best mirrors the 
position of African states who view international criminal justice as being neo-colonial. 
It shall also be argued that the reason why African states have been turning away from the 
ICC and turning to universal jurisdiction on the continent is because the ICC has extended 
the application and understanding of the principle of complementarity. Rather than being a 
court of last resort which would give primacy to national courts, as initially envisaged during 
the negotiations on the Rome Statute and during the early days of the Court, the ICC is now 
actively selecting high profile cases to prosecute regardless of whether or not the domestic 
courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute.133This has arguably resulted in the efforts by 
African states to invoke domestic jurisdiction in order to avoid the jurisdiction of the ICC 
and its expanded understanding of complementarity. 
2.2  THE MEANING OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY  
In order to examine the relationship between international criminal law and sovereignty in 
Africa as seen through the lens of the application of the principles of universal jurisdiction 
and personal immunities, and the relationship between Africa and the ICC, it is important to 
first understand the historical origins, evolution of and meaning of the doctrine of state 
sovereignty. 
The doctrine of state sovereignty is regarded as a fundamental rule of international law by a 
number of scholars. The significance of this doctrine in international law was summed up by 
Perrez, who argued that, 
 international law is based on the principle of sovereignty, that sovereignty is the most important 
if not the only structural principle of international law that shapes the content of nearly all rules 
of international law, that the international legal order is merely an expression of the uniform 
principle of external sovereignty, that sovereignty is the criterion for membership in the 
                                                 
132See Jalloh ‘Universal Jurisdiction Universal Prescription?’ 62 arguing that ‘Simply put, African states are 
highly sensitive about their relationship with former colonists such as France, Germany and Belgium...This 
point seems to be lost on the European judges and lawyers involved in universal jurisdiction cases.’ 
133 For an overview of this issue see generally P McAuliffe ‘From Watchdog to Workhorse: Explaining the 
ICC’s Burden Sharing Policy as an Example of Creeping Cosmopolitanism’ (2014)13 Chinese J of Int L 264. 
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international society, and that sovereignty in sum is the ‘cornerstone of international law’ and the  
‘controlling principle’ of world order.134 
This view is shared by Ferreira-Snyman and Bodley, who have both asserted that the doctrine 
of state sovereignty is an important aspect of international law.135 Although the importance of 
the doctrine itself is not in dispute, its meaning has been interpreted differently by a number 
of scholars, and it has undergone considerable transformation since its inception. One of the 
main reasons for this change is, according to Nagan and Haddad, because ‘…changes take 
place when the very concept itself means different things to different professions, disciplines 
and political cultures.’136 
The doctrine of state sovereignty has been defined differently by a number of scholars. 
According to Kelsen, sovereignty is ‘…a special quality of the state, the quality of being a 
supreme power or supreme order of human behaviour.’137 Crawford defines the doctrine as 
the ‘…totality of international rights and duties recognised by international law.’138 Bodley 
defines sovereignty as the inviolable rights which all states enjoy at international law by 
virtue of their statehood, and the status of equality with all other states.139 Cassese concisely 
defined state sovereignty as the power of a state to exercise its functions of statehood within 
its territorial boundaries, independent of interference from other states, and the rights that 
states have at international law, including the right to claim immunity for their officials from 
the jurisdiction of foreign courts.140 
                                                 
134  Perrez Cooperative Sovereignty from Independence to Interdependence in International Environmental Law 
13. See also A Anghie ‘LatCrit and Twail’ (2011) 42:2 Art 5 California Western Int LJ 312. 
135 Ferreira-Snyman ‘The Evolution of State Sovereignty: A Historical Overview’10; Bodley ‘Weakening the 
Principle of Sovereignty in International Law: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’ 
417. 
136 W Nagan & A Haddad ‘Sovereignty in Theory and Practice’ (2011-2012) San Diego Int LJ 429, 438.See also 
Deng ‘The Evolving Concept and Institution of Sovereignty: Challenges and Opportunities’1, and Ferreira-
Snyman ibid 2. This thesis is concerned with the meaning of sovereignty in the legal sense, although it is 
acknowledged that the doctrine is relevant to other disciplines such as international relations and political 
studies. 
137   Kelsen ‘Sovereignty and International Law’ 627. 
138  Crawford The Creation of States in International Law 26. 
139  Bodley ‘Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law’ 417. 
140 Cassese International Law in a Divided World 130.See also B Fassbender ‘Sovereignty and 
Constitutionalism in International Law’ in N Walker (ed) Sovereignty in Transition (2003) 115 explaining that 
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Sovereignty therefore constitutes both rights and duties for states. According to Bodley, for a 
state to be deemed sovereign it must satisfy the attributes of statehood which are ‘1) 
permanent population; 2) defined territory; 3) government; and 4) the capacity to enter into 
relations with other states.’141 When a state enters into relations with other states, its 
sovereignty in a sense becomes limited. It is pertinent to note that a distinction has been 
drawn between internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty refers to 
the power of the state to exercise its functions of statehood within its territory .External 
sovereignty on the other hand refers to the independence of a state from foreign interference 
in its exercise of statehood.142 In the Island of Palmas Case, the arbitrator Max Huber 
elaborated on the meaning of external sovereignty when he explained that ‘Sovereignty in the 
relation between states signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the 
globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a 
State.’143 In line with the purpose of this thesis the focus shall be on external rather than 
internal sovereignty.144 
2.2.1 The rise and decline of the concept of absolute sovereignty 
The origins of the doctrine of sovereignty can be traced back to the 17th Century Peace of 
Westphalia. This comprised two treaties which were signed in Westphalia in 1648 to end a 
thirty year war in Europe and thereby achieve peace, security and political stability for the 
region.145 The Westphalian state system had its basis on the absolute sovereignty of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
sovereignty refers to the rights and duties of a state, and J Maftei ‘Sovereignty in International Law’ (2015) 11: 
1 Acta Universitas Danubius Juridica 54, 54-56. 
141 Bodley ‘Weakening the Principle of Sovereignty in International Law’ 418 footnote 4. See also Deng ‘The 
Evolving Concept and Institution of Sovereignty’ 2 citing the basic characteristics of a state as permanent 
population, defined territory and functioning government. 
142  Ferreira-Snyman ‘The Evolution of State Sovereignty’ 4; B Fassbender ‘Article 2 (1)’ in B Simma (ed) The 
Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2002) 84. 
143 RIAA (1928) 829, 839. 
144 Concerns raised by African states with respect to the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction by 
European states against African state officials, and international criminal law as a whole, have in part been 
based on the claim that European countries do not respect the sovereignty of African states thereby unduly 
interfering in the affairs of African states. 
145 See Ferreira-Snyman ‘The Evolution of State Sovereignty’ 9 (explaining that there were two treaties which 
were concluded in this respect, the Treaty of Munster and the Treaty of Osnabruck) and Deng ‘The Evolving 
Concept and Institution of Sovereignty’2. 
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individual member states.146 It ought to be noted however that even before the Peace of 
Westphalia, some scholars were already writing on sovereignty. The 16th century scholar 
Jean Bodin, for instance, defined sovereignty as ‘…the absolute and perpetual power of a 
commonwealth…’According to Bodin, this power could only be limited by ‘natural laws and 
the laws of God’147  
It has been argued that the origins of the notion of absolute sovereignty can be attributed to 
Bodin’s work.148 The Peace of Westphalia was however a significant event in the 
development of the doctrine of state sovereignty as it established a system of governance 
based on the sovereign equality of states.149  This was contrary to the previous situation where 
there was a hierarchy of states based on their religion and form of government. European 
States were hence considered to be of equal standing regardless of the form of religion 
practiced by their people or the type of government. This principle of the sovereign equality 
of states formed the basis of modern international law and was later codified in article 2(1) of 
the United Nations Charter.150 
There has been considerable debate amongst scholars as to whether or not absolute 
sovereignty is still a part of modern international law. Some scholars have considered 
sovereignty to be the absolute power possessed by the state. Jean Bodin argued that 
‘…sovereignty, as the supreme power within a state, cannot be restricted except by the laws 
of God and by natural law.’151  Dixon defined sovereignty as ‘…the most extensive form of 
                                                 
146 See Ferreira-Snyman ibid 9. See also Perrez Cooperative Sovereignty from Independence to Interdependence 
in the Structure of International Environmental Law 22. 
147See Nagan and Haddad ‘Sovereignty in Theory and Practice’438; Ferreira-Snyman ibid 5; J Franklin(Ed) 
1992 Bodin on Sovereignty. 
148 Ferreira-Snyman ibid 9-10 
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151  Franklin Bodin on Sovereignty Book I Chapter 8. 
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jurisdiction. In general terms, it denotes full and unchallengeable power over a piece of 
territory and all the persons from time to time therein.’152 
 It has been argued by Bodley that absolute sovereignty has never existed in the practical 
sense, but that it has only been part of international law in theory.153 Bodley cites the creation 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as evidence that 
sovereignty is not absolute and that it is actually on the decline.154 Ferreira-Snyman argues 
that the notion of absolute sovereignty is now obsolete, because since the beginning of the 
20th Century, the accepted view is that absolute sovereignty threatens the peaceful 
coexistence of states.155 
It is submitted that state sovereignty is indeed weakening as a result of the rise of 
international criminal law whose emphasis is on ensuring individual accountability for 
human rights violations.156 Those individuals such as Heads of State, who would previously 
not have been called to account for their actions on the basis that no state may interfere in the 
internal affairs of another, are increasingly coming under the spotlight for alleged atrocities. 
An example of this is the exercise of universal jurisdiction against African state officials by 
European states. For instance, in November 2006 a French investigative judge indicted nine 
Rwandan officials, three of whom were considered by the Rwandan government to be 
immune from such indictment.157 
In addition, the incumbent Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir was indicted by the ICC in 
2009.158 The ICC has also confirmed charges against the incumbent Kenyan President Uhuru 
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154 Ibid 417. 
155 Ferreira-Snyman ‘The Evolution of State Sovereignty’ 1, and 12-13. 
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Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto.159 Charges against Kenyatta were subsequently 
withdrawn in December 2014 due to lack of evidence, and the case against Ruto was 
terminated at the end of the prosecution case in April 2016.160 African states under the 
auspices of the AU have raised a number of concerns with regard to the application of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction by European states, and have also voiced their discontent 
with the ICC following the indictment of Omar Al Bashir and the confirmation of charges 
against Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto.161 
An examination of the concerns raised by African states with regard to the application of the 
principles of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities reflects how African states and 
European states respectively seem to have a different understanding of the doctrine of 
sovereignty. As Deng has explained, ‘…actors make sovereignty what they want it to be.’162 
Although it is agreed that sovereignty is a fundamental doctrine in international law, it does 
not have a universal meaning as it is interpreted differently by different states. African states 
seem to understand sovereignty as an absolute concept which ought to prevail at all times 
regardless of the circumstances. In the context of the application of personal immunities, 
African states are seemingly of the view that personal immunities ought to apply regardless 
of the nature of the crime that an individual is alleged to have committed, thereby suggesting 
that sovereignty remains absolute.  
                                                 
159 See The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC 01/09-02/11 Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
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In the case of Al Bashir and Kenyatta, the AU raised a concern that the ICC had initiated 
proceedings against sitting Heads of State who are entitled to immunity both under 
customary international law and article 98 of the Rome statute.163 European states on the other 
hand seem to be of the view that personal immunities ought to give way to principles 
promoting accountability such as universal jurisdiction in cases where an individual is 
alleged to have committed international crime.164 This suggests that sovereignty is no longer 
absolute. It is pertinent to note at this point that one of the reasons why there is growing 
African discontent with the ICC is because African states have pushed unsuccessfully for the 
inclusion of an immunity provision in the Rome statute.165 
The difference in understanding of the sovereignty doctrine between African states and 
European states has led to tensions between the two sides, with African states claiming that 
universal jurisdiction, and international criminal law in general, is the new tool by which 
Western states seek to continue the legacy of colonialism in Africa.166 This claim has however 
been discredited by a number of writers. Megret, for instance argues, within the context of 
indictments of African officials by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
ICC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), that the claim that international criminal 
justice is neo- colonial is not justified because of, inter alia, ‘…the presence of many 
Africans at the tribunals, significant African public opinion and civil society support for their 
action…’167 
This does not however mean that the concerns raised by African states are completely 
baseless and ought to be dismissed without being given due consideration. In order to 
understand where African states are coming from, it is important to examine their concerns in 
the context of the history of colonialism and sovereignty. This shall be done through a 
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critique of Anghie’s theory on the historical link between colonialism and the development 
of the doctrine of sovereignty. 
2.3  JURISPRUDENTIAL THEORIES ON THE HISTORY AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGNTY 
The history of state sovereignty can best be understood from a jurisprudential analysis of the 
natural law theory, positivist theory and TWAIL theory on the subject, and a critique of the 
relevance of these theories to contemporary international law. Scholars belonging to the 
different schools of thought interpreted the meaning of sovereignty differently. This is 
because the different jurisprudential theories were prevalent at different periods of the 
development of international law, and each theory was developed in response to the events 
which were taking place at that time.168 
2.3.1 The natural law and positivist theories 
The natural law theory was prevalent from the 16th century until approximately the 18th 
century. The main aspects of this theory were that it was closely linked to the principles of 
justice, it had its roots in religion and it was predicated upon the notion of the universality of 
law. Proponents of the natural law theory attributed sovereignty to human reason and to 
natural law, and asserted that law was administered by an overarching morality which all 
states had to obey.169  Jean Bodin, a 16th century French jurist argued that sovereignty could 
only be limited by ‘…the laws of God and natural law.’170 Francisco de Vitoria, a 16th century 
Spanish jurist, argued that the ius gentium derived from natural law and human reason hence 
it was applicable to all humans.171 
 Hugo Grotius, a 17th century Dutch scholar, attributed law to reason. Like Bodin and Vitoria, 
he argued that the ius gentium was the primary source of international law. Contrary to Bodin 
and Vitoria however, Grotius drew a distinction between the ius gentium and international 
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law based on the consent of states.172 Notwithstanding this, Grotius maintained that 
international law was applicable to all sovereign states even though its application depended 
upon the consent of states.173 As rightly argued by Anghie therefore’, ‘Nominally at least, 
under the system of naturalism both European and non-European societies were bound by the 
universal law which was the foundation of international law.174 
Francisco de Vitoria’s lecture De Indis Novitre Inventis is arguably the most significant text 
in the context of the early history of the relationship between the development of the doctrine 
of sovereignty and colonialism. De Indis was based on the interactions between the Spanish 
people and the newly discovered Indians .Vitoria’s work was published before the signing of 
the Peace of Westphalia, hence religion played an important role in determining whether or 
not a state could be regarded as sovereign.175 At that time, the discovery of the Indian people 
by Christopher Columbus and the ensuing encounter between the Spanish, who were 
considered to be sovereign, and the Indians, who were considered to be lacking in any rights 
because they were, among other things, ‘barbaric’, raised important questions including what 
law was the appropriate one to deal with the encounter between the two sides as their 
societies and cultures were totally different.176 
In dealing with this issue, Vitoria rejected the notion that non-Christians could not enjoy any 
rights or own property by virtue of their status as non-believers.177  He argued that although 
the authority of the Pope was not applicable to the Indians as they did not practice the 
Christian faith, they were bound by natural law which applied to all human beings. 
Describing the Indians, Vitoria said 
the true state of the case is that they are not of unsound mind, but have, according to their kind, 
the use of reason. This is clear, because there is a certain method in their affairs, for they have 
polities which are orderly arranged and they have definite marriage and magistrates, overlords, 
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laws and workshops, and a system of exchange, all of which call for the use of reason: they also 
have a kind of religion. Further, they make no error in matters which are self-evident to others: 
this is witness to their use of reason.178 
Vitoria then proceeded to argue that because they possessed human reason, the Indians were 
bound by the ius gentium, which is the universal natural law applicable to all nations. Vitoria 
is regarded as a champion of indigenous and Indian rights for his refusal to treat the Indians 
as ‘animals.’ There is however a contradiction between his rejection of the notion that the 
Indians lacked any rights because they did not practice Christianity, and his assertion that 
they could not be classified as sovereign because although they possessed human reason, 
they did not meet the European standard of civilization.179 For this reason, his work is 
considered to have been complicit in the invasion of Indian Territory by the Spanish.180 In this 
regard, it is submitted that contrary to arguments advanced by some scholars that Vitoria’s 
De Indis established the notion of sovereignty beyond European states, his arguments 
concerning the Indian people’s standard of civilisation do not suggest that he regarded the 
Indians to be sovereign.181 
On the contrary, Vitoria regarded the Indians as being non-sovereigns.182  In his discussion on 
the law of just war in De Indis, he explained that it would be justifiable for the Spaniards to 
wage war on the Indians on the basis of Indian resistance of the occupation of their territory 
by the Spaniards, as this would be a breach of the law of nations.183 In this regard, Vitoria 
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asserted that the laws of war which made it unlawful to enslave women and children were not 
applicable to the Indians.184 According to Vitoria, 
And so when the war is at that pass that the indiscriminate spoliation of all enemy-subjects alike 
and the seizure of all their goods is justifiable, then it is also justifiable to carry all enemy-
subjects off into captivity, whether they be guilty or guiltless. And inasmuch as war with pagans 
of this type, seeing that it is perpetual and that they can never make amends for the wrongs and 
damages they have wrought, it is indubitably lawful to carry off both the children and women of 
Saracens into captivity and slavery.185 
Although Vitoria had earlier on argued that the Indians should not be classified as ‘animals’ 
as they were of sound mind and therefore the ius gentium ought to apply to them equally as it 
did to the Spaniards, he considered them to be excluded from the realm of international law 
due to their being non-sovereigns.186 Anghie has asserted that Vitoria’s argument that the 
occupation of the Indian Territory by the Spaniards was justified was based on the notion of 
the cultural difference which existed between the Indians and the Spaniards, and it is this 
cultural difference which shaped his perception on the doctrine of sovereignty.187  Anghie has 
noted in this regard that, 
In summary, then, there are two essential ways in which sovereignty relates to the Indian: in the 
first place, the Indian is excluded from the sphere of sovereignty; in the second place, it is the 
Indian who acts as the object against which the powers of sovereignty may be exercised in the 
most extreme ways.188 
Vitoria’s refusal to consider the Indians as a sovereign people is indicative of how naturalists 
viewed non-European communities. With the exception of Vitoria, natural law jurists did not 
even raise the issue of whether non-European communities could be considered as sovereign 
or not. They did not even consider that non-European communities could have sovereignty 
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apply to them. To the naturalists, it was unimaginable that non-European states could be 
sovereign. 
Vitoria’s work is still important in tracing the development of the doctrine of sovereignty 
through the colonial encounter. De Indis gives credence to Anghie’s assertion that the 
doctrine of sovereignty was constituted through colonialism. Although Vitoria first rejects 
the notion of regarding Indians as ‘animals’ and submits that the ius gentium should equally 
apply to them as it does to the Spanish people, he then goes on to elaborate on the reasons 
why they cannot be regarded to be fully sovereign and why they need to be transformed by 
the Spanish. It is submitted that, as has been rightly argued by Valenzuela-Vermehren, 
Vitoria’s work is still as relevant in modern day international law as it was in the 16th 
century.189 Through his lecture, De Indis, we are able to trace the primitive origins of the link 
between sovereignty and colonialism. As was aptly observed by Anghie, ‘The colonial 
encounter is central to the formulation of Vitoria’s jurisprudence whose significance extends 
to our own times.’190 
2.3.2 19th century: Positivism and the distinction between the civilised states and 
uncivilised communities 
The jurisprudential theory of positivism has been prevalent from the 19th century, and it 
continues to be the dominant theory in international law, having emphatically replaced the 
natural law theory in the late 19th century.191  Contrary to the natural law theory which 
asserted that the law applied universally to non-European and European people, positivism 
insisted on drawing a distinction between civilised and uncivilised states. Positivist scholars 
rejected the notion postulated by natural law jurists that there was an overarching morality 
which administered the law to all sovereigns, and instead asserted that the  law was the 
creation of the sovereign itself, which was regarded as the principle actor in international 
law.192 Positivist jurists also asserted that the sovereign could only be bound by those rules to 
which it had consented, and in this vein rejected the natural law theory on the basis that it did 
not take into account the will of states in international law. 
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It is pertinent to note at this point that some positivist scholars tried to bridge the gap 
between the natural law theory and the positivist theory. For instance, James Lorimer, whilst 
acknowledging that international law was constituted by treaties and customs, went on to 
argue that the law had its basis on the law of nature and that its objective was that ‘…of 
securing and furthering liberty.’193 According to Anghie, Lorimer emphasised on the 
interdependence of the law of nations and natural law. Jurists from the late 19th Century 
however, sought to reject all aspects of the natural law theory. One of the leading jurists of 
the time, Lassa Oppenheim, argued that it was no longer justifiable to continue with the 
teaching of natural law, due to its perceived shortcomings.194 
Positivist scholars insisted on drawing a distinction between the civilised (European) states 
and uncivilised (non-European) communities, asserting that the law applied only to the 
civilised states belonging to the family of nations.195  In this regard, positivists rejected the 
natural law theory on the basis that it failed to make this distinction. The positivists regarded 
international law to be applicable only to the civilised states, thereby rejecting the naturalist 
theory’s notion that the ius gentium, derived from human reason, applied to all humankind. 
Henry Wheaton argued that the law did not apply equally to Europeans, who were considered 
to be civilised and therefore sovereign, and to non-Europeans, who were considered to be 
uncivilised and therefore not sovereign. In making this argument, Wheaton said, 
Is there a uniform law of nations? There certainly is not the same one for all the nations and 
states of the world. The public law, with slight exceptions, has always been and still is, limited to 
the civilized and Christian people of Europe or to those of European origin.196 
Anghie has argued that the cultural and societal differences between the European and non-
European people, which he refers to as the ‘dynamic of difference’ was evident to both the 
natural law and the positivist jurists. This is highlighted by Vitoria’s De Indis, in which 
Vitoria acknowledged the cultural differences between the Spanish people and the newly 
discovered Indians. However, it is the method by which the naturalists and positivists 
attempted to bridge this gap that is different. Vitoria, whilst asserting that the Indians did not 
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practice a standard of civilisation which measured up to that of the Spanish, rejected the 
notion that they were ‘animals’, insisting that they possessed human reason and that the ius 
gentium applied to them just as it applied to the Spanish. On the other hand, the positivist 
scholars asserted that the way to bridge the gap between the civilised Europeans and the 
uncivilised non-Europeans was by imposing the European law over the non-Europeans.197  
John Westlake, for example, justified the occupation of non-European people’s land by the 
Europeans by saying that, ‘The occupation by uncivilised tribes of a tract, of which according 
to our habits a small part ought to have sufficed for them, was not felt to interpose a serious 
obstacle to the right of the first civilised occupant.’198 
African political communities and other non-European communities were therefore excluded 
from the realm of international law because they were considered to be uncivilised and that 
they were too simple to comprehend the meaning of the concept of sovereignty. They were 
therefore not recognised as sovereign states.199 During the 19th century, non-Europeans were 
referred to using derogatory language which was meant to emphasise their perceived 
backwardness and lack of civilisation. Derogatory words such as ‘barbarians’ and ‘savages’ 
were commonly used to refer to non-Europeans. Lorimer, for instance, writing on the subject 
of the partial recognition of non-European communities, said, 
He[the international jurist]is not bound to apply the positive law of nations to savages, or even to 
barbarians ,as such; but he is bound to ascertain the points at which, and the directions in which, 
barbarians or savages come within the scope of partial recognition.200 
This demeaning language, according to Anghie, was part of the positivist scholars’ strategy 
to subordinate non-European communities and thereby justify the colonial confrontation as 
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one which was legitimate, on the basis that the non-Europeans needed guidance as they were 
too backward to understand and manage legal systems.201 
As a result of this perception by European states of non-Europeans being ‘barbarians, 
savages’, non-Europeans were not consulted at all even on matters that affected them 
directly. A good example of this scenario is the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.The main 
agenda of this conference was the partitioning of Africa, and how the European states were to 
deal with the scramble for Africa which was threatening to disrupt the peace between 
European states. Although this conference was about African would-be states, the Africans 
themselves were neither consulted nor informed that such a conference was to take place.202 
Africans were therefore considered to be irrelevant in the scheme of international law, their 
opinion was not important. Anghie has rightly argued that this distinction between civilised 
and uncivilised states was the positivists’ way of managing and justifying the colonial 
confrontation.203 
2.3.3 Positivism and the definition of sovereignty 
As has been discussed above, one of the main aspects of the positivist theory on law and 
sovereignty was that it regarded sovereignty to be central to the system of international law. 
In this regard, positivist jurists were preoccupied with trying to explain why the non-
European communities which were considered to be uncivilised could not be sovereign. This 
is contrary to the natural law theory which, due to its focus on the law applying universally, 
was not concerned with defining sovereignty. According to Anghie, ‘Such a project of 
definition was not so fundamental to the naturalist framework as that jurisprudence outlined a 
system of law which applied to all human activity, whether of an individual or a sovereign.’204 
                                                 
201 See Anghie ‘The Evolution of International Law’745 explaining that one of the main aspects of positivism in 
the 19th Century is the way positivist scholars came up with principles that employed ‘…explicitly racial and 
cultural criteria …’to distinguish between civilised states and the uncivilised communities. See also Gevers 
‘Back to the Future?’ 119, explaining that on the basis that the non-European communities were considered as 
‘barbarians’ they were totally excluded from the ‘emerging family of nations.’ 
202  See U Umozurike International Law and Colonialism in Africa (1979) 26; Anghie 2007 91; Mutua ‘Why 
Redraw the Map of Africa’ 1127. 
203 Anghie ibid 65-67. 
204 Ibid 56. 
54 
 
Positivist jurists asserted in this regard that the criterion for statehood, and incidentally 
sovereignty, was that of control over territory.205  However, some of the non-European 
communities, such as the African would-be states of Benin, Mali and Ethiopia satisfied this 
criterion as they were highly sophisticated and had control over territory.206 To address this 
dilemma the positivists then added another criteria, that of society. Apart from control over a 
territory, a would-be state had to be civilised in order to be accepted in the family of 
nations.207 
The distinction between the civilised states and uncivilised communities therefore played a 
central role in determining whether or not a would-be state could be accepted into the family 
of nations. It did not matter whether or not a non-European would-be state was considered to 
be completely backward or slightly advanced in terms of civilisation. If it had not been 
accepted into the family of nations that meant that it did not meet the criteria for statehood.208 
In this vein, all non-European communities were excluded from the realm of international 
law as according to positivist jurisprudence, only European states were considered to be 
civilised and any progress by a would-be state in terms of civilisation had to be measured 
against the European standard. As a result, the family of nations was comprised of European 
states only. Commenting on the exclusion of non-Europeans from international law, Anghie 
asserts that the doctrine of sovereignty developed from this distinction. He argues that ‘…the 
constitution of sovereignty doctrine itself was based on this fundamental distinction because 
positivist definitions of sovereignty relied on the premise that civilised states were sovereign 
and uncivilised states were not.’209 
It is submitted that it is this distinction between the civilised states and uncivilised 
communities by the positivist jurists which validates Anghie’s argument that the doctrine of 
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sovereignty was developed through the colonial confrontation. This is because having made 
this distinction between civilised states and uncivilised communities, the positivist scholars 
then articulated ways in which the uncivilised non-European communities could be brought 
into the realm of international law.210 
The positivists devised four basic doctrines by which non-European communities could be 
assimilated into the realm of international law. The non-European communities could be 
integrated into the family of nations through treaty making, colonisation, protectorate 
agreements, and independent non-European communities such as the then Japan and Siam 
could be accepted into the family of nations upon meeting the European standard of 
civilisation.211  When a non-European community was assimilated through colonialism, it was 
then subjected to the sovereignty of the European state which would have colonised it, and 
consequently any state which sought to enter into relations with the colonised community 
would deal not with the indigenous people but the colonisers.212  In this vein, it is asserted that 
the positivist jurisprudence played an active role in legitimising colonialism and the 
dispossession of the non-European communities of their territory by the Europeans.  
The distinction made by positivist scholars between civilised European states and uncivilised 
non-European communities is now obsolete due to the doctrine of sovereign equality of 
states as codified in article 2 (1) the United Nations Charter. Notwithstanding this, there have 
been allegations of double standards regarding the application of international rules along 
colonial lines by scholars, and by the AU. Gevers has discussed this issue of double 
standards in the context of the complementarity provision in the Rome statute, which states 
that the ICC will only deal with a matter if a state is unable or unwilling to deal with it.213  He 
notes that as all cases that the ICC has dealt with are from Africa, complementarity 
challenges have come from African states only and that the ICC has not dealt with this matter 
directly and argues that ‘…when one compares the fairly rigorous standards applied in these 
cases, to the casual manner in which the previous Prosecutor determined - in a sentence - that 
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British war crimes in Iraq were being investigated by the relevant authorities, concern might 
be warranted.’214 
In terms of both domestic and international courts and tribunals therefore, it is evident that a 
higher standard of justice is placed on African states than on their European counterparts.215 
This highlights that although colonialism is now a thing of the past and all states now 
participate equally in international law, the impact of the positivist jurists’ distinction 
between civilised and uncivilised states which then legitimised colonialism, conquest and 
dispossession of non-European states can still be felt in modern day international law. 
African states have claimed that when European states exercise universal jurisdiction against 
African state officials, this evokes memories of colonialism to them. All the aspects of the 
positivism theory including the standard of civilisation are therefore still relevant to modern 
day international law.  
2.3.4 Third Word Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) and Anghie’s Theory 
on the Colonial Origins of International Law 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) originated in the late 1990s.216  Some 
of the fundamental aspects of TWAIL are drawn from the critical legal theory, whose main 
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focus is to show that international law concepts are neither natural nor neutral, but that they 
have been shaped by a history which highlights the reason why they are in their present 
state.217 TWAIL scholars approach international law issues from a critical perspective.218 
The fundamental aspects of TWAIL have arguably been best articulated by Antony Anghie 
in Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law.219 The main focus of 
TWAIL is to bring politics to the centre of international law by examining the colonial 
origins of international law. According to Gathii and other adherents to TWAIL, ‘…while 
international law guarantees sovereign equality and self-determination, it carries forward the 
legacy of imperialism and colonial conquest.’220 
Anghie has asserted that the colonial confrontation between Europeans and non-Europeans is 
the one which shaped international law, particularly the doctrine of sovereignty which is 
regarded as the founding doctrine of international law. He argues in this regard that ‘…no 
adequate account of sovereignty can be given without analysing the constitutive effect of 
colonialism on sovereignty. Colonialism was not an example of the application of 
sovereignty; rather, sovereignty was constituted through colonialism.’221 
The central aspect of Anghie’s theory is that in order to understand the present day structure 
of international law and international relations, it is important to fully consider the colonial 
history, particularly that of the 19th century, and how it had a lasting effect on relations 
between the former colonisers and those who were colonised. The doctrine of sovereignty 
can therefore not be fully understood without comprehending the history of the colonial 
encounter from the discovery of Africa to the decolonisation of the continent and other 
continents such as Asia which suffered the same fate. Anghie explains how the colonial 
encounter constituted sovereignty by critiquing Francisco de Vitoria’s De Indis, highlighting 
that the notion of the standard of civilisation originated long before the 19th Century, the 
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period during which it was legitimised by positivist jurisprudence prevalent at that time.222 He 
then goes on to examine the theory of positivism and how it legitimised the colonial 
encounter by coming up with doctrines to explain the relations between the Europeans who 
were regarded to be civilised and therefore sovereign, and the non-Europeans who were 
considered to be uncivilised and therefore not sovereign. 
Another important aspect of TWAIL is its rejection of the positivist jurists’ Eurocentric 
perception of the origins of international law. Positivist scholars argued that international law 
originated in Europe and it was later spread to non-Europeans when they came into contact 
with the ‘civilised’ Europeans.223 TWAIL scholars however argue that the colonial encounter 
is the one which shaped international law, and that the history of international law is not 
complete without analysing the part played by colonialism in its development. Anghie argues 
that contrary to assertions by some scholars that international law was developed in Europe 
then assimilated in the non-European colonies; it is the colonial confrontation which shaped 
international law. He argues in the context of the development of the doctrine of sovereignty 
that, ‘…sovereignty was improvised out of the colonial encounter, and adopted unique forms 
which differed from and destabilised given notions of European sovereignty.’224 
Anghie also asserts that Vitoria’s De Indis is evidence that contrary to the traditionally 
accepted view, sovereignty was not extended to the non-European states in its Westphalian 
form.225 The peace of Westphalia was therefore not the defining moment for the doctrine of 
sovereignty, but it was the colonial encounter which had a profound effect on this doctrine. 
According to Anghie, 
Clearly, then, Vitoria’s work suggests that the conventional view that sovereignty doctrine was 
developed in the West and then transferred to the non-European world is, in important aspects, 
misleading. Sovereignty doctrine acquired its character through the colonial encounter. This is 
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the darker history of sovereignty which cannot be explored or understood by account of 
sovereignty doctrine assuming the existence of sovereign states.226 
The historical development of international law and its present day nature therefore cannot be 
divorced from the history of colonialism which played a significant part in shaping 
international law. This is so despite the fact that many scholars have attempted to downplay 
the role that colonialism played in shaping international law.227  Anghie has asserted that one 
of the reasons why the colonial encounter was regarded as being peripheral to the 
development of international law is because it did not take place between two sovereign 
states. Rather, it was an encounter between a European sovereign state and a non-European 
community, which would be regarded as not being sovereign and excluded from the realm of 
international law.228 
Contrary to the traditional view that regarded colonialism as being peripheral to the 
development of international law however, colonialism has always been central to the subject 
of international law. According to Gevers, colonialism,  
has and continues to shape international law’s past, present and future in ways that are still being 
articulated today. This is equally true of international criminal law, where colonialism and the 
discipline’s failure to come to terms with it not only haunts its past, but threatens its future.229  
This assertion by Gevers resonates with Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of 
international law, particularly the doctrine of state sovereignty, which is the main focus of 
Anghie’s book. 
TWAIL focuses on the history of international law in order to show that there is a link 
between the older forms of domination particularly colonialism, and the newer forms of 
domination such as governmentality, which have arguably seen Third World countries being 
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subordinate to their First World counterparts.230 The prevailing trends in international law can 
therefore only be understood through an understanding of the historical relationship between 
the European states and non-European states. According to Anghie,   
If, however, the colonial encounter, with all its exclusions and subordinations, shaped the very 
foundations of international law, then grave questions must arise as to whether and how it is 
possible for the postcolonial world to construct a new international law that is liberated from 
these colonial origins.231  
Anghie then explains, using what he terms the ‘dynamic of difference’ which refers to the 
way in which positivist jurists distinguished between civilised European states and 
uncivilised non-European communities, how the colonial encounter was legitimised by the 
positivist language and doctrines. In this regard, the doctrine of sovereignty was not 
developed entirely on a legal basis, but also on the basis of cultural and societal differences.232 
Anghie explains that although positivist scholars emphasised on the primacy of sovereignty, 
the concept of society was equally important to the civilising mission.233 Although the 
‘standard of civilisation’ as articulated by the positivist scholars is now a thing of the past as 
all states freely participate in the international legal system as equal members, remnants of 
this distinction are still manifest in present day international law. Gevers has noted that 
despite the fact that  the ‘standard of civilisation’ is now obsolete in international law, a 
number of scholars have pointed to the application of double standards in international 
criminal law, with different standards seemingly applying to the former colonisers and the 
former colonies respectively.234 
Although colonialism is now a thing of the past, it continues to shape international law. This 
is evident in the way in which African states under the auspices of the AU have claimed that 
when European states exercise universal jurisdiction against African state officials, this 
invokes memories of colonialism to them. African states collectively view international 
criminal law as being neo-colonial. In the context of the indictments of incumbent African 
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leaders by the ICC, African states believe that they are being unfairly targeted because they 
are the politically weaker states. The Rwandan President Paul Kagame said regarding this 
issue, ‘This world is divided into categories, there are people who have the power to use 
international justice or international law to judge others, and it does not apply to them.’235 
It is therefore important to examine the role that colonialism has played in influencing 
present day international law theories and international relations, as seen through the lens of 
the application of international criminal law in Africa. Central to this examination is the issue 
of the misunderstandings between African states and European states with regard to the 
application of the principles of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities, as a result of 
the different ways in which they understand and invoke the doctrine of state sovereignty, and 
the perceived unfair targeting and disregard of the immunities of African leaders by the ICC. 
According to Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of international law, historically non-
European communities were not recognised as being sovereigns. This is because they were 
considered to be uncivilised. In this regard, international law applied only to the civilised 
states, and in the 19th Century this essentially meant international law only applied to 
European states.236 African communities were therefore considered to be, and treated as 
inferior to, their European counterparts.  
This inferior position was manifest in a number of ways. In the context of immunities, 
Gevers and Vrancken have explained that European states used to ensure that their subjects 
were immune from foreign jurisdiction when they travelled to non-European communities. 
However, as these communities were not considered to be sovereign, the immunity was not 
immunity proper as the non-sovereign communities did not have the capacity to confer the 
immunity in question.237  It has further been explained that European states did not seek 
immunity only for state officials, but even for ordinary citizens. The non-Europeans on the 
other hand, were not entitled to this privilege.238 This shows that international law; in 
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particular the doctrine of sovereignty did not apply universally to all states. It only became a 
universal doctrine as a result of colonial expansion, at the end of the 19th century.239 
At the dawn of decolonisation, African states sought to reinforce the doctrine of sovereignty 
in order to avoid external influence on their new found independence. To African states 
therefore, sovereignty is an all-important concept which ought to be strengthened rather than 
eroded. The importance of the doctrine of state sovereignty to non-European states that were 
previously colonised was aptly summed up by Abi-Saab, who asserted that, 
For the newly independent states, sovereignty is the hard won prize of the long struggle for 
emancipation. It is the legal epitome of the fact that they are masters in their own house. It is the 
legal shield against any further domination or intervention by stronger states. They are very 
aware of its existence and importance for, until recently, they were deprived of it.240 
This argument by Abi-Saab resonates with arguments by African states that the perceived 
abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction by European states against African officials is 
an affront to their sovereignty and that it evokes memories of colonialism to African states. 
With respect to the operation of the ICC, there has been controversy surrounding the 
purported immunity that is enjoyed by the five permanent members of the Security Council, 
and their allies such as Israel. African states are of the view that only African situations such 
as Sudan and Libya are being referred, but there is evidence of human rights abuses by 
countries such as America in Iraq and Israel in Gaza, yet these states seem to be untouchable 
to both the Security Council and the ICC241  
These misunderstandings highlight the effects that colonialism has had on the shaping of 
international law. Although the distinction between civilised and non-civilised states as 
advanced by positivist scholars is no longer relevant in modern day international law, it 
remains significant in that it is part of the history which shows that international law has not 
always been universal and neutral. Notwithstanding that international law now applies 
equally to all states, African states are of the view that international criminal law, in 
particular ‘European’ universal jurisdiction, and the ICC, are neo-colonial. 
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As has been mentioned above, one of the aims of TWAIL is to show that the pattern of 
dominance which prevailed during the colonial era is still evident in contemporary 
international law.242  In this vein, Anghie has asserted elsewhere that, ‘The end of colonialism, 
whilst extremely significant, did not result in the end of colonial relations. Rather, in the view 
of Third World societies, colonialism was replaced by neo-colonialism.’243 
Positivist scholars created a doctrine which tried to make sense of the colonial encounter 
thereby legitimising it, and entrenching the idea that non-European peoples were uncivilised 
therefore inferior to the Europeans. African states are still sensitive to the issue of their 
colonial past, where Africans and other non-Europeans were referred to as ‘barbarians, 
savages, backward’ among other derogatory terms.244 It is important to mention at this point 
that when European states exercise universal jurisdiction, or when the members of the 
Security Council exercise their powers of referral under the Rome Statute, they do not tell 
African states that they have less sovereignty, or purport to do so by exercising universal 
jurisdiction against African states officials.  However, because Africans have historically 
been deprived of their sovereignty, they then interpret these actions as showing that the West 
still has power over them, and that their sovereignty is not being respected. This is because 
due to the colonial history as discussed above, the African states’ understanding of 
international law doctrines particularly universal jurisdiction, personal immunities and state 
sovereignty is different from that of European states. As has been argued by Anghie, the 
exercise of sovereignty often mirrors the inequalities that were characteristic of the 19th 
Century.245 
For this reason, African states’ discontent with international criminal law is likely to continue 
for the foreseeable future.  Megret has rightly observed that, ‘The colonial moment will not 
go away that easily because it helped to forge some of the very basic concepts of 
international law.’246 
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It would suffice in this regard to draw a conclusion that African states, weary of their 
colonial past, view international criminal law as a neo-colonial tool which is being utilised by 
Western states to assert their dominance over them. 
As explained by Anghie, the decolonisation process itself was characterised by inequalities, 
and he brings out the continued subordination of the non-European people by giving a 
detailed account of the Mandate System of the League of Nations. 247 The detailed history of 
colonisation, the partitioning of Africa and the Mandate system is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, it ought to be emphasised that all the phases of this history from the 
‘discovery’ of Africa by the Europeans, until decolonisation, are important in unpacking the 
relationship between African states and European states in modern day international law. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
The above discussion on the different jurisprudential theories on sovereignty has highlighted 
that African sovereignty has always been deficient. Non-European states were historically 
denied their sovereignty as they were considered to be uncivilised. At the dawn of 
decolonisation, the distinction between civilised and uncivilised became obsolete as all states 
became equal sovereigns. However, as argued by Anghie the end of colonialism did not 
result in the end to colonial relations. African states therefore sought to reclaim their 
sovereignty which they had been previously denied, as they regarded it as their shield against 
continued domination by their former colonisers. 
When the Organisation of African Unity was formed in 1963, its main purposes included 
defending the territorial sovereignty of its member states and to end colonialism in all its 
forms, thereby ensuring total emancipation for its member states.248 Since the AU replaced the 
OAU in 2002, a number of instruments have been adopted which reiterate Africa’s 
commitment to fight impunity, and respect the sovereignty of its member states. The 
Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted in 2000.This was the first instrument 
which addressed the issue of impunity on the continent, and provided for intervention in a 
member state where there were allegations of international crimes having been committed.249 
The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU was 
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introduced in 2002.It provided for the establishment of the Peace and Security Council and 
empowered it to deploy a peacekeeping mission in a member state without approval from the 
UN Security Council.  
In 2008, the AU introduced the Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
which proposed the merger of the African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human 
and Peoples Rights into a single regional court with a criminal chamber. This chamber would 
have the jurisdiction to try international crimes. The 2008 protocol was amended in 2014 to 
include an immunity provision for Heads of State and other senior state officials. These 
instruments, starting from the Constitutive Act, reiterate that the AU is guided by the 
principle for the respect of the sovereignty of its member states. Intervention in a member 
state is only warranted in cases where there is evidence of the crimes of genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity having been committed, as provided in article 4 (h) of the 
Constitutive Act.  
As has been explained in the introduction to this chapter, African states have expressed their 
concern in various decisions of the AU Assembly, on the perceived abuse of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction by European states. African states have claimed that the indictment of 
African state officials by European states has the effect of undermining their sovereignty.250 In 
addition, African states have also expressed their misgivings towards the perceived unfair 
targeting of African leaders by the ICC, which they view as neo-colonial. In order to avoid 
the jurisdiction of the ICC, and universal jurisdiction as practiced by European states, 
African states under the auspices of the AU have embarked on a project to reaffirm their 
sovereignty by strengthening their own justice systems. The stated commitment by the AU to 
fight impunity is therefore part of efforts by the AU to reassert sovereignty for its member 
states, by strengthening the justice mechanisms on the continent so that issues of impunity 
can be dealt with by African states without interference from non-African states.251  
As this thesis shall argue in Chapter Four, the push by African states for universal 
jurisdiction takes place against the background of Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of 
international law. The rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa since 2002 when South Africa 
became the first African country to domesticate the Rome Statute is a reaffirmation of 
sovereignty by African states in order to avoid unwarranted interferences in the name of 
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international criminal justice. Since 2002, a number of African states have enacted universal 
jurisdiction legislation and these include Kenya, Uganda, Mauritius, Senegal and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Senegal amended its Penal Code and Criminal Procedure 
Code in 2007 to provide a framework for the prosecution of Hissene Habre. This led to the 
establishment of the Extraordinary African Chambers in 2013 and ultimately to the 
successful trial and conviction of Habre in 2016, based solely on universal jurisdiction. 
Universal jurisdiction has therefore gained ground in Africa because African states want to 
reclaim their sovereignty.252 As Williams has explained, ‘The AU has become increasingly 
opposed to international criminal justice in general, and places a strong emphasis on the 
sovereignty of its member states.’253 
With respect to the perceived unfair targeting of African state officials by the ICC, the AU 
has also claimed that this undermines the sovereignty of its member states. In 2009, the AU 
Assembly adopted a decision on non-cooperation with the ICC following the indictment of 
incumbent Sudanese president Omar Al Bashir in 2009.254 As Africa’s discontent with the 
work of the ICC in Africa grows, there have been calls for a mass withdrawal from the Rome 
Statute by African states. 
 Following the confirmation of proceedings against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and 
his deputy William Ruto by the ICC, Kenya has been at the forefront of calling for African 
states to withdraw from the ICC. In 2016 South Africa, Gambia and Burundi announced their 
intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the ICC, and South Africa and Gambia later 
revoked their withdrawal notices in 2017. The question to be asked in this regard is why 
African states, which at the inception of the ICC were very supportive of the court, have 
become critical of the court and are now pushing for universal jurisdiction on the continent as 
an alternative to ICC jurisdiction. African states, which had at the inception of the court been 
very supportive of the court, are increasingly becoming weary of its efforts to deal with 
impunity on the continent and have indicated a desire to withdraw from this court. A project 
                                                 
252 See Perrez-Leon-Acevedo ‘The conviction of Hissene Habre by the Extraordinary African Chambers in the 
Senegalese Courts’. 
253 S Williams ‘The Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese Courts: An African Solution to an 
African Problem?’ (2013)11 J of Int Criminal Justice 1139, 1148. 
254 See Decision on the Meeting of African State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), Assembly/AU/Dec 245(XIII) July 2009. See also Tladi ‘The African Union and the ICC: The Battle for 
the Soul of International Law’ 57. 
67 
 
which was initially welcomed within the continent is now being viewed with scepticism as a 
neo-colonial tool. 
It is submitted that the reason why African states welcomed the idea of an international 
criminal court at the beginning is because to African states, the ICC represented international 
justice that was not in any way influenced by Western states as it was envisaged to be an 
independent Court. To African states therefore, supporting the ICC was a way of reclaiming 
their sovereignty by avoiding universal jurisdiction as practiced by European states and 
subjecting themselves to a court which would give primacy to national courts through its 
principle of complementarity. During the negotiations on the Rome Statute, and in its early 
days, the emphasis lay on the court being a court of last resort. McAuliffe has explained that 
at the beginning, the primary role of the ICC would be to ensure that States fulfilled their 
obligations under the Rome Statute. However, although on paper the Court is a court of last 
resort, which is supposed to initiate proceedings only when domestic courts with jurisdiction 
are unable or unwilling to prosecute, in practice the court has ceased to play a monitoring 
role and is now actively selecting high level cases to prosecute, leaving the lower level cases 
to national jurisdictions.255 
This policy shift is highlighted by the contrasting views expressed by two judges of the ICC. 
In 2004 the first President of the ICC Judge Philippe Kirsch asserted that,  
It is only in extreme cases that the international community should intervene. Normally there 
should be no reason to intervene…The business of the court is not to second-guess domestic 
prosecutions. The ICC is not after prosecutions.256 
In contrast, Judge Mario Politi in 2011 said, 
What is then, the ultimate purpose of complementarity? There is no doubt that one important 
goal is to establish a division of labour between national jurisdictions and the ICC ,under which 
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the Court should essentially concentrate on those who have major responsibility for the crimes 
involved.257  
This reflects a policy shift from the ICC being a court of last resort with a monitoring role to 
one which circumvents the sovereignty of states and is actively involved in prosecutions 
regardless of whether or not the domestic courts have shown a willingness to prosecute 
international crimes. According to McAuliffe, ‘The old orthodox that the court would operate 
in a merely residual manner as a ‘last resort’ or as a ‘safety net’ may now represent the 
minority view.’258 
It is this shift in policy which has arguably resulted in the fallout between African states and 
the ICC, in addition to the perceived double standards on complementarity with respect to 
African states, as discussed above. 
The question to be asked then in this regard is why when the ICC has had such bad press 
African states seem to be keen on universal jurisdiction. It is submitted that the answer to this 
question is that African states are pushing for universal jurisdiction because the ICC has 
failed them. The ICC has expanded the application and understanding of the principle of 
complementarity. It has ceased to play a monitoring role and has become actively involved in 
selecting high level cases to prosecute. The policy shift on the part of the ICC as explained 
above shows that the ICC just assumes that it can override the sovereignty of individual 
states. This does not sit well with African states because one of the main reasons why 
African states supported the ICC in the beginning was because they wanted to reaffirm their 
sovereignty by engaging with a court which they perceived to be free from the influence of 
the Western states and which would give primacy to domestic courts, thereby respecting their 
sovereignty. As the ICC has arguably done the opposite of this, African states are now 
seeking an alternative to the jurisdiction of the ICC as evidenced by the recent trial of 
Hissene Habre by the EAC in Senegal. 
This chapter has examined the different jurisprudential theories on the development of the 
sovereignty doctrine. It is submitted that any discussion of the relationship between 
sovereignty and universal jurisdiction and personal immunities in Africa would be 
incomplete without a consideration of how the colonial confrontation played a role in the 
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development of the sovereignty doctrine, leading to a different understanding of the doctrine 
between African states and European states.  
In view of the recent developments in international criminal law which have seen some 
African states indicating their intention to withdraw from the Rome statute of the ICC, it is 
therefore important to assess which of the jurisprudential theories that have been discussed 
above best resonates with the reaction of African states to international criminal law. In the 
wake of the notifications for the intended withdrawals by South Africa, Gambia and Burundi, 
a number of scholars have added their voice to the issue of what could be the reason behind 
why the ICC project, which enjoyed novel support from African countries at its inception, 
seems to be slowly crumbling due to African states’ disillusionment with the project.259 
Gevers has argued that in order to understand why Africa seems to have lost its zeal for 
international criminal law, it is important to seriously take into account the impact that the 
colonial and racial history of international law has had on contemporary international law.260 
Any theory that deals with the relations between European states and non-European states, 
without considering international law’s colonial and racial history, is therefore inadequate in 
terms of explaining why African states feel that they are being unfairly targeted. In this 
regard, it is submitted that Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of international law   is the 
one which best resonates with African states’ position regarding international criminal law, 
as seen through the lens of the application of the principles of universal jurisdiction and 
immunities, and the reaction to the work of the ICC in Africa. 
Anghie’s theory takes into account other theories in tracing the colonial origins of 
international law from Vitoria’s De Indis, right through to the 19th Century ‘dynamic of 
difference’ as advanced by the positivist jurists. In so doing, Anghie enables us to answer the 
question as to how international law, which is supposed to be universal and to apply equally 
to all states regardless of their history as either the colonisers or the colonised, is understood 
differently by African and European states respectively. 
African states have indeed taken a collective position that universal jurisdiction as practiced 
by European states, and the ICC are neo-colonial. The announcements by South Africa, 
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Gambia and Burundi of their intention to withdraw from the Rome statute of the ICC can be 
interpreted as a move to counter the perceived unfair targeting of African states by the West. 
Anghie’s theory is in this regard the one which best mirrors the concerns raised by African 
states with regards to international criminal law. The intended withdrawals (and the actual 
withdrawal by Burundi) can also be inferred as the African states’ way of reinforcing their 
sovereignty and avoiding external influence. 
The South African Minister for Justice explained that South Africa would closely cooperate 
with other African countries to strengthen continental mechanisms including the African 
Court on Human and People’s Rights. One of the reasons the minister gave for South 
Africa’s intended withdrawal was that the ICC Act contradicts the provisions of the 
Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act (2001) which provides for the immunities and 
privileges of diplomats and other foreign state officials. This is because both the Rome 
statute and its implementing domestic legislation, the ICC Act, require the arrest and 
surrender of a person who is wanted by the court but who may be immune from such arrest 
under customary international law.261 
In concluding this chapter, it is submitted that the concerns raised by African states with 
respect to the exercise of universal jurisdiction by Western states against African officials, 
and the perceived unfair targeting of African leaders by the ICC, have to be taken clearly and 
given due consideration rather than be brushed away by Western states and the ICC 
respectively.262 As the above examination of Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of 
international law has highlighted, the inequalities which were prevalent during the colonial 
era did not end with the end of colonialism, but the exercise of sovereignty in contemporary 
international law often mirrors the inequalities which were characteristic of the discipline of 
international law during the colonial confrontation.  
As correctly argued by Gevers therefore, in considering the validity of the concerns raised by 
the African states, regard ought to be had to the colonial and racial nature of the history of 
international law.263 African states are still very sensitive to their colonial past hence their 
concerns ought to be evaluated in the context of this history which played a very significant 
part in shaping the important doctrines of international law. Abi-Saab, describing the attitude 
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of the former colonies to international law, averred that, ‘The newly independent states do 
not easily forget that the same body of international law that they are now asked to abide by 
sanctioned their previous subjugation and exploitation and stood as a bar to their 
emancipation.’264 
It is therefore important for these concerns to be considered wholesomely to understand 
where the African states are coming from. In addition, it is important for the European states 
when they do exercise universal jurisdiction, to strive to strike a balance between ensuring 
accountability and respecting the basic tenets of the doctrine of state sovereignty. This would 
address the allegations of double standards in the application of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction by European states. With regards to the ICC, it is hoped that the court will 
seriously consider the recommendations and concerns raised by African states. Perhaps, as 
argued by Woolaver, continued engagement between the Court and African states, 
particularly on the issue of immunities of Heads of State, might result in African states 
reconsidering their stance on withdrawal from the Rome statute.265  
It is hoped that the resolutions adopted by the AU Assembly in its latest decision to request 
the ICJ to render an advisory opinion on immunities before the ICC will help to resolve the 
impasse between the AU and the ICC on this issue. The decision also resolved to request 
African state parties to the ICC to request the Assembly of State parties to convene a working 
group of experts to clarify the relationship between article 27 and 98 of the Rome statute, 
which has been the main source of contention between the AU and the ICC regarding the 
issue of immunities before the Court.266 This is evidence that African states are not totally 
opposed to the ICC but they want their concerns regarding the operation of the Court to be 
taken seriously. 
Discussions within the AU on the mass withdrawal of African states from the Court have 
been ongoing for some time, with reports of a non-binding decision on a mass withdrawal 
strategy having been made at the AU summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on the 31st of January 
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2017. It was however reported that there was no general consensus on the issue, with Senegal 
and Nigeria being opposed to the withdrawal.267 The African Union also wants to engage the 
United Nations on the issue of reforming the ICC. It cannot therefore be concluded that 
African states are totally against the ICC as they are divided on the issue of withdrawal. It is 
however clear that they want their own justice mechanisms which would result in them not 
having to defer matters to the ICC always.268  
In this vein, it is submitted that whilst it would be commendable for Africa to strengthen its 
own justice mechanisms, there are many issues that need to be addressed before the proposed 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights can effectively prosecute international crimes.269 
In the meantime, it would be in the interest of justice for African states and the ICC to 
cooperate in order to effectively combat atrocities on the continent. In this regard, it is argued 
that the ICC should take the views of African states seriously in order for African states to 
cooperate with it. As ICC Judge Eboe-Esuji has warned, ‘It is…not only naïve for the judges 
and Prosecutor of this Court to ignore the views of Heads of State in important questions of 
the day in international affairs, but it is also possibly wrong, as a matter of law, to do so.’270 
It is pertinent to note that the ICC does not practice universal jurisdiction, but it is a court of 
last resort. However, an examination of the African states’ reaction to the work of the ICC is 
important because it mirrors the attitude of African states which collectively view 
international criminal law   as neo-colonialism. Finally, the discussion on the history of 
colonialism and sovereignty has clearly highlighted that the reason why the application of 
international criminal law has resulted in misunderstandings between African states and 
European states are a result of the two different sides not giving the doctrine of sovereignty 
cognisance to the same extent  
                                                 
267  See BBC News 1/2/2017 ‘African Union Back Mass Withdrawals from ICC’ available at 
www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38826073 (accessed 28/6 /2018). 
268 See The Guardian 31/1/2017 ‘African leaders plan mass withdrawal from International Criminal Court’ 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jan/31/african-leaders-plan-mass-withdrawal-from-
international-criminal-court (accessed 28/6/2018). 
269 See H Woolaver ‘International and Domestic Implications of South Africa’s Withdrawal from the ICC.’EJIL 
Talk (24/10/2016) available at www.ejiltalk.org/international-and-domestic-implications-of-south-africas-
withdrawal-from-the-icc (accessed 28/6/2018). 
270 ICC-The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta Decision on Defence Request for Conditional Excusal from 
Continuous Presence at Trial, ICC-01/09-02/11- 830,Separate Further Opinion of Judge Eboe-Esuji. See also 
Gevers ‘Back to the Future?’ 105 
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                                      CHAPTER THREE 
THE RISE AND FALL OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN 
EUROPE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The principle of universal jurisdiction has gone through different phases in its 
implementation. In the 1990s there was the first phase which saw the rise of the principle in 
Europe, then its decline from 2003 following the repeal of universal jurisdiction legislation in 
Belgium. Just as the application of universal jurisdiction was declining in Europe, there was a 
second phase which was the rise of the principle in Africa, beginning in 2002 with the 
enactment of domestic legislation to implement the Rome Statute in South Africa.271 This 
chapter shall examine the first phase of universal jurisdiction, the rise and decline of the 
principle in Europe. 
It has been argued by some scholars that the reason why the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
has often resulted in tensions between states is because universal jurisdiction transcends state 
sovereignty. According to Kontorovich, because universal jurisdiction supersedes the 
concept of state sovereignty, its exercise could lead to conflict between states as the state 
with traditional jurisdiction over a crime may claim that a state exercising universal 
jurisdiction is infringing its sovereignty.272  This has been the situation between African states 
and European states. African states have claimed that the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
over African state officials by European states is an abuse of the principle and that European 
states disregard the sovereignty that African states ought to enjoy at international law.273  
                                                 
271 See the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002.For an 
overview of domestic legislation on universal jurisdiction in Africa; see generally Dube ‘The AU Model Law 
on Universal Jurisdiction’. 
272  Kontorovich ‘The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation’184.For a similar 
view see N Strapatsas ‘Universal Jurisdiction and the International Criminal Court’ (2002) 11 Manitoba LJ 1, 5. 
273 For an overview of the AU concerns regarding the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction by 
European states, see the AU-EU Expert Report on Universal Jurisdiction; and Observations submitted by the 
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It is submitted that the tensions between African states and European states regarding the 
principle of universal jurisdiction ought to be understood in the context of Anghie’s theory 
on the colonial origins of the doctrine of state sovereignty which has been discussed in detail 
in Chapter Two. As there is a doctrinal link between universal jurisdiction and state 
sovereignty, the misunderstandings stemming from the application of universal jurisdiction 
are arguably a result of the differences in understanding of the doctrine of sovereignty 
between African and European states respectively. African states are of the view that the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction against African state officials by European states is an 
infringement of their sovereignty, and has the effect of evoking memories of colonialism.274  
In addition, they   have raised concern that they have been unfairly targeted by European 
states in their exercise of universal jurisdiction. According to AU experts,  
African states take the view that they have been singularly targeted in the indictment and arrest 
of their officials and that the exercise of universal jurisdiction by European States is politically 
selective against them. This raises a concern over double standards…275 
The concerns raised by African states under the auspices of the AU with regards to the 
perceived abuse of the principle of universal jurisdiction have ignited considerable debate 
amongst scholars who have expressed contrasting views as to whether they are justified. It 
shall be argued in this chapter that these concerns should not be dismissed without being 
given due consideration. An examination of the rise and decline of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction in Europe shows that African state officials make up the majority of those against 
whom universal jurisdiction has been exercised by European states.276  In this vein, it is 
submitted that there is indeed evidence of a double standard in the application of 
international criminal law. This perceived double standard has arguably contributed 
significantly to the tension between African states and European states, and between African 
states and the ICC, regarding the application of international criminal justice. It has also 
contributed to the desire by African states to reaffirm their sovereignty by strengthening their 
                                                                                                                                                       
African Union to the Secretary General, The Scope and Application of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, 
Report of the Secretary –General (U. N. Doc. A 66/93, 20/6/2011) para 101-109. 
274 See the AU-EU Expert Report on Universal Jurisdiction   para 37. 
275 Ibid para 34. 
276 See Jalloh ‘Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription?’14 explaining that between the late 1990s and 
2009, courts in Europe have indicted and investigated several African leaders and officials. 
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regional justice mechanisms in order to avoid the jurisdiction of the ICC, and universal 
jurisdiction as practiced by Western states.277 
An examination of the rise and decline of the principle of universal jurisdiction in Europe is 
of both academic and practical relevance. The implementation of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction by European states contributed significantly to the rise of universal jurisdiction in 
Africa, as African states sought to avoid universal jurisdiction as practiced by European 
states. 278 In order to examine the first wave of universal jurisdiction in Europe, jurisdiction in 
its broad sense and the meaning, scope and rationale of the principle of universal jurisdiction 
shall be discussed briefly first. 
3.2 THE MEANING, SCOPE AND RATIONALE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
Universal jurisdiction is the exercise of jurisdiction over a crime by a state which has no 
territorial links with the crime itself, the victims or the alleged perpetrator.279 The rationale 
behind the principle of universal jurisdiction is to ensure that certain international crimes do 
not go unpunished due to territorial limitations in jurisdiction.280 Of all the grounds upon 
which a state may exercise jurisdiction in international law, the exercise of jurisdiction based 
on the universality principle is the most controversial. As has been explained by Gevers and 
Vrancken, many aspects of universal jurisdiction including its origins, conditions for its 
exercise and the crimes over which it can be exercised are controversial.281 
 
                                                 
277 This issue shall be discussed in detail in chapter four. 
278 See for example Dube ‘The Au Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction (summary) asserting that ‘…the 
political and selective use of the principle of universality by foreign states to prosecute perpetrators of these 
crimes was seen as causing conflicts and undermining peace efforts, reconciliation and regional stability …This 
prompted the AU to produce its own model law on UJ, which African states could adapt to their own socio-
political circumstances and legal context.’ 
279 For a definition of the principle of universal jurisdiction see Coombes ‘Universal Jurisdiction: A Means to 
End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly Interstate Relations?’ 423-424; Princeton Principles on Universal 
Jurisdiction principle 1(1); AU-EU Expert Report para 8. 
280 See Du Plessis and Bosch ‘Immunities and Universal Jurisdiction-The World Court steps in (or on?)’242; 
Judge Van den Wyngaert’s dissenting opinion in Arrest Warrant, para 46. 
281 See Gevers & Vrancken ‘Jurisdiction of States’ 250.It is pertinent to note from the outset that 
notwithstanding the controversy surrounding many aspects of universal jurisdiction, it has become well settled 
in international law that its exercise is permissible. 
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3.2.1 The Lotus Case 
The territorial principle is the primary ground upon which jurisdiction is exercised by states. 
Notwithstanding this, international law permits states to exercise jurisdiction in respect of 
conduct occurring beyond their territorial boundaries.282 The PCIJ ruled in the Lotus Case that 
states are allowed to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in the absence of a prohibitive rule.283  
The court said regarding this permissive rule, 
It does not however, follow that international law prohibits a state from exercising jurisdiction in 
its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and 
in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law…it leaves them in this 
respect a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive 
rules…284 
This dictum in Lotus has been the subject of controversy, with scholars expressing 
conflicting views as to its continued validity in contemporary international law. Some have 
argued that it is the source of all the confusion surrounding the subject of jurisdiction. Gevers 
and Vrancken, for instance, argued that, ‘This Lotus case, and its legacy, is the source of 
much of the uncertainty regarding the exercise of jurisdiction by states under international 
law.’285 
Most of the criticism around the Lotus Case has been based on the argument that the PCIJ did 
not consider the importance of the doctrine of state sovereignty in making its dictum on the 
‘permissive’ rule, thereby giving states unbridled jurisdictional powers.286 It has also been 
criticised by a number of scholars who suggest that the dictum in Lotus has been modified by 
subsequent practice.287  
                                                 
282 Other grounds upon which states are permitted to exercise jurisdiction are the nationality principle; passive 
personality principle; effects principle; protective principle and the universality principle. For a detailed 
overview of the jurisdictional grounds see Gevers & Vrancken ‘Jurisdiction of States’ 242-252. 
283 France v Turkey 1927 PCIJ Series A no 10 19. 
284 See page 19 of the Judgment. 
285 Gevers & Vrancken ‘Jurisdiction of States’236. 
286  Ibid. 
287 See for example C Ryngaert Jurisdiction in International Law ( 2008) 29.For a similar view see A Bianchi 
‘Reply to Professor Maier’ in K Meessen (ed) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Theory and Practice (1996) 
74.For a conflicting view see for example P Kuiper ‘The European Community and the U. S. Pipeline Embargo: 
Comments on Comments’  (1984) German Yearbook of Int L 1984 72,93 asserting that ‘…insufficient research 
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It is submitted that the controversy regarding the permissive approach in Lotus is not likely to 
be settled anytime soon. This is because there is no specific treaty which governs the exercise 
of jurisdiction by States hence reliance is had on State practice, which is itself inconsistent.288  
As jurisdiction is closely linked to state sovereignty, it is unlikely that States will reach an 
agreement in treaty form on the subject of jurisdiction in the foreseeable future because states 
would view the limiting of their jurisdiction as an infringement of their sovereignty. 
Notwithstanding the controversy emanating from the Lotus Case, it remains the leading 
authority on the subject of jurisdiction, and arguably the starting point for any discussion on 
jurisdiction.289 
3.2.2 The definition of universal jurisdiction 
There is no consensus amongst legal scholars as to the exact definition of universal 
jurisdiction. A number of scholars have defined this term in different ways. Judge Van den 
Wyngaert noted in her dissenting opinion in Arrest Warrant that, ‘There is no generally 
accepted definition of universal jurisdiction in conventional or customary international 
law…Much has been written in legal doctrine about universal jurisdiction. Many views exist 
as to its legal meaning.’290In A similar vein, Scheffer asserted that, ‘…any attempt to identify 
a universally acceptable definition of universal jurisdiction, the crimes it covers and its 
enforceability remains a largely futile exercise .There are simply too many variables to 
permit any definitive approach to the issue.’291 
                                                                                                                                                       
has been done so far to decide with a degree of certainty whether or not the Lotus decision has been set aside by 
subsequent developments in customary international law.’ A detailed discussion as to which approach is more 
convincing is beyond the scope of this thesis. As argued by O’Keefe , ‘ …it arguably does not matter whether 
the so-called ‘Lotus presumption’ in general or in a specific context of criminal jurisdiction is correct or 
accepted in principle…all that is required is that, instead of the accepted heads of prescriptive jurisdiction as 
permissive rules against a backdrop of a general prohibition, we think of them as residual presumptive 
permission in the interest of specific prohibitions’  O’Keefe ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic 
Concept’  738 footnote 12. 
288 See Gevers & Vrancken ‘Jurisdiction of States’238-239, explaining the challenges of relying on state practice 
and opinio juris to ascertain rules of jurisdiction. 
289 The ICJ has since Lotus systematically declined to address the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. See 
Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 147; Gevers & Vrancken ibid 238. 
290 Para 44-45.  
291  D Scheffer ‘The Future of Atrocity Law’ (2002) 25 Suffolk Transnational LR389, 422. 
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Gevers and Vrancken have explained that the term universal jurisdiction has been defined 
both in the positive and negative sense.292 The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 
described it as  
criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime 
was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the 
victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such jurisdiction.293 
O’Keefe has defined universal jurisdiction negatively as ‘…the assertion of jurisdiction to 
prescribe in the absence of any other accepted jurisdictional nexus at the time of the relevant 
conduct.’294As thoughtfully argued by O’Keefe, 
 the absence of a customary or conventional definition and the supposed plurality of doctrinal 
definition of universal jurisdiction does not mean that no single soundest definition of universal 
jurisdiction cannot be given.295 
 In this regard, this thesis is based on the definition of universal jurisdiction as given in the 
Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction. 
3.2.3 The rationale for the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
Historically, universal jurisdiction originated in the 16th Century to enable states to prosecute 
the crimes of piracy and to a lesser extent, the slave trade which occurred in locations over 
which no single state had territorial jurisdiction. Piracy296 and the slave trade were committed 
in the high seas where no state had territorial jurisdiction.297 The rationale for the exercise of 
                                                 
292 Gevers & Vrancken ‘Jurisdiction of States’250. 
293  Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction Principle 1 (1). See also Institut de Droit International (IDI) 
2005 Resolution on Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with regard to the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. Paragraph 1 defines universal jurisdiction as ‘…the competence of a State to 
prosecute alleged offenders and to punish them if convicted, irrespective of the place of commission of the 
crime and regardless of any link of active or passive personality, or other grounds of jurisdiction recognised by 
international law.’ 
294 O’Keefe ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’ 745.See also L. Reydams Universal 
Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (2004) 5 and H Ascenscio ‘Are Spanish Courts 
Backing Down on Universality?  699. 
295 O’Keefe ibid 744-745.  
296 See United States v Layton 509 F.Supp.212, 223(N.D Cal 1981) where the court explained that, ‘Universal 
jurisdiction had its origins in the special problems and characteristics of piracy’. 
297 See Arajarvi ‘Looking Back from Nowhere’ 8. 
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universal jurisdiction was therefore that serious crimes should not go unpunished due to 
territorial limitations on jurisdiction. In recent times however, as explained by Arajarvi, all 
parts of the globe fall under the jurisdiction of States, although in some cases the jurisdiction 
might be subject to dispute between States.298 The United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) now governs the issue of jurisdiction over high seas.299 
3.2.4 The piracy analogy  
The piracy analogy has been invoked by a number of scholars to explain the expansion of the 
scope of crimes over which states can exercise universal jurisdiction to include crimes other 
than piracy, such as war crimes and crimes against humanity. In terms of the piracy analogy, 
the expansion of the scope of crimes over which universal jurisdiction could be exercised 
came about as a result of the recognition that these crimes such as war crimes were as 
heinous as piracy itself.300  Orentlicher, for instance, argued that,  
One rationale for universal jurisdiction that is equally applicable to pirates and human rights 
violators is that both offenders commit acts so antithetical to the common standards of 
civilisation that they have, in effect, renounced the right to be protected by its laws.301 
Reliance on the heinous nature of the crime as a basis for expanding the scope of universal 
jurisdiction has however been refuted by many scholars. According to Kontorovich, there is 
no evidence to suggest that piracy was considered to be more heinous than all other crimes.302 
Megret argued that the reliance on the heinous nature of the crime as a rationale for the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction is contentious. He asserted in this regard that the rationale 
                                                 
298 Ibid. 
299 1982 21 ILM (1982) 1261; Arajarvi ibid. 
300 For a detailed account of the piracy analogy, see generally Kontorovich ‘The Piracy Analogy’ and Arajarvi 
ibid 9-14 
301 D Orentlicher ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime’ 
(1991)100 Yale LJ 2537, 2557 fn 78 (cited by Kontorovich ibid 205 fn 126). See also W Cowles ‘Universality 
of Jurisdiction over war crimes’ (1945) 33:2 California LR 177,217-18, advocating for the expansion of 
universal jurisdiction to war crimes because they were as serious as piracy. 
302 Kontorovich ibid 233. 
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that ‘…certain crimes are so heinous that they ‘shock the conscience of mankind’ is 
questionable as ‘In practice what shocks some does not necessarily shock others’.303 
The expansion of the scope of crimes over which universal jurisdiction can be exercised has 
also been explained on the basis of the hostis humani generis formulation which was 
supposedly associated with piracy. It has been asserted by some scholars that pirates were 
considered to be hostis humani generis, enemies of all mankind, hence all states had a duty to 
prosecute them. In terms of the piracy analogy therefore, those alleged to have committed 
international crimes are also to be treated as enemies of mankind. In the civil case of 
Filartiga v Pena-Irala, the United States Second appeals court drew an analogy between 
piracy and torture and noted that, ‘The torturer has become, like the pirate and slave trader 
before him, hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.’304 
 Bassiouni explained in this regard that ‘… a state exercising universal jurisdiction carries out 
an actio popularis against persons who are hostis humani generis.’305 Dugard asserted that 
when exercising universal jurisdiction, ‘…the national court acts as the agent of the 
international community in the prosecution of an enemy of all mankind in whose prosecution 
all states have an equal interest.’306 The treatment of the pirate as an enemy of all mankind has 
however been convincingly questioned by a number of scholars including Kontorovich who 
argued that, ‘No one supposed the pirate to actually be the enemy of all mankind; it was a 
legal fiction…and no part of the legal definition.’307 
It is submitted that both the reliance on the heinousness of the crime and the hostis humani 
generis formulation as a rationale for the exercise of universal jurisdiction have been 
convincingly discredited. This thesis therefore asserts that the rationale for the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction in its expanded scope is to ensure that certain international crimes do 
not go unpunished.308 
                                                 
303 F Megret ‘The Elephant ‘in the Room’ of Universal Jurisdiction: Diasporas, Duties of Hospitality and the 
Constitution of the Political’ (2015) 6:1Transnational Legal Theory 89. 
304 630 F.2d 876 Cir 1980. 
305 M.Cherif Bassiouni ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes’ 96. 
306 Dugard International Law-a South African Perspective 154. 
307 Kontorovich ‘The Piracy Analogy’235. 
308 Du Plessis and Bosch ‘Immunities and Universal Jurisdiction-The World Court steps in (or on?)’; Arrest 
Warrant Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert para 46 asserting that ‘…the ratio legis of universal 
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3.2.5 The scope of universal jurisdiction 
The generally agreed list of crimes over which universal jurisdiction can be exercised include 
piracy, slave trading, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture.309 The list of 
crimes is not exhaustive. This is because as the crimes are derived from customary 
international law which is made up of state practice and opinio juris, the generally agreed 
crimes could change with changes in state practice.310 
In the Arrest Warrant case the judges in their separate opinions expressed different views on 
the crimes over which universal jurisdiction is applicable. The Judge President Guillaume 
and Judge Rezek expressed the view that true universal jurisdiction applies only in respect of 
piracy.311 On the other hand, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in their joint 
separate opinion asserted that universal jurisdiction can also be lawfully exercised over war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, in addition to piracy. This view was shared by Judge 
Koroma in his separate opinion, and Judge Van Den Wyngaert in her dissenting opinion.312 
As noted by O’Keefe, these statements did not form part of the ratio decidendi as the court 
was not required to rule on the legality and scope of universal jurisdiction. State practice and 
opinio juris shows, contrary to the arguments advanced by Judge President Guillaume and 
Judge Rezek that states are allowed to exercise universal jurisdiction in respect of crimes 
other than that of piracy.313 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
jurisdiction is based on the international reprobation for certain very serious international crimes such as war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. Its raison detre is to avoid impunity, to prevent suspects of such crimes 
finding a safe haven in third countries.’ 
309 Colangelo ‘The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction’151; Addis ‘Imagining the International Community: 
The Constitutive Dimension of Universal Jursidiction’136; Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 
(Principle 2); AU-EU Expert Report on Universal Jurisdiction para 9 and Arajarvi ‘Looking Back from 
Noiwhere’7. 
310  Coombes ‘Universal Jurisdiction: A Means to End Impunity or a Threat to Friendly Interstate Relations’432 
footnote 70. For an overview of the generally agreed crimes over which states may exercise universal 
jurisdiction, see O’Keefe International Criminal Law 17-25. 
311 Arrest Warrant separate opinion of Judge President Guillaume para 16; and separate opinion of Judge Rezek 
Para 10. See also O’Keefe ibid 22-23. 
312 Arrest Warrant Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal para 65; separate 
opinion of Judge Koroma para 9; and dissenting opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert para 59; O’Keefe ibid. 
313 O’Keefe ibid 22-23. 
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3.2.6 The presence requirement 
There has been considerable debate regarding the legality of exercising universal jurisdiction 
in absentia (pure universal jurisdiction). Some scholars have argued that the requirement of 
the presence of the accused person in the territory of the State seeking to exercise jurisdiction 
on the basis of the universality principle must be met in order for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction to be lawful (conditional universal jurisdiction). Cassese, an ardent proponent of 
conditional universal jurisdiction, commenting on the assertion that piracy is the only crime 
under customary international law over which states are permitted to exercise universal 
jurisdiction, argued that universal jurisdiction over piracy can only be exercised when the 
accused is present in the territory of the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction.314 Elsewhere, he 
argued that 
universality may be asserted subject to the condition that the alleged offender be on the territory 
of the prosecuting state. It would seem contrary to the logic of current state relations to authorize 
any state of the world to institute criminal proceedings…against any foreigner or foreign state 
official allegedly culpable of serious international crimes.315 
On the other hand there are scholars who have asserted that presence of the accused is not a 
requirement for the exercise of universal jurisdiction.316 In the Arrest Warrant case, Judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal argued in their Joint Separate Opinion that the 
commencement of investigations in the absence of the accused person does not amount to a 
violation of the immunity which that individual might be entitled to at international law.317 
Gevers and Vrancken have attributed the debate over the presence requirement to a 
conflation of prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement or adjudicative jurisdiction. They note 
that universal jurisdiction is a type of prescriptive jurisdiction and as states are permitted at 
international law to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe extraterritorially, it is lawful for a state 
                                                 
314 Cassese ‘When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?’ 857. 
315 Cassese ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality?’ 592. 
316 See C Kres ‘Universal Jurisdiction over International Law and the Institut de Droit International’ (2006) 4 J 
of Int Criminal Justice 561,577 arguing that ‘…there is, certainly, also insufficient state practice to assert the 
creation of a rule that would specifically prohibit any investigative act in the absence of a suspect based (only) 
on universal jurisdiction.’ 
317 See paragraph 59 of the Joint Separate Opinion. 
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to exercise universal jurisdiction even in the absence of the accused.318 On the other hand, the 
issue of the requirement of the presence of the suspect on the territory of the state exercising 
universal jurisdiction is related to enforcement and adjudicative jurisdiction. As has been 
explained by Gevers and Vrancken, prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction are 
two distinct forms of jurisdiction, therefore it does not necessarily follow that when a state 
has prescriptive jurisdiction it can also exercise enforcement jurisdiction.319 In this vein, 
O’Keefe has noted that, 
A state’s jurisdiction to prescribe its criminal law and its jurisdiction to enforce it do not always 
go hand in hand. It is often the case that international law permits a state to assert the 
applicability of its criminal law to given conduct but, because the author of the conduct is 
abroad, not to enforce it.320 
The debate about the presence requirement therefore seems to be not a matter of law, but a 
matter of policy and practical considerations by individual states. As has been noted by 
Ryngaert, state practice has not been consistent on this issue. Some states have included a 
presence requirement in their enabling legislation whilst others have not.321 In this regard, this 
thesis submits to the assertions by Gevers and Vrancken, and by O’Keefe, that the presence 
of the accused is not a requirement for the exercise of universal jurisdiction to be deemed 
lawful. According to O’Keefe, ‘…if universal jurisdiction to prescribe criminal laws is 
internationally lawful in any given instance, so too is so called universal jurisdiction in 
absentia.322 
3.3 THE FIRST PHASE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: RISE AND DECLINE   
IN EUROPE 
Before the 1990s, universal jurisdiction was seldom exercised by states. In the 1990s 
however, there was a rise in the application of the principle by European states, particularly 
Belgium and Spain. The universal jurisdiction legislation in these two countries was 
                                                 
318 Gevers & Vrancken ‘Jurisdiction of States’ 251.See also O’Keefe International Criminal Law 17, explaining 
that universal jurisdiction is jurisdiction to prescribe. 
319 Gevers & Vrancken ibid 251. 
320 O’Keefe ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept’740; Arajarvi ‘Looking Back from 
Nowhere’14. 
321 Ryngaert Jurisdiction in International Law 120. See also Gevers & Vrancken ‘Jurisdiction of States’ 252. 
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unconditional in that it did not require the existence of any pre-existing conditions in order 
for the courts to exercise universal jurisdiction, and in the case of Belgium immunities of 
state officials were not considered. The courts in Belgium and Spain proceeded to exercise 
universal jurisdiction based on this legislation.323 This included cases involving high profile 
individuals such as complaints brought before the Belgian courts against former United 
States President George Bush for alleged war crimes. In Spain, high profile cases included 
the Tibet case which involved a number of Chinese leaders including former Chinese 
President Hu Jintao.324  
Following diplomatic pressure from politically powerful states including China and the 
United States, and as a result of the ruling by the ICJ in Arrest Warrant, Belgium and Spain 
amended their universal jurisdiction laws so as to require some pre-existing conditions such 
as presence of the accused. Despite these amendments to the legislation, diplomatic pressure 
persisted and Belgium consequently repealed its legislation in 2003.325 In 2014 Spain 
amended its legislation further, effectively removing universal jurisdiction from the Spanish 
legal system.326 
Following the repeal of the Belgian legislation, the general consensus amongst scholars was 
that this repeal had signalled the ‘death’ of universal jurisdiction and a number of ‘obituaries’ 
were written in this regard. Admittedly, following the decision in Arrest Warrant and the 
subsequent repeal of the Belgian legislation, there was a noticeable decline in the application 
of universal jurisdiction by European states, most notably Spain which had been hailed as 
being the most welcoming forum for universal jurisdiction. It is submitted however that 
contrary to assertions that the demise of the universal jurisdiction legislation in Belgium led 
to the death of the principle, universal jurisdiction is very much alive as evidenced by its 
increased adoption and application in Africa. There is however scholarly silence on the rise 
                                                 
323 See Act of 16 June 1993 Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949 and their Additional Protocols I and II of 18 June 1977, as amended by the Act of 10 February 
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324 Bhuta & Schurr ‘Universal Jurisdiction: State of the Art’ 37; Arajarvi ‘Looking Back from Nowhere’20. For 
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of universal jurisdiction in Africa and it is submitted that this is due to the historically 
Eurocentric focus of international law. 
As the discussion below shall show, many European states have amended their legislation to 
include the requirement that some pre-existing conditions must be met before the courts can 
exercise universal jurisdiction. This can be attributed to the desire by states to avoid political 
tensions with other states as a result of the exercise of universal jurisdiction, as was the case 
between Spain and China when Spain exercised universal jurisdiction against some high 
ranking current and former Chinese officials. The diplomatic spat following this exercise of 
universal jurisdiction is what led to the amendment of Spain’s Organic Law on universal 
jurisdiction in 2009 and 2014.327Apart from Belgium and Spain; other European countries 
have also enacted universal jurisdiction legislation and included conditions for its exercise. 
These include Netherlands, United Kingdom and Germany.  
This section shall examine the first phase of universal jurisdiction, which is the rise and 
decline of universal jurisdiction in Europe. The examination shall be limited to the practice 
of universal jurisdiction in Belgium, Spain, Germany, United Kingdom (England and Wales) 
and Netherlands as it is considered that the practise of universal jurisdiction in these selected 
states best mirrors the rise and decline of universal jurisdiction in Europe. It ought to be 
noted that at present there is no European state that is actively applying universal jurisdiction. 
However, the examination of this phase of the application of universal jurisdiction in Europe 
is relevant to the thesis because it contributed significantly to the rise of universal jurisdiction 
in Africa. 
3.3.1 Belgium 
The Belgian legislation conferring universal jurisdiction upon Belgian courts for war crimes 
came into effect in 1993.328 It was amended in 1999 to include the crimes of genocide and 
crimes against humanity. In addition, the Code of Criminal Procedure allowed victims to 
initiate a criminal investigation based on the universality principle.329 The 1993 law provided 
that immunity did not apply where an individual was accused of having committed war 
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crimes, and the 1999 amendment expanded this to include crimes against humanity and 
genocide.330 Another notable feature of the 1999 amendment was that it removed the defence 
of immunity, in compliance with article 27 of the Rome Statute of the ICC.331 
The Belgian law was applied without incident in the Butare Four case, in which four 
Rwandans were tried and convicted for their role in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.332 However, 
this law later became subject to controversy when its provisions were relied upon to bring 
complaints against high profile individuals from other states. In April 2000, a Belgian 
investigative magistrate issued and circulated a warrant of arrest against the then Foreign 
Affairs Minister for the Democratic Republic of Congo, based on the Belgian law. The 
issuing of this warrant resulted in a dispute between the two countries which was then 
brought before the ICJ.333 The court ruled that the arrest warrant violated the immunity and 
inviolability that Mr. Ndombasi was entitled to enjoy as a Foreign Affairs Minister.334 
Following the ICJ’s decision in the Arrest Warrant case, and political pressure from powerful 
states whose high ranking officials had been the target of investigations in Belgium based on 
its law, Belgium amended the law in April 2003. The amended law included immunity 
provisions to bring it in conformity with international law, and the right of victims to initiate 
investigations based on universal jurisdiction was removed.335 Complaints had been filed 
against a number of high profile individuals including former United States President George 
Bush and former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and others for having allegedly 
committed war crimes during the 1991 Gulf war; and then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel 
Sharon and others for crimes allegedly committed in the Sabra and Shatila massacre, as well 
                                                 
330 See the Law Concerning the Punishment of Grave Violations of International Humanitarian Law (1999) 38 
ILM 918; N Roht-Ariaza ‘Universal Jurisdiction: Steps Forward, Steps Back’ (2004) Leiden J of Int L 335,383. 
331 Langer ‘The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction’ 26. 
332 For a detailed overview of the case see L Reydams ‘Belgium’s First Application of Universal Jurisdiction: 
the Butare Four case’ (2003) 1 J of Int Criminal Justice 428. 
333 For the background to the case see the Judgment in Arrest Warrant. 
334 See para 56 of the Judgment of the majority in Arrest Warrant (outlining the customary international law 
position with regards to immunities). 
335 Arajarvi ‘Looking Back from Nowhere’18; Bhuta & Schurr ‘Universal Jurisdiction: State of the Art’37. For 
the amendments see the unofficial English translation available in International Legal Materials 2003 (42) 749 
87 
 
as against U.S. General Tommy Franks for war crimes allegedly committed whilst he was 
army commander during the 2003 Iraq war.336 
The United States and Israel had raised concern that Belgium’s universal jurisdiction 
legislation was a threat to state sovereignty.337 Following increased diplomatic pressure, the 
Act was repealed in August 2003, and a new law on extraterritorial jurisdiction was 
enacted.338 The provisions of the repealed act dealing with international crimes were 
incorporated into the Criminal Code, hence Belgian courts now exercise jurisdiction over war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide based on the passive personality and active 
personality grounds of jurisdiction.339 The courts can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
international crimes provided that one of  the requirements that the accused must be resident 
in Belgium; the victim must have lived in Belgium for a minimum of three years; and that 
Belgium must be required to exercise jurisdiction over the crime by treaty, has been met.340 
3.3.2 Spain 
 Spain’s Organic Law 6/1985 conferred universal jurisdiction on Spanish courts. Article 23:4 
provides that the courts shall have universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, 
terrorism, and any other crimes which Spain is obliged to prosecute in terms of international 
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treaties or conventions.341 The Spanish Criminal Code was amended in 2004 to give the courts 
universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity.342  
The Spanish Courts relied on the Organic Law of 1985 to exercise universal jurisdiction in a 
number of cases. The first case to be based on the principle of universality was the Pinochet 
Case in 1998, where an investigative judge requested the arrest and extradition of the former 
Argentinian ruler Augusto Pinochet from the United Kingdom.343 Subsequently, the Spanish 
National Court exercised universal jurisdiction in the Scilingo Case in 2005.Scilingo, a 
former Argentinian military officer, was found guilty of attempted genocide and other crimes 
he perpetrated during the dirty war in Argentina.344 Universal jurisdiction was also relied on in 
the trial of another former Argentinian military officer Ricardo Cavallo in 2003.He was 
however extradited to Argentina to stand trial in 2008 hence the proceedings were not 
completed in Spain.345 
Spain’s Organic Law of 1985 did not require any pre-existing link between Spain and either 
the accused or the victim for the exercise of universal jurisdiction. The presence of the 
accused was only required at the trial stage, thus investigations could be initiated even when 
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the accused was not physically present.346 The Constitutional Tribunal held in the Guatemala 
Generals appeal that the presence of the accused in Spain was not required at the 
investigative stage.347  The country’s universal jurisdiction legislation was hailed by a number 
of commentators as being progressive due to its unrestricted form. Kaleck, for instance, 
argued that Spain was the most convenient forum for those seeking to pursue cases of human 
rights violations, owing to its ‘…expansive legislation and independent judiciary.’348 
It ought to be noted that the exercise of universal jurisdiction by Spanish courts against 
African officials based on this law contributed significantly to the tensions between African 
states and European states regarding the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. 
In February 2008 a French investigative judge issued arrest warrants against forty current and 
former high ranking officials from Rwanda. They were accused of having committed 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and terrorism in the period between 1990 and 
2002.349 Rwanda then claimed that the European states were seeking to recolonise Africa 
through their exercise of universal jurisdiction against African officials, and the AU 
Assembly adopted a decision which raised concern about the perceived abuse of the principle 
of universal jurisdiction.350 This was the first in a series of decisions adopted by the AU on the 
subject of universal jurisdiction. The AU Assembly resolved in this Decision that ‘The 
political nature and abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction by judges from some 
non-African states against African states, particularly Rwanda, is a clear violation of their 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.’351 
Diplomatic pressure led to Spain reforming its legislation on universal jurisdiction. In 2009, 
the Spanish Congress passed a law restricting the jurisdiction of the Audencia Nacional in 
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respect of international crimes as provided for in Organic Act no 6/1985. In terms of Organic 
Act no 1/2009, jurisdiction over international crimes could only be exercised in cases where 
the victims are Spanish, there is a relevant link between the crime and Spain, or the accused 
is present in Spain.352 This amendment also introduced the requirement of subsidiarity. Article 
23 (4) (h) provides that the courts can only exercise jurisdiction where ‘…no other competent 
country or international court has initiated proceedings including an effective investigation 
and, where appropriate, prosecution of, such crimes.’353 
The 2009 amendment led to the termination of proceedings in the Tibet 2 case, which was 
one of the most contentious cases arising from Spain’s universal jurisdiction legislation. 
Notwithstanding this, many other cases remained open.354 In 2013, the issuing of arrest 
warrants against several former Chinese state officials led to renewed diplomatic tensions 
between Spain and China, which resulted in a further reform of Spain’s universal jurisdiction 
legislation in 2014.355 Organic Act no 1/2014 retained the pre-existing conditions 
requirements in Organic Act no 1/2009.In addition, it further limited the right to commence 
an action in cases of international crimes to the victims and the Public Prosecution Service.356 
In terms of the 2014 amendment, ‘Proceedings relating to the offences referred to in this Act 
that are in progress at the time of its entry into force shall be stayed until it can be verified 
that the requirements established therein have been met.’357 This retrospective application of 
the amendment resulted in proceedings in a number of cases including Tibet 1, the Falun 
Gong Case and the Rwanda Case being stayed.358 Spain and Belgium’s experience with 
universal jurisdiction is therefore illustrative of the rise and fall of universal jurisdiction in 
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Europe. Fernandez, commenting on the 2014 amendment, asserted that ‘Together with it 
universal jurisdiction virtually disappeared from the Spanish legal system.’359 Spain, which 
was once hailed as the most progressive state in terms of preventing impunity through its 
expansive universal jurisdiction legislation, has done away with universal jurisdiction from 
its legal system through the 2014 amendment. 
It is submitted that although this reform has been viewed by a number of scholars as being 
retrogressive for the fight against impunity, the universal jurisdiction legislation in its broad 
form was problematic. As argued by Jalloh, the universal jurisdiction laws in Belgium and 
Spain promoted forum shopping. In addition, Jalloh notes that, ‘Their very attractiveness to 
victims with few links to the national territory also rendered them susceptible to abuse for 
political purposes that are not co-extensive with the imperative of justice.’360 
Commenting on the 2003 repeal of the Belgian law, Reydams noted that one of the reasons 
given for the repeal was that the provisions of the Act were open to political abuse.361 
According to Reydams, ‘The most important lesson to be drawn from the Belgian experience 
is that a system of universal jurisdiction that is not principled is doomed to fail.’362 
3.3.3 United Kingdom (England and Wales) 
In the United Kingdom, the Geneva Conventions Act of 1957 provides for the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction over certain war crimes. These include grave breaches of the Four 
Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocol.363 The Criminal Justice Act of 1988 
authorises the courts in England and Wales to exercise universal jurisdiction over the crime 
of torture.364 The exercise of jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide and crimes against 
humanity is only permitted if the crimes were committed after the enactment of the 
International Criminal Court Act (ICC Act) of 2001.365 The ICC Act provides for the exercise 
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of universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and certain 
war crimes.366 
The United Kingdom rarely exercised universal jurisdiction despite implementing legislation 
permitting the courts to exercise jurisdiction based on the universality principle. To date, the 
only successful prosecutions based on universal jurisdiction have been the prosecution of the 
Afghan militia leader Faryadi Zardad, who was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in 
prison for torture and hostage-taking committed in Afghanistan in the 1990s, and that of 
Anthony Sawoniuk who was convicted in 1999 of the murder of two Jewish women in 
Belarus in 1942. He was sentenced to life in prison.367 
Prior to the enactment of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act in September 
2011, the Prosecution of Offences Act allowed for the issuing of arrest warrants for private 
prosecutions on the basis of universal jurisdiction.368 The warrant could be issued without the 
consent of the Crown Prosecution Services or Attorney General, although prosecution could 
be halted if the Crown Prosecution Services or Attorney General opposed it.369 This provision 
became controversial following the issuing of arrest warrants against Israeli Major General 
Doron Almog in 2005 on behalf of Palestinian victims, and former foreign Affairs Minister 
Tzipi Livni in 2009 for war crimes allegedly committed in Gaza.370 Although neither of the 
warrants led to arrest, the United Kingdom noted that the provision on arrest warrants could 
be exploited to the detriment of the United Kingdom. Consequently, in September 2011 the 
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act was enacted. 
The Act restricts the issuing of warrants of arrests for private prosecutions by requiring the 
consent of the Director for Public Prosecutions.371  It has however been argued that this 
reform on universal jurisdiction law in the United Kingdom is of little practical significance 
because the category of persons against whom arrest warrants could be issued was limited 
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under the previous law.372 Although the reform was criticised by some NGOs as promoting 
impunity, scholars including Williams have asserted that it was necessary to address the 
diplomatic relations and evidentiary problems that arose from the previous law.373 
The reform of the universal jurisdiction legislation in the United Kingdom, as well as 
Belgium and Spain, has been attributed to the realisation by states that broad universal 
jurisdiction laws are unsustainable and impractical due to the damage caused to diplomatic 
relations.374 
3.3.4 Germany 
In terms of the German Code of Crimes against International Law of 2002 (CCAIL), German 
Courts can exercise universal jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.375 Before the coming into force of the CCAIL, the German Criminal Code 
conferred courts with universal jurisdiction over the crime of genocide and those 
international crimes which Germany was obliged to prosecute by treaty.376 The courts 
required the presence of the accused and the existence of a ‘legitimising link’ between 
Germany and the crime.377 The CCAIL does not require the presence of the accused in 
Germany. It provides for absolute universal jurisdiction in section 1 which states that, ‘This 
Act shall apply to all criminal offenses against international law designated under this Act, to 
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serious criminal offenses designated therein even when the offense was committed abroad 
and bears no relation to Germany.378 
The Criminal Procedure Code which was enacted simultaneously with the CCAIL however 
allows the federal prosecutor to exercise discretion as to whether or not to initiate an 
investigation if the presence of the accused in Germany is not expected.379 For this reason, a 
number of cases against high profile individuals from politically powerful states have not 
been investigated. These include the cases against the former U.S Defence Secretary Donald 
Rumsfeld and former Chinese President Jiang Zemin.380 
The arrest of the then Rwandan chief of Protocol, Rose Kabuye, in Germany in November 
2008 pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued earlier by a French magistrate drew widespread 
criticism from African states.381 In its various decisions on the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction, the AU Assembly expressed concern that the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
by European states against African state officials amounts to an abuse of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction. Seen against the backdrop of the arrest of Rose Kabuye, in contrast to 
the prosecutor exercising his discretion and choosing not to prosecute in cases involving 
individuals from powerful states particularly USA, it can be argued that African states are 
indeed justified in asserting that their officials have in the past been unfairly targeted by 
European states. 
3.3.5 Netherlands 
Netherlands enacted the International Crimes Act (ICA) in 2003.382 The Act confers the Dutch 
courts with universal jurisdiction over international crimes which include torture, genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity.383 The courts in Netherlands have exercised 
universal jurisdiction over a number of cases. These include the case of Sebastian Nzapali, a 
former Congolese military colonel who was tried and convicted for torture perpetrated in the 
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Democratic Republic of Congo. The court exercised universal jurisdiction based on 
Netherland’s obligations in terms of the Convention against Torture.384 
Although the Netherlands’ criminal procedure permits trials in absentia, in terms of section 
2(1) (a) of the ICA, the voluntary presence of the accused in Netherlands is a prerequisite for 
an investigation to be initiated where the universality principle forms the basis of the exercise 
of jurisdiction.385 In this vein, the courts declined to exercise universal jurisdiction in the case 
of Desire Bourtese on the basis that the presence of the accused was required for the trial to 
commence, and that the provisions of the Convention against Torture could not be applied 
retroactively.386 Kaleck has explained that the inclusion of the presence requirement in the 
ICA was mainly a response to the decision in Arrest Warrant and Belgium’s experience with 
absolute universal jurisdiction.387 
The Belgian experience has had a significant impact on the decline of universal jurisdiction 
in Europe. Most European states which have enacted universal jurisdiction legislation have 
included conditions for its exercise. The exercise of conditional universal jurisdiction serves 
to guard against frivolous complaints, and to ensure that the principle of universal 
jurisdiction is not abused for malicious and political purposes, such as what was supposedly 
happening in Belgium before the repeal of the universal jurisdiction legislation. As observed 
by Vandermeersch, 
                                                 
384 Rotterdam District Court 7/4/2004 AO 7287,Rotterdam 00050-30 official English translation available at 
https://www.coeid.de/dokumente/NL-Nzapali-judgment.pdf (accessed 29/6/2018) See also Kaleck ibid; Human 
Rights Watch ‘Netherlands: Congolese Torturer Convicted’(7/4/2004) available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/04/07/netherlands-congolese-torturer-convicted (accessed 29/6/2018). 
385 Bhuta & Schurr ‘Universal Jurisdiction; State of the Art) 72; Kaleck’ From Pinochet to Rumsfeld’943. 
386 Supreme Court of the Netherlands nr .00749/01,18/09/2001, XXXII NYIL 282-96; Arajarvi ‘Looking Back 
from Nowhere’18; Kaleck ibid 942.For a summary and commentary of the case see generally P 
Schimmelpennick van der Oije and S Freeland ‘Universal Jurisdiction in the Netherlands-the right approach but 
the wrong case?  Bourtese and the December murders’ (2001) 7: 2 Australian J of Human Rights 89. 
387 Kaleck ibid 943. 
96 
 
in the absence of filtering safeguards to ascertain that those complaints were a priori founded, 
certain alleged victims gave the appearance of availing themselves Belgian justice by abusing 
political procedures to pursue political objectives that did not include justice.388 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the domestic legislative instruments on universal jurisdiction in 
selected European countries, and the decline of the principle beginning from 2003 when 
Belgium repealed its universal jurisdiction legislation. The decline of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction in Europe led to scholars declaring that the principle had met its final 
demise with the repeal of the Belgian legislation.389 It shall be argued in Chapter Four that 
contrary to the assertions that the repeal of the Belgian legislation was the final ‘death knell’ 
for the principle of universal jurisdiction, the principle is very much alive as evidenced by its 
rise in Africa since 2002.However due to the historically Eurocentric focus of international 
law, the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa is not being given the scholarly attention it 
deserves. 
 The examination has highlighted that the majority of individuals against whom universal 
jurisdiction was exercised by European states are from Africa. The main concerns raised by 
African states regarding the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction by European 
states have been that European states seem to be unfairly targeting African state officials; and 
disregarding the immunities that these officials ought to enjoy at international law. African 
states also argued that, 
Indictments issued by European states against officials of African states have the effect of 
subjecting the latter to the jurisdiction of European states, contrary to the sovereign equality and 
independence of states. For African states, this evokes memories of colonialism.390 
It is submitted that one of the reasons why the exercise of universal jurisdiction is subject to 
controversy is because of the uncertain nature of its relationship with other principles of 
international law. M.Cherif Bassiouni has asserted that because universal jurisdiction is 
rarely invoked by national courts, its relationship with other principles of law such as that of 
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immunities is not altogether clear.391 The uncertainties regarding the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction are caused partly by a lack of a specific treaty governing the subject of 
jurisdiction, and inconsistencies in state practice.392 
In Arrest Warrant, Judge Van den Wyngaert in her Dissenting Opinion noted that the 
implementation of domestic legislation on universal jurisdiction by States has not been done 
in a consistent manner.393 It is regrettable that the ICJ has not yet given authoritative guidance 
on the scope of universal jurisdiction, as the uncertainty in the nature of the relationship 
between the two principles of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities is likely to 
continue for as long as there is no pronouncement from an international court or tribunal on 
this contentious issue. The uncertainty regarding the relationship between universal 
jurisdiction and personal immunities both generally and in the African context is problematic 
in that it undermines the importance of universal jurisdiction as a principle of international 
law.  
The tensions between African states and European states regarding the application of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction ought to be understood against the background of Anghie’s 
theory on the colonial origins of international law and the sovereignty doctrine. The problems 
arguably arise due to differences in conception of the doctrine of state sovereignty by African 
states and European states respectively. As Anghie has explained, colonialism denied African 
states their sovereignty as they were deemed to be uncivilised and therefore incapable of 
managing legal systems. At the dawn of decolonisation, African states sought to reinforce the 
doctrine of sovereignty in order to guard against post-colonial interferences. 394   
Due to their history of colonialism and subjugation African states seem to view sovereignty 
as an absolute concept which ought to apply regardless of the circumstances. Any exercise of 
jurisdiction over their leaders and state officials by European states, is therefore viewed by 
African states as an infringement of their sovereignty. On the other hand, European states 
view sovereignty, and incidentally the principle of personal immunities, as principles which 
are on the decline and which ought to give way to the notions of accountability and respect 
for human rights. This is arguably because they have never been deprived of their 
                                                 
391 M.Cherif Bassiouni ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes’ 83. 
392 Gevers & Vrancken ‘Jurisdiction of States’236. 
393  Para 44 of the dissenting opinion. 
394 See Anghie 2007 196-198. 
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sovereignty hence they do not need to reassert it .It is this difference in conception of the 
sovereignty doctrine which has led to the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa in recent 
years despite a decline in its application in Europe, with African states determined to reassert 
their sovereignty by strengthening their justice mechanisms, thereby avoiding the jurisdiction 
of non-African states and that of the ICC.395 
In concluding this chapter on the rise and decline of universal jurisdiction in Europe, it is 
submitted that although universal jurisdiction is a controversial principle, its legality has not 
been contested and therefore it is a well settled principle of international law. However, the 
tensions between African states and European states arising from the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction against African state officials by European states are likely to continue for the 
foreseeable future. This is because of the legacy of colonialism which rendered non-
European states non-sovereign and inferior to their European counterparts. Although 
colonialism is now confined to history, its effects can still be felt in modern day international 
relations. As argued by Anghie, 
the nineteenth century is very much an integral part of contemporary international law. At a 
material level, the systems of economic and political inequality which were created by 
colonialism under the auspices of nineteenth-century international law continue to operate 
despite the ostensible change of the legal regime.396 
African states are still sensitive to their colonial past, and that explains why they view 
international criminal justice as practiced by Western states as neo-colonialism. To African 
leaders, much of international criminal law looks too much like the colonial encounter, and 
this explains why they have expressed concerns regarding the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by European states against African state officials. When European states 
exercised universal jurisdiction against African states officials, it can be argued that African 
states had to relive the trauma of colonialism, a period during which they were treated as 
objects rather than subjects of international law. 
 
 
                                                 
395 See Dube ‘The AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction’ (summary) arguing that the AU Model Law was 
developed as a result of African states’ misgivings towards universal jurisdiction as practiced by Western states 
and the perceived unfair targeting of African leaders by the ICC. 
396 Anghie 2007 111. 
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                                       CHAPTER FOUR 
THE RISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN AFRICA 
 
4.1  INTRODUCTION 
When Belgium repealed its law on universal jurisdiction in 2003, many scholars wrote 
‘obituaries’ for universal jurisdiction, asserting that the repeal of the law was the final death 
knell for the principle.397 This thesis asserts that the decline of universal jurisdiction in Europe 
did not signal the complete demise of the principle. There has been a rise of universal 
jurisdiction in Africa since 2002 when South Africa became the first African country to enact 
legislation domesticating the Rome Statute of the ICC thereby enabling its courts to exercise 
universal jurisdiction. Uganda, Kenya, Senegal; Mauritius and Democratic Republic of 
Congo have also enacted enabling legislation. 
In 2012, the AU adopted the AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction, which can be adapted 
by states to suit their domestic situations. It is submitted that the rise of universal jurisdiction 
in Africa is driven by the African states’ desire, under the auspices of the AU, to reaffirm 
their sovereignty. Contrary to the widely held view that universal jurisdiction is on the 
decline globally, it is very much alive in Africa, but it is not being given scholarly attention 
due to the Eurocentric focus of international law. 
This chapter shall examine this phase of the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa, and 
attempt to address the gap in the existing literature on the rise of universal jurisdiction in 
Africa. It shall be argued that the reason why the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa has 
not been considered important, or worthy of academic commentary and attention, is because 
of the double standard in international law. As argued in chapter two, there is evidence of a 
double standard applied in international law along colonial lines, with the general view that 
African states are incapable of putting in place effective justice mechanisms. According to 
Gevers, 
                                                 
397 See for example Cassese ‘Is the Bell Tolling for Universality?’  589 asserting that the principle of universal 
jurisdiction had met its demise.  See also generally Verhaeghe ‘The political funeral procession for the Belgian 
UJ Statute’. 
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the double standard claim persists. In particular, recent practice in the field of 
complementarity…suggests that a new double standard may be emerging with similar colonial 
undertones: namely that there is a different standard applied to potential domestic prosecutions 
by African states, than that applied to the prosecutions by (i) international or (ii) European 
courts, as the case may be.398 
The argument of the existence of a double standard in the application of international 
criminal law resonates with Anghie’s argument that the end of colonialism did not result in 
the end of colonial relations.399  In this regard, it is submitted that the rise of African universal 
jurisdiction has not been given much attention because universal jurisdiction is considered to 
be legitimate when it is practised by European states as opposed to African states. 
As recently as 2016, the Democratic Republic of Congo passed legislation on universal 
jurisdiction, which was hailed by NGOs as a progressive step in the fight against impunity.400 
However, literature on this legislation is scant, with scholars hardly paying attention to it. 
The same applies to the AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction, which is such a significant 
instrument, but not much has been written about it.401 This is in sharp contrast to the attention 
that was accorded to the legislation in European states especially Belgium and Spain.402 There 
is therefore a gap in the existing literature on the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa, and it 
is this gap which this chapter shall attempt to address by examining both the regional and 
domestic African legislative instruments on universal jurisdiction. 
                                                 
398 Gevers ‘Back to the Future?’124. 
399 Anghie ‘The Evolution of International Law’ 748-749. 
400 See Parliamentarians for Global Action 4/1/2016 ‘PGA welcomes the enactment of the Implementing 
legislation for the Rome Statute of the ICC by the Democratic Republic of Congo’ available at 
www.pgaction.org/news/pga-welcomes-enactment-drc-implementing.html  (accessed 29/6/2018).As explained 
in Chapter One, this thesis does not examine the legislation in detail due to difficulties encountered in obtaining 
information pertaining to it. 
401 To date, the only comprehensive scholarly article on the Model Law is one by Angelo Dube (See Dube ‘The 
AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction: An African Response to Western Prosecutions Based on the 
Universality Principle’). 
402 There is vast literature available on the practice of universal jurisdiction by European states. See for example 
Reydams ‘Belgium’s First Application of Universal Jurisdiction: the Butare Four Case’;  Reydams ‘Belgium 
Reneges on Universality: the 5 August 2003 Act on Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian Law’;  
Kaleck ‘From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998-2008’ 2009 ; R Rissing-van Saan  
‘The German Federal Supreme Court and the Prosecution of International Crimes Committed in the Former 
Yugoslavia’; J Alvarez ‘The Reform of Universal Jurisdiction in Spain: For Whom the Bell Tolls?’ 
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It shall be argued that the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa ought to be understood 
against the background of Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of the sovereignty 
doctrine. As argued by Anghie, the colonial confrontation was central to the development of 
international law including fundamental doctrines such as state sovereignty. In this vein, it is 
submitted that the efforts by the AU and the individual African states to strengthen universal 
jurisdiction mechanisms on the continent are a way of reasserting African sovereignty. As 
was discussed in Chapter Two, after decolonisation the previously colonised states sought to 
enforce the doctrine of sovereignty in order to guard against post-colonial interferences. 
African states have reiterated through the various decisions adopted by the AU that the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by European states against African officials, and the 
indictment of African Heads of States by the ICC, is a violation of their sovereignty. It is 
submitted in this regard that the push for universal jurisdiction by African states is a way to 
reclaim their sovereignty and thereby avoid universal jurisdiction as practiced by European 
states, and the jurisdiction of the ICC. The adoption of the Model Law, as well as the 
assertion by the AU of the right to initiate peacekeeping missions on the continent without 
the involvement of the AU in the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council, is a reaffirmation of the sovereignty of African states by the AU.403 
The provisions of instruments introduced by the AU starting from the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union which was adopted in 2000 shall be examined in detail. The Constitutive Act 
provides for intervention in a member state where there is evidence that genocide, war crimes 
or crimes against humanity may have been committed.404 The 2002 African Union Protocol 
relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council; the 2008 Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights and its 2014 amendment; and the 
2012 AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction shall also be examined. Domestic legislative 
instruments in South Africa; Kenya; Uganda; Mauritius and Senegal shall also be examined 
to show that universal jurisdiction is indeed on the rise in Africa. 
 
                                                 
403 See Article 7 of the African Union Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council 
of the African Union (2002)  
404 See article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act (2000). 
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4.2  THE SECOND PHASE: THE RISE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN 
AFRICA 
Since 2000, the African Union has stated its commitment to dealing with impunity for 
international crimes on the continent. A number of instruments have been introduced, and 
they all reiterate the AU’s commitment to fighting impunity and to defending the sovereignty 
of its member states. It is submitted that these instruments were introduced by the AU as part 
of efforts to consolidate the sovereignty of its member states and thereby avoid undue 
influence from non-African states. The instruments, starting with the Constitutive Act of the 
African Union shall be examined below in order to show that their introduction resonates 
with the argument advanced in chapter two that the colonial confrontation was central to the 
development of international law, particularly the sovereignty doctrine. African states, weary 
of their colonial past, are making efforts to reassert their sovereignty and put their own 
international justice mechanisms in place to ensure that there is no unwarranted external 
interference by Western states. It is pertinent to mention at this point that the AU as a 
regional body does not enjoy sovereignty, but the actions taken by the AU are aimed at 
reinforcing the sovereignty of the individual member states. 
4.2.1 African regional instruments on the punishment of international crimes 
4.2.1.1 The Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000). 
The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted in Lome, Togo on the 11th of June 
2000. It replaced the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU Charter) of 1963 
following the replacement of the Organisation of African Unity by the African Union. The 
Constitutive Act outlines the objectives of the African Union, and one of them is to defend 
the sovereignty and independence of member states. It states in article 3 that, ‘The objectives 
of the Union shall be to… (b) defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence 
of its Member States.’405 
The issue of sovereignty has always been of paramount importance to African states. The 
OAU Charter states in its preamble that the Heads of States and Government agreed to the 
Charter, ‘…Determined to safeguard and consolidate the hard-won independence as well as 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our states and to fight against neo-colonialism in 
                                                 
405 See article 3 (b) of the Constitutive Act. 
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all its forms.’406 In a similar vein, The Constitutive Act provides in article 4 (a) that, ‘The 
Union shall function in accordance with the following principles (a) sovereign equality and 
interdependence among member states of the Union.’ 407  
One of the primary goals that the AU seeks to achieve is therefore to ensure that the 
sovereignty of its individual member states is respected. This resonates with arguments by 
Anghie and other scholars such as Abi-Saab who have asserted that after decolonisation, the 
newly independent states sought to safeguard their hard won sovereignty. Abi-Saab said of 
the previously colonised states,  
Once they have achieved independence and reacquired sovereignty, they are very reluctant to 
accept any limitation of it. They consider such limitations as indirect means to achieve what was 
achieved earlier by outright domination.408 
Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act is arguably the most significant provision in the context 
of the AU’s stated commitment to fight impunity on the continent. It provides for ‘the right 
of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in 
respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.’409 
This provision is evidence that the AU as a regional body is committed to deal with impunity 
on the continent and it thus provides for intervention in Member States where there are 
allegations of the core crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity having 
been committed. This is a noticeable shift from the OAU Charter which provided in its article 
III (2) that, ‘The member States…solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the 
following principles…Non-interference in the internal affairs of states.’410 
The shift in focus is attributable to a shift in the priorities of the African Union. As all 
African states had become independent from colonialism by the time the AU replaced the 
OAU, the goal of African states shifted from that of eradicating all colonial forms to that of 
ensuring the protection of human rights and it was determined that intervention in member 
states was possible. However, the OAU Charter’s provision on non-intervention became a 
                                                 
406 See the Preamble to the OAU Charter (1963), and article III (1) which states the sovereign equality of all 
states as one of the guiding principles of the organisation. 
407 See article 4 (a) of the Constitutive Act. 
408 Abi-Saab ‘The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law: An Outline’103-104. 
409 See article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000)  
410 See article III (2) Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (adopted 25/5/1963). 
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stumbling block to the protection of human rights and the fight against impunity by African 
states; hence this necessitated the inclusion of article 4 (h) in the Constitutive Act.411 
Although the Constitutive Act does not provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction, 
article 4 (h) is indicative of the regional body’s commitment to ensure accountability for 
international crimes.412 
4.2.1.2 The African Union Protocol on Peace and Security Council (2002). 
In 2002 the AU adopted the Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council. The Peace and Security Council has the power to deploy a peace keeping mission to 
a member state. In this Protocol, the AU reiterates that the Peace and Security Council shall 
be guided by the principle of ‘…respect for the sovereignty of Member States.’413 Article 4 (j) 
of the Protocol provides that the Peace and Security Council shall also be guided by the 
principle of the right to intervene in Member States pursuant to article 4 (h) of the 
Constitutive Act. Article 7 outlines the Powers of the Peace and Security Council. It has the 
power to undertake peace building missions, recommend to the Assembly intervention in a 
Member State pursuant to article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act and approve the modalities for 
such intervention.414 
It is significant that the Protocol makes no mention of the United Nations Security Council, 
which is mandated with the maintenance of peace and the deployment of peacekeeping 
missions by the United Nations. The fact that the AU has given itself the power to deploy 
peacekeeping missions without authority from the UN is indicative of African states’ desire 
to find African solutions to African problems. By mandating the Peace and Security Council 
with deployment of peace keeping missions without deferring to the UN Security Council for 
approval, the AU has asserted the sovereignty of its member states. This is achieved by 
ensuring that there are mechanisms in place to deal with problems on the continent without 
interference from non-African states. 
                                                 
411 See H Hestermeyer ‘African Union replaces Organization of African Unity’2002 (3) German Law Journal 11 
available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artid=173 (accessed 29/6/2018). 
412 See Dube ‘The AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction’457 explaining that ‘…the AU has consistently 
noted the utility of UJ in ending impunity, especially in light of article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU.’ 
413 See Article 4 (e) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (2002). 
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It is worth noting that no African State is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, 
and concerns have been raised about the purported immunity and perceived double standards 
of the Security Council.415 The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
Security Council therefore makes for a strong argument that African states are reclaiming 
their sovereignty through strengthening their own mechanisms for justice and peace building 
on the continent. Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act becomes the central principle which 
guides subsequent instruments on universal jurisdiction and regional peace keeping efforts. 
Although the respect for sovereignty and independence of States is of paramount importance 
to the AU, intervention is warranted where core crimes have allegedly been committed. 
4.2.1.3 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(2008), and the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights (2014) 
The Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights was adopted in 
2008.It proposed the merging of the African Court on Human and People’s Rights and the 
Court of Justice of the African Union into a single regional court, the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights. This court, whose establishment now awaits ratification by 15 
countries, will have jurisdiction to try international crimes through the establishment of a 
criminal chamber.416 The protocol states in its Preamble that the member states of the AU 
have made a commitment, ‘…to take all the necessary measures to strengthen their common 
institutions and to endow them with the necessary powers and resources to carry out their 
missions effectively.’417 It is submitted that this reflects on the African states’ desire to 
reaffirm their sovereignty by putting in place effective justice mechanisms. 
A number of scholars have argued that the proposed Court is a response by African states to 
the perceived unfair targeting of African officials by the ICC.Du Plessis, for example, argued 
that, 
While those involved in its drafting explain that the protocol has been motivated by reasons other 
than anti-ICC sentiment, this explanation rings hollow when considering the recent tension 
between African States ,the UN Security Council and the ICC; and when…the protocol is 
                                                 
415 See generally D Tladi ‘The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The battle for the soul of 
International Law’ (2009) 34 SAYIL 57. 
416 See article 2 of the Protocol. 
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studiously silent on any relationship between the African Court with its expanded criminal 
jurisdiction, and the ICC.418   
It is submitted that contrary to this assertion by Du Plessis, there is evidence to suggest that 
there were reasons for the adoption of the protocol which are not related to the negative 
perception of the ICC. The idea of an African court with a criminal chamber was first 
proposed in 2004 by the then Chairperson of the AU Assembly, former Nigerian President 
Olusegun Obasanjo. In January 2005 a panel of legal experts met in Addis Ababa to consider 
this proposal.419 This happened before the indictment of Al Bashir by the ICC and before the 
relationship between African states and the ICC deteriorated.  
The main reason why the court was proposed was to cut the operating costs of the AU by 
avoiding duplication of its institutions. Another significant reason for the proposal to 
establish the merged court was to find a mechanism to try leaders such as Hissene Habre.420 
During the Hissene Habre debacle, Senegal had indicated that it did not have the financial 
means to conduct the trial. At the same time, the AU did not have a competent court to try 
Hissene Habre, although it had been agreed by member states that they should find an 
African solution to this ‘African problem’.421 
Apart from the practical reasons, the underlying notion that triggered the proposal of the 
establishment of the court was to strengthen African sovereignty, by strengthening African 
justice mechanisms and to avoid African leaders such as Habre facing trial in non-African 
states. Long before the deterioration of the relationship between African states and the ICC; 
the AU had already embarked on a project to reclaim the sovereignty of African states, 
beginning with the Constitutive Act in 2000, and more significantly the establishment of a 
Peace and Security Council with the power to deploy a peacekeeping mission without UN 
approval in 2002. 
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It has been argued that there are practical and legal problems associated with the proposed 
establishment of the criminal chamber.422 Gevers has however convincingly argued that the 
establishment of the criminal chamber in the proposed court is a welcome development as it 
might work against the perceived double standard in international criminal law. A number of 
scholars and African leaders have claimed that the ICC practises double standards. The 
former AU Chairperson Jean Ping said that, ‘We are not against the ICC…But we need to 
examine their manner of operating. There are double standards. There seems to be some 
bullying against Africa.’423 
4.2.1.4 The AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction 
African states have in the past expressed concern regarding the application of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction by European states. These concerns have been expressed in the various 
decisions of the AU Assembly on the subject of universal jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this, 
both at the regional and domestic level, African states have shown an acceptance of the 
legality of this principle.424 In 2012 the AU Assembly adopted the AU (Draft) Model Law on 
Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes. The model law provides a framework for 
the application of the universality principle in AU member states which can be adapted by 
states to suit their domestic legal frameworks.425 The AU Model Law on Universal 
Jurisdiction provides for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over certain international 
crimes including the core crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and 
other serious crimes including piracy and terrorism.426  
                                                 
422 For an overview of the pros and cons of establishing a criminal chamber in the proposed court, see generally 
Murungu  ‘Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court of Justice and Human Rights’; Du Plessis 
‘Implications of the AU Decision to give the AU Court Jurisdiction over International Crimes’; M Matasi & J 
Brohmer ‘The Proposed International Criminal Chamber Section of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights’ (2012) 37 SAYIL 248. 
423 Sudan Tribune 24/7/2010 ‘The AU Chief challenges ICC to arrest Sudanese President’ available at 
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article3574 (accessed 29/6/2018). 
424 Gevers ‘Back to the Future?’112. 
425  Dube ‘The AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction’ 457. 
426 See Section 8 of the African Union (Draft) Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes 
(2012); Gevers ‘Back to the Future?’112; Dube ‘The AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction’ 458. 
108 
 
As has been explained in Chapter Three, the legality of the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
is no longer a subject of dispute in international law.427 What remains controversial is the 
scope of universal jurisdiction, in particular the crimes over which universal jurisdiction can 
be exercised and their definitions; whether or not the presence of a suspect is required in the 
territory of a state seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction, and the issue of immunities of 
state officials in relation to the exercise of universal jurisdiction.428  In this regard, both the 
AU Model Law and the domestic instruments (which shall be examined below) address these 
questions, although not all of them provide clarity on all the contentious issues related to 
universal jurisdiction. 
With regard to the definition of core crimes, the Model Law mainly gives the same definition 
as that given in the Rome Statute.429 This is with the exception of the definition of genocide, 
which is defined differently in the AU Model Law and the disputes surrounding the 
definitions of the expanded crimes including aggression, terrorism as well as the recently 
recognised crimes such as the unconstitutional change in government.430 
In terms of the requirement that the accused must be present in the territory of the state 
seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction, the Model Law provides for the presence of the 
accused person at the beginning of the trial, therefore the presence of the suspect is not 
required for stages prior to trial such as investigations.431 It is pertinent to note at this point 
that for practical reasons, the AU Model Law and other sub-regional instruments which deal 
with the prosecution of international crimes provide for mutual legal assistance between 
states in the event that there is competing jurisdiction between states.432 In the context of 
securing the presence of the accused for trial, the model law provides that all the crimes 
provided for are ‘extraditable offences.’433 In this vein, the SADC Protocol on Mutual Legal 
Assistance in Criminal Matters; the ECOWAS Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
                                                 
427  Gevers & Vrancken ‘Jurisdiction of States’ 250. 
428 Gevers ‘Back to the Future?’ 112.  
429 See the Definitions section of the AU Model Law, which gives the same definitions as those in articles 6, 7 
and 8 of the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court. See also Gevers ibid 113. 
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Matters and the Great Lakes Protocol on Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against 
Humanity, all provide for an undertaking of mutual legal assistance by their member states.434  
In addition to providing that the crimes in the AU model law shall be extraditable offences, 
the instrument refers to a number of other measures which may be taken to assist other states 
such as the collecting of evidence and making it available to the state seeking to exercise 
jurisdiction, as well as the identifying and tracing of the proceeds of crime.435 It is submitted 
that the provisions relating to mutual legal assistance in the AU Model Law and in the sub-
regional instruments are in sync with the AU’s stated commitment to combating impunity for 
atrocities.436 
The instruments discussed above, with the exception of the AU Model Law on Universal 
Jurisdiction, do not provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction. They are however 
relevant to this thesis because they reiterate the AU’S commitment to reassert the sovereignty 
and independence of member states, as well as to prevent impunity on the continent. The rise 
of universal jurisdiction in Africa arguably takes place against the background of the above 
instruments. 
4.3 AFRICAN UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: ICC IMPLEMENTATION 
EGISLATION IN SELECTED AFRICAN STATES 
At the domestic level, a number of African states have implemented legislation enabling their 
courts to exercise universal jurisdiction whilst at the same time implementing the provisions 
of the Rome Statute of the ICC. These include South Africa; Uganda; Mauritius; Kenya; the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Senegal. Senegal amended its Penal Code in 2007 to 
incorporate the core crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
country also simultaneously enacted a law to update its criminal procedure. This was done to 
                                                 
434 See article 2(1) SADC Protocol on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (adopted on 1 March 2007); 
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enable the Senegalese courts to exercise universal jurisdiction for international crimes and to 
provide a framework for the trial of Hissene Habre as well as the country’s cooperation with 
the ICC.437 
4.3.1 South Africa 
In South Africa, the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court have 
been implemented in domestic legislation through the enactment of the Implementation of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 (ICC Act). The ICC Act 
confers jurisdiction upon South African courts over the core crimes in the Rome Statute i.e. 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.438 In addition to this, South Africa has 
also domesticated the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional 
Protocols through the Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act 8 of 2012 (hereinafter 
the Geneva Conventions Act).439 These legislative instruments shall be examined in turn in 
order to highlight South Africa’s perspective on the application of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction. 
It is important to note at this point that South Africa is a dualist country, and this means that 
international treaties only become part of international law after they have been domesticated 
by an Act of Parliament.440 For this reason, before the enactment of the ICC Act in 2002, 
South African courts did not have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
torture.441 
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4.3.1.1. The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 
27 of 2002 
The ICC Act enabled South African Courts to exercise jurisdiction over the core crimes of 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.442 The main purpose of the Act was to 
enable South Africa to fulfil its obligations under the Rome Statute of the ICC, which it 
ratified in November 2000.443 With regards to the definitions of the crimes, the ICC Act 
incorporates the definitions as they are given in the Rome statute of the ICC, in Schedule 1.444 
In terms of section 4(3), there are four jurisdictional bases upon which South African courts 
may exercise jurisdiction over the core crimes. The courts may exercise jurisdiction where 
the accused is a South African citizen; accused is ordinarily resident in the Republic or the 
victim is ordinarily resident in the Republic. Notably, section 4 (3) (c) provides as follows, 
In order to secure the jurisdiction of a South African court for purposes of this chapter, any 
person who commits [an ICC] crime outside the territory of the Republic, is deemed to have 
committed that crime within the territory of the Republic if …that person, after the commission 
of the crime, is present in the territory of the Republic.445 
The effect of section 4(3) (c) is therefore to confer upon South African courts universal 
jurisdiction, to be exercised in cases where no other jurisdictional nexus exists between South 
Africa and the crime.446 According to Gevers, although the Act provides for four jurisdictional 
bases, only  jurisdiction based on the universality principle is significant because the fact that 
                                                 
442  See section 4(1) of the ICC Act which provides that ‘Despite anything to the contrary in any other law of the 
Republic, any person who commits a crime, is guilty of an offence….’. For a detailed commentary on the ICC 
Act see generally Kantz ‘An Act of Transformation: The Incorporation of the Rome Statute of the ICC into 
national law in South Africa’ and Du Plessis ‘South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute: An African 
example’. 
443 Woolaver ‘Partners in Complementarity’131. 
444  See Schedule 1 of the ICC Act; Gevers ‘International criminal law in South Africa’ 416. 
445 See section 4 (3) (c) of the Act. 
446 Gevers ‘International Criminal Law in South Africa’ 416; Chenwi ‘Universal Jurisdiction and South Africa’s 
Perspective on the Investigation of International Crimes’ 35. 
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the Act empowers courts to exercise universal jurisdiction renders the inclusion of the 
territoriality, nationality and passive personality bases of jurisdiction redundant.447 
Section 4(3) (c) also provides for the presence of the accused person in South Africa after the 
commission of a crime. A number of scholars including Woolaver and Chenwi have asserted 
that this section provides for the exercise of conditional universal jurisdiction by South 
African Courts.448  However as has been discussed in Chapter Three, whether or not a 
country’s legislation requires the presence of the accused for universal jurisdiction to be 
exercised does not have a bearing on the permissibility of the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction.449  In this vein, Gevers has convincingly argued that section 4(3)(c) ought to be 
read together with section 4(1) which confers upon South African Courts prescriptive 
jurisdiction over the crimes provided for in the Act. Gevers notes that the issue which is 
subject to debate is not whether universal jurisdiction is conditional, but at what stage of the 
proceedings the presence of the accused in South Africa is required.450 
4.3.1.2. SOUTH AFRICA’S PERSPECTIVE ON UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION: THE ZIMBABWE TORTURE DOCKET CASE 
The Zimbabwe Torture Docket Case451 was the first case in which the South African courts 
had to rule on the interpretation of the provisions of the ICC Act. Prior to this, the decisions 
in AZAPO452 and S v Basson453 had been the leading authorities on the subject of the 
application of international criminal law in South Africa.454The case was first decided by the 
North Gauteng High Court, then on appeal by the Supreme Court of Appeal and finally the 
                                                 
447 Gevers ibid fn 63. 
448 See Chenwi ‘Universal Jurisdiction and South Africa’s Perspective on the Investigation of International 
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449 See Woolaver ibid 131-132 and Chenwi ibid 35. 
450 For a detailed argument on this point see generally C Gevers ‘Southern African Litigation Centre and 
Another v NDPP and Others: Note’ (2013) 130 SALJ 293. 
451 Southern African Litigation Centre and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 
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Constitutional Court.455 The Zimbabwe Torture Docket Case is discussed in detail here 
because the jurisprudence of the three Courts which dealt with the matter is important in the 
examination of the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa. It is pertinent to note that the 
discussion of this case at length, notwithstanding that the focus of the thesis is not limited to 
the practice of universal jurisdiction in South Africa; is not in any way intended to diminish 
the importance or relevance of the domestic instruments of the other selected African states. 
The brief facts of the matter are that in March 2007, state police in Zimbabwe raided the 
headquarters of the country’s main opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC). Following this a South African NGO, the Southern African Litigation Centre 
(SALC) compiled a dossier with the help of the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum, a South African 
based NGO. This dossier detailed alleged torture perpetrated against MDC activists by high 
ranking state officials in Zimbabwe. It was submitted in 2008 to the Priority Crimes 
Litigation Unit (PCLU) of the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA), and the SALC 
requested the NPA and the South African Police Services (SAPS) to investigate the alleged 
systemic torture, in terms of the ICC Act. The NPA declined to initiate investigations on the 
basis that it lacked the jurisdiction to initiate such investigations as the alleged torture had 
been committed outside the territorial borders of South Africa, against non-South Africans, 
by non-South Africans.456 
In response to the refusal by the NPA to initiate investigations, the SALC approached the 
North Gauteng High Court for an administrative review of this decision. In 2012, the High 
Court ruled that the refusal by the NPA to investigate the matter had been unreasonable. The 
first key issue which was considered by the court was whether South Africa was obliged to 
investigate and prosecute international crimes under (the ICC Act) domestic law and (the 
Rome Statute) international law. On this point, the court ruled that South Africa was obliged 
to investigate and prosecute international crimes ‘as far as possible’. The second issue that 
the court pronounced on was the question at what stage the presence of the accused in South 
                                                 
455 For a detailed commentary of the case as decided by the High Court, Supreme Court and Constitutional Court 
see Gevers ibid 427-438, and see generally A Mudukuti ‘The Zimbabwe Torture Docket Case: Reflections on 
domestic litigation for international crimes in Africa’ (2016) 1 Acta Juridica 287. 
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Africa is required. The court held that the presence of the accused was not required at the 
investigation stage but only at the trial stage.457 
As noted by Gevers, this pronouncement by the court brought clarity to section 4 (3) of the 
ICC Act, which does not specify at which stage the accused’s presence is required in South 
Africa458 Thirdly, the court considered the issue of the threshold required for an investigation 
to be initiated, and it held in this regard that the required threshold is that there should be a 
reasonable basis to initiate an investigation.459 Lastly, the court considered whether or not 
political considerations are relevant in deciding whether to initiate investigations, and it held 
that political considerations or diplomatic initiatives were irrelevant for purposes of 
determining whether to investigate. They would however become relevant at the stage of 
determining whether or not to prosecute.460 
The North Gauteng High Court ruling was appealed by the South African government, and 
this appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court of Appeal in its judgment on 27 November 
2013.461 On appeal, the first and third issues were discussed. In particular, the SCA was 
requested to rule on the proper interpretation of section 4 (3) (c) of the ICC Act. The Court 
concluded, as the High Court had done, that the South African police are empowered and 
required to investigate the allegations of torture regardless of whether or not the accused had 
been present in South Africa.462 In this regard, the court held that  section 4 (1) of the ICC Act 
as read with the definitions of crimes against humanity and part 2 of schedule 1 of the Act  
‘…criminalises…conduct at the time of its commission, regardless of where and by whom it 
was committed’.463 
                                                 
457 Southern African Litigation Centre and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 
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The South African Police Services then took the matter on appeal to the Constitutional 
Court.464 The Constitutional Court upheld the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal and 
ruled that the SAPS had breached its obligations by declining to initiate an investigation. The 
Constitutional Court endorsed the finding by the SCA that the SAPS were not only 
empowered to investigate the crimes in question, but that they had a duty to do so. It further 
held that this duty stemmed from those situations where the territorial state is unable or 
unwilling to investigate the alleged crimes.465 On the issue of the presence requirement, the 
Court held that the presence of the suspect in South Africa was not required in order for an 
investigation to be initiated.466 
The Constitutional Court judgment is laudable for having clarified a number of issues 
relating to South Africa’s application of international criminal law generally, and more 
specifically the implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
These issues include that of the presence requirement and the contentious issue of 
immunities.  
4.3.1.3 The Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act 8 of 2012 
South Africa enacted the Geneva Conventions Act in 2012, becoming the first country to 
domesticate the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols, thereby 
ensuring the prevention and punishment of their breaches.467 The Act was adopted sixty years 
after the country acceded to the Geneva Conventions.468 It criminalises offences which fall 
under two categories. One is the category of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and 
their first Additional Protocol of 1977, and these are breaches which are typically committed 
                                                 
464 For a detailed commentary of the Constitutional Court judgment see Gevers ‘International Criminal Law in 
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during international armed conflicts.469 Section 5 (2) of the Act provides that ‘a grave breach 
means a breach referred to in article 50 of the First Convention; article 51 of the Second 
Convention; article 130 of the Third Convention; article 147 of the Fourth Convention ,and 
article 11 or 85 of Protocol I.’470 
The second category of offences which are criminalised by the Geneva Conventions Act is 
that of breaches to the Conventions which are not included in section 5 (2).471 According to 
Gevers, this category of offences possibly includes war crimes which are committed in non-
international armed conflict.472 These two categories are subject to different jurisdictional 
bases. The first category of offences is subject to the exercise of universal jurisdiction by the 
courts. Section 7 (1) of the Act provides that  
Any court in the Republic may try a person for an offence under this Act in the same manner as 
if the offence had been committed in the area of jurisdiction of that court, notwithstanding that 
the act or omission to which the charge relates was committed outside the Republic.473 
Contrary to the ICC Act, the Geneva Conventions Act provides for ‘unconditional’ universal 
jurisdiction in that section 7 (1) does not provide for a requirement of presence of the 
accused. 
With respect to the second category of offences, the Act does not confer universal 
jurisdiction upon South African courts over these offences. Instead, jurisdiction can be 
exercised based on the grounds of territoriality and nationality, but not passive nationality.474 
The Chief Justice and the National Director for Public Prosecutions have to be consulted 
                                                 
469 Du Plessis ‘The Geneva Conventions and South African Law’2; Gevers ‘International Criminal Law in South 
Africa’ 420. 
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before a determination is made as to which court should try a person accused of offences 
referred to in the Act.475 
Another point worth noting with respect to the Act is that it applies to offences which were 
committed before it was adopted. Section 7 (4) of the Act provides that, ‘Nothing in this Act 
must be construed as precluding the prosecution of any person accused of having committed 
a breach under customary international law before this Act took effect.’476 As has been noted 
by Gevers, and Du Plessis, this provision is confusing because it does not specify how such 
prosecution is to take place.477 
4.3.2 Kenya 
In Kenya, the provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC were domesticated by the 
International Crimes Act 16 of 2008.This followed the country’s ratification of the Rome 
Statute of the ICC in 2005. Its purpose is to enable the courts to exercise jurisdiction over the 
core international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, and to enable 
Kenya to cooperate with the ICC.478 The Act incorporates the Rome Statute of the ICC in its 
entirety, appended as a First Schedule. In terms of defining the core crimes, the Act imports 
the definitions directly from the Rome Statute of the ICC.479 This is similar to the definitions 
in the ICC Act of South Africa which are incorporated directly from the Rome Statute of the 
ICC. The Act provides for two categories of offences. The first category is the core crimes 
which are provided for in section 6 (1) which states that, ‘A person who, in Kenya or 
elsewhere, commits – (a) genocide, (b) a crime against humanity; or (c) a war crime, is guilty 
of an offence.’480 
It is specified in the Act that the High Court is the court which will conduct trials in respect 
of these crimes.481 The second category consists of crimes which stem from the prosecution of 
                                                 
475 See section 7 (2) of the Act; Chenwi ‘Universal Jurisdiction and South Africa’s Perspective on the 
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core crimes under section 6 of the Act. These offences range from bribery of judges and 
officials, obstructing justice, perjury and fabricating evidence among others, and are provided 
for in section 9-17 of the Act. 
With respect to the first category of offences, the Act empowers the court to exercise 
jurisdiction on the basis of the territoriality, nationality and passive personality principle. In 
addition, jurisdiction can be exercised in those instances where the accused at the time of the 
commission of the offence was a citizen or an employee of a state engaged in an armed 
conflict against Kenya, or if the victim is a citizen of a state that was allied with Kenya in an 
armed conflict. Finally, the Act empowers the court to exercise universal jurisdiction over the 
core crimes. It stipulates in section 8 (c) that, ‘A person who is alleged to have committed an 
offence under section 6 may be tried and punished in Kenya for that offence if …the person 
is, after the commission of the offence, present in Kenya.’482 
For the second category of offences, jurisdiction is provided for in section 18 which provides 
for jurisdiction on the basis of the territoriality, nationality and universality principle.483 In 
contrast to jurisdiction over the core crimes which is the preserve of the High Court in terms 
of section 8,section 18 (2) stipulates that a trial in respect of the crimes provided for in 
section 9-17 may be conducted by any competent court. 
With respect to the issue of presence of the accused, the Act is strict on the presence 
requirement. Both section 8 (c) and section 18 (c) which provide for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction require the presence of the accused in Kenya after the commission of the offence. 
Both provisions stipulate that an accused person ‘…may be tried and punished in Kenya if 
they are present in Kenya after the commission of the offence.’484 
It ought to be noted that despite Kenya having domesticated the Rome Statute of the ICC, the 
relationship between the country and the ICC has been deteriorating in recent years. This 
followed the confirmation of proceedings against the incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta 
and his deputy William Ruto in 2012.Although the cases have now ended, Kenya has been at 
the forefront of calling for a mass withdrawal of African countries from the ICC. In a public 
address in December 2016, Kenya’s President said that,  
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The Kenyan cases at the International Criminal Court have ended, but the experience has given 
us cause to observe that this institution has become a tool of global power politics and not the 
justice it was built to dispense.485 
4.3.3 Uganda 
The International Criminal Court Act 11 of 2010 confers universal jurisdiction upon 
Ugandan courts in respect of the core crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.486 The purposes of the Act include giving domestic effect to the Rome Statute of 
the ICC, to implement Uganda’s obligations under the Rome Statute of the ICC, and to 
enable Uganda to cooperate with the ICC in matters including the arrest and surrender of 
suspects.487 In terms of definitions of the core crimes, the Act incorporates the definitions as 
they are given in the Rome statute of the ICC and in the Geneva Conventions. Section 7 (2) 
provides that genocide is an act referred to in article 6 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, whilst 
section 8 (2) provides that crimes against humanity are those referred to in article 7 of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC. In terms of section 9 (2) of the Act, war crimes are those acts 
referred to in article 8 (2) (a)-(e) of the Rome Statute. Article 2 (a) relates to the breaches of 
the Geneva Conventions. 
In addition to the core crimes, the Act also provides for jurisdiction over offences related to 
the administration of justice including corruption of a judge, bribery of a judge, corruption 
and bribery of an official of the ICC, and giving false evidence. These are provided for in 
section 10-16 of the Act. The difference between the core crimes and the crimes against the 
administration of justice is that for the core crimes the Act specifies that the penalty to be 
imposed upon conviction shall be ‘…imprisonment for life or a lesser term.’488 With the 
offences related to the administration of justice, the penalties vary according to the offence, 
with a heavier penalty being imposed for offences involving an act of omission compared to 
those which do not. For instance, section 10 (1) of the Act stipulates that the penalty of a 
judge convicted of corruption in respect of an act of omission is ‘…imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding 14 years.’ Section 10 (2) provides that the penalty of a Judge, Registrar or 
                                                 
485 See Voice of Africa (13/12/2016) ‘Kenya Signals Possible ICC Withdrawal’ available at 
www.voanews.com/a/kenya-signals-possible-icc-withdrawal/3634365.html (accessed 29/6/2018). 
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Deputy Registrar convicted for corruption which does not involve an act of omission is 
‘…imprisonment for a term not exceeding 7 years.’489 
For both the core crimes and offences relating to the administration of justice, the Act confers 
the courts with jurisdiction on the basis of the nationality, passive personality and 
universality principles where the offence has been committed outside Uganda. In terms of 
section 18, jurisdiction may be exercised if the person, 
(a) is a citizen or permanent resident in Uganda;(b) is employed by Uganda in a civilian or 
military capacity; (c ) has committed the offence against a citizen or permanent resident of 
Uganda; or (d) is after the commission of the offence, present in Uganda.490 
Although the Act provides that the accused must be present in Uganda after the commission 
of the Act, it does not specify at which stage this presence is required. It only states that the 
accused must be present ‘for the purpose of jurisdiction.’491 It is therefore not clear as to 
whether the accused must be present at the stage of investigations or at the trial stage. 
However, as rightly argued by Dube, as there is no customary international law rule 
prohibiting investigations  in absentia, the suspect’s presence in Uganda is only required at 
the trial stage.492 The consent of the Director for Public Prosecutions is required before 
proceedings can be initiated before a court, although an accused may be arrested and 
remanded in custody, and an arrest warrant may be issued without such consent.493 
4.3.4 Mauritius 
Mauritius domesticated the Rome Statute of the ICC by enacting the International Criminal 
Court Act 27 of 2011.The Act criminalises the three core crimes and incorporates the Rome 
Statute definitions for these crimes.494 The Act confers jurisdiction upon the courts for acts 
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committed outside the country on the basis of the nationality, passive personality and 
universality principles. Section 4 (3) provides that, 
Where a person commits an international crime outside Mauritius he shall be deemed to have 
committed the crime in Mauritius if he (a) is a citizen of Mauritius;(b) is not a citizen of 
Mauritius but is ordinarily resident in Mauritius;(c) is present in Mauritius after the commission 
of the crime; or (d) has committed the crime against a citizen or resident of Mauritius.495 
Section (4) (3) (c) does not specify at which stage after the commission of the crime the 
presence of the accused person is required. However, as thoughtfully argued by Gevers, the 
presence requirement is provided for under the ‘Offences and Jurisdiction of Courts of 
Mauritius’ section, therefore by implication the presence of the accused is only required at 
the trial stage.496 
4.3.5 Senegal 
Senegal was the first country in the world to ratify the Rome statute of the ICC, but it did not 
take any immediate steps to domesticate its provisions.497 However, following Senegal’s 
refusal to extradite the former Chadian leader Hissene Habre to Belgium in 2005, and the 
decision by the AU that Habre should be tried in Senegal and that Senegal should put in 
place a legal framework to enable such a trial to take place, the country took steps to 
domesticate the provisions of the Rome statute of the ICC.498  
In a law enacted on 31 January 2007, the country amended its Penal Code to provide a 
framework for the prosecution of the crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.499 In addition, Senegal amended its Criminal Procedure Code to provide for the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction and to give effect to the complementarity provision in the 
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Rome Statute.500 Article 2 of the law amending the criminal Procedure Code amended article 
669 of the Criminal Procedure Code and provides for the exercise of universal jurisdiction by 
the Courts of Senegal.501 The exercise of universal jurisdiction in Senegal is subject to the 
accused person being present in the territory of Senegal. Article 2 of Law no 2007-05 
provides that universal jurisdiction can be exercised ‘…if that person is found in Senegalese 
territory or if the victim resides in Senegal if the government obtains extradition for that 
person.’502 As was mentioned above, the amendment to the Penal Code and to the Criminal 
Procedure Code was done in order to put in place a legal framework to try Habre.503 Earlier 
attempts to try Habre for human rights violations perpetrated whilst he was president of Chad 
had failed as Senegalese law did not incorporate a framework for the punishment of 
international crimes, or provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction.504 
Article 431-1 of the Amended Penal Code incorporates the crime of genocide and it lists the 
four protected groups which are the national, ethical, racial and religious groups, 
incorporating the groups as they are stated in both the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Genocide of 1948  (Genocide Convention) and the Rome Statute of the ICC.505 
Article 431-2 incorporates crimes against humanity and war crimes are incorporated in article 
431-3.506 Article 431-6 introduced a departure from the principle of non-retroactive 
application of the law. This was necessitated by the fact that the crimes which Habre was 
accused of having committed dated back to between 1982 and 1990, and therefore the 
enabling legislation would have to be applied retroactively in Habre’s case.507 Despite the 
provision in Article 431-6, the Penal Code could not override the Constitution as it is the 
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supreme law. Article 9 (2) of the Senegalese Constitution provides that, ‘No one can be 
convicted save pursuant to a law entered into force prior to the act committed.’508 
In order to overcome this legal hurdle, a new paragraph was added to article 9 of the 
Constitution, providing for an exception to the principle of non-retroactivity with respect to 
the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. It provides as follows, 
the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not exclude the prosecution, trial and sentencing 
of a person for acts which at the time they were committed were deemed to be criminal acts in 
accordance with the rules of international law on genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.509 
 In addition, the amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code provides in article 1 that the 
crimes incorporated into the Code shall not be subject to the Statute of Limitations.510 Habre 
however successfully challenged the amendments to both the Penal Code and the Criminal 
Procedure Code before the ECOWAS court in 2010.The court ruled that if a domestic court 
in Senegal were to try Habre based on these amendments the trial would still be in violation 
of the nullum crimen sine lege rule, but this would not be the case if he were to be tried by an 
international tribunal. Following this ruling, Senegal agreed to set up a tribunal to try Habre, 
with the support of the AU.511 
The EAC was established in December 2012 after Senegal enacted the requisite legislation, 
leading to the arrest of Habre in June 2013.512 The trial of Habre began on the 20th of July 
2015 and was concluded on the 11th of February 2016.He was convicted of crimes against 
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a Special Tribunal in Compliance with ECOWAS Court Judgment’ available at 
http://hrbrief.org/2011/04/bringing-hissene-habre-to-justice-senegal-to-create-a-special-tribunal-in-compliance-
with-ecowas-court-judgment- (accessed 29/6/2018). 
512 Williams ibid 1144. 
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humanity, war crimes and torture and sentenced to life in prison.513 This marked an end to a 
decade-long legal battle between Senegal (backed by the AU) and Belgium concerning the 
issue of bringing Habre to trial. Habre appealed the judgment in 2017 and the EAC upheld 
his conviction for war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture and life sentence, but 
acquitted him of rape.514 The trial of Hissene Habre is very significant to the rise of universal 
jurisdiction in Africa as it was the first time that a domestic court in Africa had exercised 
universal jurisdiction against a former head of state. It is worth noting at this point that the 
EAC is a hybrid quasi-judicial court as it was established by Senegal with the support of the 
AU, but it is embedded in the domestic legal system .As explained by Williams, ‘The EAC is 
…best characterized as an internationalized criminal tribunal, which are ‘essentially domestic 
institutions but with significant participation from other states or from international 
organisations.’515 
This discussion on regional and domestic legislation on universal jurisdiction has highlighted 
that African states have accepted the legality of the principle of universal jurisdiction. 
However, African states are disgruntled about the application of this principle by European 
states, hence the AU Model Law and the domestic legislative instruments can be seen as 
Africa’s way of trying to avoid ‘European’ universal jurisdiction and come up with their own 
mechanisms to deal with international crimes on the continent. One of the major concerns 
raised by African states regarding the exercise of universal jurisdiction by European states 
against African officials is that it infringes upon their sovereignty. The fact that universal 
jurisdiction is gaining ground in Africa shows that African states are trying to reclaim their 
sovereignty by avoiding the exercise of jurisdiction over African state officials by non-
African states, and the jurisdiction of the ICC through putting in place effective justice 
mechanisms. 
                                                 
513 See Perez-Leon-Acevedo ‘’The Conviction of Hissene Habre by the Extraordinary African Chambers in the 
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515 Williams ‘The Extraordinary African Chambers in the Senegalese Courts’1146.  
125 
 
4.4  CONCLUSION: AFRICA, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND 
SOVEREIGNTY 
This chapter has attempted to address the gap created by the scholarly silence on the rise of 
universal jurisdiction in Africa since 2002 when South Africa enacted domestic legislation to 
implement the provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC. The examination of universal 
jurisdiction legislative instruments both at the domestic level and at the regional level has 
shown that contrary to assertions by a number of scholars, the repeal of the universal 
jurisdiction legislation in Belgium did not result in the total demise of the principle. Instead, 
universal jurisdiction has gone through a second phase in the form of its rise in Africa, a 
development which, this thesis argues, is part of efforts by African states to reaffirm their 
sovereignty. 
 It is submitted that the reaction by African states to universal jurisdiction as practiced by 
European states, and to efforts by the ICC to prosecute African leaders for human rights 
violations, ought to be understood against the background of Anghie’s theory on the colonial 
origins of international law. As was explained in Chapter Two, African states and European 
states have historically experienced sovereignty differently. As a result, they understand and 
apply the doctrine differently; leading to tensions between the two sides. Anghie has 
explained that the exercise of the sovereignty doctrine often mirrors the inequalities which 
were characteristic of the colonial confrontation.516 The rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa 
at a time when African states have criticised the perceived abuse of the principle by 
European states, and when they have criticised the ICC as selectively targeting African 
leaders, therefore takes place against the background of Anghie’s theory on the historical link 
between colonialism and sovereignty. African states want to strengthen their justice 
mechanisms at the regional level in order to avoid the jurisdiction of European states and that 
of the ICC. 
It has been argued, for instance, that the establishment of the EAC was part of efforts by the 
AU to reinforce the sovereignty of its member states and to avoid the exercise of jurisdiction 
by non-African states against African leaders, in this case by Belgium.517 Williams has 
asserted that the involvement of the AU in setting up institutions such as the EAC solves the 
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problem of African states’ concerns regarding the infringement of their sovereignty.518The 
colonial confrontation subordinated non-European states and resulted in them being treated 
as objects rather than subjects of international law. According to Anghie, ‘...It is simply and 
massively asserted that only the practice of European states was decisive and could create 
international law .Only European law counted as law.’519 
It is because of this history of subordination and being denied their sovereignty that African 
states are constantly placing an emphasis on the issue of their sovereignty. They view any 
attempts by European states to prosecute African state officials as being neo-colonial, which 
is why they have claimed that the exercise of universal jurisdiction by European states over 
African state officials evokes memories of colonialism.520 
A discussion of the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa would therefore not be complete 
without taking into consideration the historical link between colonialism and the sovereignty 
doctrine. Anghie has explained that the end of colonialism did not result in the end to 
colonial relations, and that the decolonisation process did not result in the complete 
emancipation of the former colonies. African states are still weary of their colonial past; 
hence they often take steps to reassert their sovereignty. He has asserted that, 
The end of formal colonialism, while extremely significant, did not mean the end of colonial 
relations. Rather, in the view of Third World societies, colonialism was replaced by neo-
colonialism; Third World states continued to play a subordinate role in the international system 
because they were economically dependent on the West, and the rules of international economic 
law continued to ensure that this would be the case.521 
In this vein, it is submitted that the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa is an attempt by 
African states to re-assert their sovereignty which they were historically denied, in order to 
avoid interference in their affairs by their former colonisers. Although colonialism is now 
confined to history and it is now considered that all states are equal, the different conceptions 
of the sovereignty doctrine by African and European states respectively is evidence that the 
colonial confrontation is still central to the development of international law. This resonates 
with Anghie’s assertion that, 
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the colonial encounter has ineluctably shaped the fundamental doctrines of international law –
sources and sovereignty. Further, it has created an international law which, even when it 
innovates, follows the familiar pattern of the colonial encounter, the division between civilized 
and uncivilized, the developed and the developing 522 
Although the end of colonialism was supposed to result in all states being equally sovereign, 
the deficiency of African sovereignty continues to manifest in the application of international 
law. This is why African states are trying to re-assert their sovereignty by coming up with 
their own universal jurisdiction mechanisms, thereby blocking the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by non-African states, against African officials.523 The recent trial and conviction 
of Hissene Habre by the EAC with the backing of the AU, highlights the resolve by African 
states to find African solutions to African problems. Belgium wanted Habre to be extradited 
from Senegal and tried by its courts. On the other hand, Senegal, backed by the AU, was of 
the view that the best place for Habre to face trial was in Africa. The former Senegalese 
President Abdoulaye Wade told reporters at an African Union Summit in Gambia in 2006 
that, ‘Africans must be judged in Africa. That is why I refused to extradite Hissene Habre to 
Belgium.’ 524 
It is submitted that the Hissene Habre debacle was not just about the legal issues surrounding 
his prosecution. It was about the struggle by African states to resist neo-colonialism. The 
escalating tensions between African states under the auspices of the AU and Western states 
with regards to the application of the universality principle, and the perceived unfair targeting 
of African Heads of State by the ICC, show that African states are weary of international 
criminal justice as practised by Western states and the ICC, therefore they would want to 
have their own mechanisms in place.  
In this regard, Dube has convincingly argued that the AU Model Law was adopted by the AU 
as a means to address the concerns raised by African states regarding the application of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction by non-African states, and the work of the ICC in Africa.525 
The model law was therefore adopted to provide an alternative to universal jurisdiction as 
administered by Western states, and to the jurisdiction of the ICC. It provides a framework 
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for the application of universal jurisdiction at a domestic level, thereby ensuring that African 
states have a mechanism to bring those accused of committing international crimes to trial, 
without interference from non-African states. In this way, African states can supposedly 
enjoy the sovereignty that they are entitled to at international law without it being infringed 
upon by Western states in the name of international criminal justice.  
Commenting on the reaction by African states to universal jurisdiction as practised by 
Western states, and the work of the ICC in Africa, Jalloh has explained that African states are 
of the view that ‘…the two jurisdictional devices are the new weapons of choice of former 
colonial powers targeting weaker African nations.’526  
The attitude of African states to the application of universal jurisdiction by non-African 
states, and to the distinct but closely related, role of the ICC in Africa, resonates with 
Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of international law.527 According to Anghie at the 
dawn of decolonisation, former colonies sought to enforce the doctrine of sovereignty in 
order to guard against post-colonial interferences. Anghie asserted that,  
the new states would seek to regain control over their own economic and political affairs, and to 
change an international legal regime that operated to their disadvantage. The use of the newly 
acquired weapon of sovereignty was fundamental to these initiatives.528 
 By adopting the AU Model Law, and by assisting Senegal to try Hissene Habre in the EAC, 
African states have embarked on a project to reclaim their sovereignty. Past African 
experiences with interference from European states including the indictment of African 
officials by European states such as Spain and Belgium, and the insistence by Belgium that 
Hissene Habre must be extradited to Belgium even as the AU was working out the modalities 
to try Habre, arguably contributed to this rise in universal jurisdiction in Africa.  
Habre’s trial and conviction has demonstrated to the world that Africa is indeed capable of 
prosecuting those accused of committing international crimes, and that the legitimate fight 
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against impunity in Africa is possible.529 Commenting on the establishment of the EAC, 
Williams argued that  
‘A ‘successful trial’ of Habre before the Extraordinary African Chambers would demonstrate 
that an AU-led initiative is a viable alternative to the exercise of universal jurisdiction by other 
states, and that the region can be trusted to resolve situations of impunity.’530 
The successful trial of Habre has therefore strengthened rather than weakened the position of 
African states on the issue of universal jurisdiction. African states have shown that they are 
willing to deal with international crimes on the continent. As noted by Williams, when 
responding to African concerns on the perceived abuse of universal jurisdiction, the EU 
experts argued that African states need to show that they are really willing to prosecute 
international crimes in their territories. 531 The fact that Senegal, with the help of the AU, 
managed to successfully conduct the trial of Hissene Habre, is evidence that African states 
are capable of coming up with African solutions to African problems. 
The discussion on African states and their application of the principles of universal 
jurisdiction and sovereignty has highlighted that, as argued by Anghie, the end of the colonial 
confrontation and the universalisation of international law did not result in the end to colonial 
relations.532 According to Anghie, ‘…because sovereignty was shaped by the colonial 
encounter, its exercise often reproduces the inequalities inherent in that encounter.’533 It is 
asserted that it is these inequalities that African states seek to address by pushing for the rise 
of the principle of universal jurisdiction on the continent. In Chapter Five, it shall be asserted 
that these inequalities are highlighted by the perceived double standard in the application of 
the principle of immunities by European States in the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
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                                        CHAPTER FIVE 
THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
IMMUNITIES AND ITS APPLICATION IN EUROPE 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The principle of immunities is considered to be one of the oldest principles in international 
law, and can be traced back to the Greek and Roman times. Van Alebeek has explained in 
this regard that, 
The inviolability of diplomatic agents is one of the oldest rules of international law. Already 
thousands of years ago, in the practice of, for example the Greeks and the Romans, a diplomatic 
agent-then called a messenger or herald-was not to be maltreated or subjected to any form of 
arrest or detention.534 
It was only in the 19th century however that courts began to apply immunities for foreign 
state officials.535 These immunities did not apply to all states, as only European states were 
considered to be civilised and therefore sovereign. Non-European communities were 
considered to be uncivilised and therefore not sovereign and were excluded from the realm of 
international law. The principle of immunities therefore did not apply to them.536 On the other 
hand, it was common practice for European states to assert immunity not only for their state 
officials, but for ordinary citizens as well whenever they travelled outside their countries. 
This immunity was de facto immunity because as Gevers and Vrancken have explained, ‘In 
most instances, this restriction on jurisdiction did not amount to immunity proper as the 
‘territories’ concerned were not recognised as sovereigns.’537 Immunities have therefore 
always been a part of international law, but due to the ‘dynamic of difference’ and the 
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‘standard of civilisation’ as explained by Anghie, not all states have historically been able to 
claim immunities for their subjects. 
In recent years, African states under the auspices of the AU have raised the concern that 
when European states exercise universal jurisdiction against African state officials, they 
disregard the immunities which these officials ought to enjoy at international law. 538 The 
African states regard this as an infringement of their sovereignty and a reminder of 
colonialism.539 With regards to the ICC, the relationship between the AU and the ICC has 
deteriorated following the indictment of the Sudanese President Al Bashir in 2009, and the 
confirmation of proceedings against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy 
William Ruto in 2012.540  African states are of the view that the ICC should not indict sitting 
Heads of State, as they consider them to be immune from such indictment.541 The ICC on the 
other hand has reiterated that Head of State immunity is irrelevant in proceedings before the 
Court.542 As was stated in Chapter One, there is also uncertainty as to whether or not Al 
Bashir is immune from the jurisdiction of states and from arrest and surrender by states in 
cooperation with the Court.  
The perceived disregard of the immunities of African Heads of State and state officials by the 
ICC and European states respectively has had serious legal, policy and political implications 
for state sovereignty on the African continent. For this reason, the discussion on the 
development of international law on immunities is of both practical and academic relevance. 
The rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa; the expansion of the proposed African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights to include a criminal chamber with jurisdiction to try international 
crimes; the amendment to the Protocol of the statute of the proposed court giving immunity 
to Heads of State and senior state officials; and the recent announcements by South Africa, 
Gambia and Burundi of their intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute, all arguably take 
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place against the background of African states’ discontent with ‘European’ universal 
jurisdiction and the work of the ICC in Africa . In this vein, it is submitted that African 
misgivings towards the application of universal jurisdiction by European states against 
African state officials, and the indictment of African Heads of State by the ICC, have 
motivated the desire by African states to re-assert the immunities of their Heads of State and 
state officials. 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine the historical evolution of the principle of 
immunities and its application by European states. The claim by African states that there is a 
double standard in the application of international criminal justice shall also be examined in 
the context of the application of the principle of immunities by European states. The AU has 
argued that European states seem to be targeting sitting African state officials in their 
exercise of universal jurisdiction, and that the ICC has been unfairly targeting African leaders 
and disregarding their immunities.543   
The literature available on the decline of the application of the principle of immunities points 
to immunities having fallen universally.544 It is submitted that contrary to the international 
criminal law narrative that the principle of immunities has fallen universally, the reality is 
that immunities have fallen only in respect to officials of the politically weaker states, with 
African state officials being the majority of those whose immunities have been disregarded 
by both international criminal tribunals and domestic courts.545 This is illustrative of the 
perceived double standard in international law, which as Gevers has rightly argued, continues 
to exist despite colonialism having come to an end and all states being able to participate 
equally in international law.546  
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An understanding of the perceived double standard in the context of the application of the 
principle of immunities helps to explain why the application of this principle, which is a 
well-established principle of international law, has resulted in tensions between African 
states and European states, and African states and the ICC. It is submitted that the perceived 
existence of this double standard in international criminal law, and the tension between 
African states and European states, and African states and the ICC, ought to be understood 
against the background of Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of the sovereignty doctrine 
which was discussed in detail in Chapter Two.  
The tensions between African states and European states with regards to the application of 
the principles of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities are centred on the doctrine of 
state sovereignty. It is submitted in this regard that the principle of immunities is seen as a 
means by which African states can reaffirm their sovereignty; hence they view it as an 
absolute principle which ought to apply regardless of the circumstances. On the other hand, 
European states have never been deprived of their sovereignty; hence they see no need to 
reaffirm their sovereignty. They therefore view the principle of immunities as one which is 
no longer absolute and which ought to give way to newer principles of international law such 
as that of ensuring accountability for atrocities.  
In this vein, this chapter shall examine the history of immunities to show that African 
sovereignty has always been deficient and that as sovereignty is a fundamental principle in 
international law, this deficiency manifested in a number of aspects of international law, 
including that of the application of the principle of immunities. The capitulations granted by 
partially recognised ‘states’ such as the Ottoman Empire (Turkey), and the then Japan and 
Siam to European states are an example of how European states subjugated non-European 
‘states’ during the colonial confrontation. 
 The Turkish capitulations shall be examined in detail as it is considered that the Turkish 
experience best illuminates how the colonial confrontation was central to the development of 
international law as explained by Anghie, in the context of the principle of immunities. 
Capitulations were at first granted voluntarily as incentives for trade by non- European states 
which were partially recognised such as Turkey, and the then Japan and Siam. However, at 
the height of the colonial confrontation, these capitulations were used by European countries 
as a means to subjugate the non-European ‘states’. European states demanded the granting of 
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these capitulations, on their own terms, but it was unimaginable that the same capitulations 
would be granted to non-European states by European states.547 
5.2 THE MEANING, SCOPE AND RATIONALE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
IMMUNITIES 
In order to examine the perceived double standard in the application of the principle of 
immunities, it is important to first understand the meaning, scope and rationale of the 
principle. 
 Immunity from jurisdiction means that states and their officials are exempt from the 
jurisdiction of foreign courts, both civil and criminal.548  In the criminal law context, 
immunity from jurisdiction means that an individual cannot be prosecuted, summonsed or 
required to answer questions.549 The principle of immunities is doctrinally linked to the 
principle of the sovereign equality of states which essentially means that as all sovereigns are 
equal, no state can sit in judgment over the actions of another without infringing upon the 
sovereignty of that state whose actions are being judged.550  According to Akande, the law on 
immunities, ‘…proceeds from notions of sovereign equality and is aimed at ensuring that 
states do not unduly interfere with other states and their agents.’551 
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The principle of the sovereign equality of states has been codified in the United Nations 
Charter which provides that ‘The Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its members.’552 The Declaration on the Principles of International Law, 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN 
(1970) provides that, ‘All states enjoy sovereign equality and are equal members of the 
international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or 
other nature.’553 
The principle of sovereign equality of states has two components, state sovereignty and 
equality of states.554 According to Kelsen, 
[T]o speak of sovereign equality is justified insofar as both qualities are usually considered to be 
connected with each other. The equality of states is frequently explained as a consequence of or 
as implied by their sovereignty.555 
The focus of this thesis is on personal immunities in relation to the doctrine of state 
sovereignty as it is not in dispute that all states are now regarded as being equal and they are 
able to participate as equal sovereigns in international law.556 
The principle of immunities has its basis in both customary international law and treaty. The 
customary international law position on the subject of immunities was explained by the 
International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant Case. In terms of treaty, the1961 Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for the immunities of diplomatic agents.557 
There are two categories of immunities in international law.  These are functional immunity 
(immunity ratione materiae), accorded to state officials for the official functions they 
perform on behalf of the state, and personal immunity (immunity ratione personae) which is 
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the immunity enjoyed by high ranking individuals such as Heads of State and Foreign Affairs 
Ministers, by virtue of their status. 558  
5.2.1 Functional immunity (immunity ratione materiae) 
Functional immunity is the immunity conferred to state officials because of the official duties 
which they perform on behalf of the state. Functional immunity is substantive in nature and 
continues to apply even after the official has left office.559 Functional immunity can be applied 
erga omnes i.e. in respect of states other than the receiving state.560  It applies only in respect 
of conduct which is part of the official duties of a state official, and it cannot be waived by 
the home state of the official.561 As Gevers has explained functional immunity ‘…cannot be 
waived by the state concerned because it is the conduct itself and not the office bearer that 
forms the basis of that immunity.’562 
The rationale behind functional immunity is that state officials cannot be held accountable 
for those acts which are considered to be not their own but those of the state which they 
represent. The ICJ held in the Arrest Warrant case that state officials are considered in 
customary international law to be acting not on their own behalf but on behalf of their home 
states.563 For this reason, according to Akande and Shah, state officials cannot be held to 
account for acts of state.564 Similarly in Prosecutor v Blaskic, the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
ruled that, ‘…State officials cannot suffer the consequences of wrongful acts which are not 
                                                 
558 Akande & Shah ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes, and Foreign Domestic Courts’817; 
Gevers & Vrancken ‘Jurisdiction of States’   261-262. 
559 See Akande & Shah ibid 826; Kayitana ‘The Universal Jurisdiction of South African Criminal Courts and 
Immunities of Foreign State Officials’ 2567. 
560 Cassese ‘When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?’863. 
561 Gevers ‘Immunity and the Implementation legislation in South Africa, Kenya and Uganda’ 89. 
562 Ibid. 
563 See Arrest Warrant Judgment para 53. 
564 Akande and Shah (note 558 above) 826-827; See also Kayitana ‘The Universal Jurisdiction of South Africa’s 
Criminal Courts’ 2567(explaining that as acts committed by state officials in the course of carrying out their 
duties are attributable not to them but to their home states, ‘…actions against state agents in respect of their 
official acts are essentially proceedings against the state they represent.’) 
137 
 
attributable to them personally but to the State on whose behalf they act: they enjoy so-called 
functional immunity…’565 
It is generally accepted that functional immunity cannot be raised in respect of prosecution 
for international crimes.566 The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg held in In re 
Goering & Others that, 
The principle of international law which under certain circumstances, protects the representatives 
of a State, cannot be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. The 
authors of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be freed 
from punishment.567 
A number of scholars have put forward different reasons as to why functional immunity must 
not apply in respect of international crimes, even before domestic courts. These reasons 
include that international crimes violate jus cogens norms hence they cannot be classified as 
official acts, and that the traditional view that functional immunity applies even in the case of 
international crimes has been superseded by recent rules in international criminal law on 
individual accountability.568 Akande and Shah, for instance, have argued that, 
 the principle is necessarily in conflict with more recent rules of international law and it is the 
older rule of immunity which must yield. Developments in international law now mean that the 
reasons for which immunity ratione materiae are conferred simply do not apply for international 
crimes.569 
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567 1946 (13) International Law Reports 203,221. 
568 See for example Bianchi ‘Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case’ 259-262. 
569 Akande & Shah ‘Immunities of State Officials, International Crimes and Foreign Domestic Courts’ 840.For a 
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Functional immunity is normally relied upon in civil cases.570 For this reason, a detailed 
discussion on this category of immunities is beyond the scope of this thesis, which is focused 
on immunities for international crimes. 
5.2.2 Personal immunity (immunity ratione personae) 
Personal immunity is the immunity which is conferred on senior state officials such as Heads 
of State and Foreign Affairs Ministers by virtue of their status.571 It has its basis in both 
customary international law and treaty. The customary international law position pertaining 
to personal immunity was outlined by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case.572In terms of treaty, 
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides that a diplomatic agent shall 
enjoy immunity from both the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state.573 
Personal immunity applies in respect of   both official and private acts.574  It applies only for 
as long as the individual remains in office.575 It cannot be applied erga omnes i.e. it can only 
be applied between the sending state and receiving state with respect to a diplomat, and in a 
third state that a diplomat may pass through in transit to or from the receiving state.576  
Personal immunity applies even when an official is alleged to have committed international 
crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity.577  In Arrest Warrant, the ICJ held 
that there is no exception in customary international law to the rule that incumbent Foreign 
Affairs Ministers enjoy full immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts, even when 
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they are alleged to have committed international crimes.578 Domestic courts have in the past 
declined to prosecute Heads of State on this basis. 
In Tachiona v Mugabe a U.S. District Court upheld the suggestion of immunity by the U.S. 
State Department on the basis that the then Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and his 
Foreign Affairs Minister Simbarashe Mumbengegwi enjoyed personal immunity from 
prosecution before the American Courts. This was notwithstanding that the two were being 
accused of having committed a number of crimes including murder and torture.579 In De 
Boery v Gaddafi the French Court of Cassation held that the proceedings in which then 
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was being accused of complicity to a terrorist act had to be 
discontinued on the basis of his personal immunity.580 The court held that there was no 
exception to the customary international law rule giving immunity to incumbent Heads of 
State before foreign domestic courts. Earlier, the House of Lords had adopted this position 
that incumbent Heads of State enjoy full immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign domestic 
courts in the Pinochet Cases. In Pinochet no 1, Lord Nicholls said that, ‘…there can be no 
doubt that if Senator Pinochet had still been the head of the Chilean state; he would have 
been entitled to immunity.’581  
 Likewise, in Pinochet no. 3 Lord Millet said regarding the argument raised by the defence 
that Pinochet was immune to the proceedings, that, ‘Senator Pinochet is not a serving Head of 
State. If he were he could not be extradited. It would be an intolerable affront to the Republic of Chile 
to arrest him or detain him.’582 
 
                                                 
578 Para 58. This position also applies to incumbent Heads of State. For a critique of the court’s findings in this 
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5.2.3 The rationale and scope of personal immunity 
The rationale behind the principle of personal immunity is that of functional necessity, i.e. to 
ensure that Heads of State and diplomats can carry out their duties effectively, and travel 
without the fear of being arrested or harassed in a foreign country, thereby promoting orderly 
and friendly interstate relations.583 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states in 
its preamble that the parties agreed to the Convention, ‘Believing that an international 
Convention on diplomatic intercourse would contribute to the development of friendly 
relations among nations.’584 
According to Akande, personal immunities, 
stem from the recognition that the smooth conduct of international relations and international 
cooperation requires an effective process of communication. The effectiveness of this process of 
communication and cooperation in turn requires that the state agents charged with the conduct of 
international relations be able to travel freely in order to perform their functions without the fear 
or possibility of harassment by other states.585 
 In a similar vein, Kayitana has asserted that personal immunity is essential in order to guard 
against the abuse of criminal jurisdiction by states, particularly universal jurisdiction.586 
There has been considerable debate amongst scholars as to whether or not personal immunity 
ought to apply before domestic courts, in those cases where an individual is alleged to have 
committed international crimes. One group of scholars argues that it is inconsistent with the 
emerging principle of accountability for atrocities for personal immunity to apply before 
domestic courts regardless of the nature of the crime in question. Dugard and Abraham for 
instance, have argued that,  
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It would be ridiculous to allow a foreign Head of State or government responsible for 
committing genocide in his own country to successfully plead immunity before a South African 
court, when he could not do so before the ICC.587 
In a similar vein, Bianchi has asserted that, 
The alleged commission of international law crimes should also dispose of a claim of immunity 
ratione personae. Were it not so, one would be left with the impression that it is power more 
than law which protects office holders 588 
On the other hand, another group of scholars has argued that it is justifiable that personal 
immunity should apply even when a state official is alleged to have committed international 
crimes. Tunks, for instance, has argued that removing personal immunity in cases of 
allegations of human rights violations would not increase accountability for such violations 
but only serve to hinder officials from travelling abroad.589 Similarly, Kayitana has asserted 
that, ‘Without the guarantee that States’ officials will not be subjected to trial in foreign 
courts, they may simply choose to stay at home rather than to run the risks of engaging in 
diplomacy.’590 
It is submitted that although there has been a decline in the application of personal immunity 
as an absolute principle, the argument that personal immunity should not apply before 
domestic courts is inconsistent with the rationale behind the principle of personal immunity, 
and with state practice in this regard. As noted by Akande, no case can be found where a 
domestic court did not uphold the immunity of an incumbent Head of State.591 Although 
ensuring accountability for atrocities is important to avoid impunity, the principle of personal 
immunities is equally important for the maintenance of orderly interstate relations. 
As Kayitana has convincingly argued, personal immunities are also necessary in order to 
ensure that states do not abuse their criminal jurisdiction, particularly jurisdiction based on 
the universality principle. In this regard, a number of scholars have expressed concern that if 
the universality principle is not applied with caution, this could pose a threat to friendly 
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interstate relations and lead to abuse of legal processes.592 According to M-Cherif Bassiouni, 
‘Unbridled universal jurisdiction can cause disruptions in the world order and deprivation of 
individual human rights when used in a politically motivated manner or for vexatious 
purposes.’593  Kissinger expressed a similar view, arguing that universal jurisdiction has the 
potential to be used as a weapon to settle political scores.594 
The principle of personal immunities is one of the checks and balances which ensure that the 
universality principle is not abused by states. It is therefore submitted that as there is no case 
where a domestic court has disregarded the personal immunity of a Head of State and as 
enunciated by the ICJ in Arrest Warrant, personal immunity applies before domestic courts 
regardless of the nature of the crime in question. As O’Keefe has asserted, 
The conclusion to be drawn from state practice and international jurisprudence is that the various 
immunities ratione  personae undoubtedly pose a bar as a matter of international law to 
prosecution in a foreign court for an international crime…both treaty-based and customary 
immunity ratione personae remain absolute, no customary exception being made for allegations 
of international crimes.595 
5.3 THE HISTORY OF THE PRINCIPLE OF IMMUNITIES 
An examination of the history of the application of immunities during colonial times 
highlights that non-European sovereignty, when it has been granted, has always been 
deficient. As non-European communities were regarded to be uncivilised and therefore not 
sovereign, the principles of international law did not apply to them. They were objects rather 
than subjects of international law.596  The granting of capitulations by partially recognised 
‘states’ including Turkey (formerly Ottoman Empire), and the then Japan and Siam to 
European states provides an insight into the subjugation of non-European ‘states’ by 
European states. 
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The capitulations granted to European states by the Ottoman Empire are arguably the most 
significant in the history of immunities in that they bring into focus the subjugation of non-
European states by European states during the colonial confrontation. Özsu has explained 
that, 
The individual beneficiary of a capitulatory grant…was typically extended privileges of 
residence on or safe passage through Ottoman territory, made immune from the jurisdiction of 
Islamic courts, and provided with the benefit of tax exemptions and low custom duties.597 
 It ought to be noted that other partially recognised ‘states’ also granted capitulations to non-
European states. These states included the then Japan and Siam, and China. At first the 
capitulations were granted voluntarily, and it was only at the height of the colonial 
confrontation in the 19th century that European states started to rely on them to subjugate the 
partially recognised non-European states.598 
Commenting on the partial recognition of the Ottoman Empire, Özsu explained that, 
‘…while the Ottoman Empire was seldom recognized as a full member of the ‘family of 
civilised nations’, European jurists of the period often postulated an intermediate class for 
States of the kind it was deemed to exemplify…’599 
James Lorimer broke humanity down into ‘three concentric zones or spheres’, with Turkey as 
an archetype of the kind of ‘barbarous state’ that found itself lodged between ‘civilized’ 
states and ‘savage’ peoples.600  As was discussed in Chapter Two, within the positivist 
jurisprudence, whether a non-European community was regarded to be partially civilised or 
totally backward, as long as it had not been accepted into the ‘family of nations’ it did not 
meet the criteria for statehood. Consequently, communities which received partial 
recognition such as the Ottoman Empire were excluded from the proper application of the 
principles of international law.601 With this in mind, it is important to examine the scope of 
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Ottoman capitulations, and how they eventually came to be used as a tool to subjugate the 
non-European states, particularly in the 19th century. 
The history of the Ottoman capitulations can be traced back to the 14th and 15th centuries, 
when the Ottomans would grant capitulations to traders including Genoese and Venetian 
traders.602 It is however argued that a 1740 capitulation granted to France is the most 
significant in the history of the Ottoman capitulations. This capitulation reinforced the 
immunities conferred upon  French traders in earlier capitulations, in addition to the Ottoman 
Empire agreeing to a set of concessions, the binding nature of which were not subject to a 
renewal of the capitulation.603  By the middle of the 19th century, European states had come to 
rely on capitulations to reassert their dominance over the Empire. Contrary to the 
capitulations being mere privileges granted to non-Muslim foreign traders, they were now 
regarded as treaties with a binding effect.604 The capitulations therefore evolved from being 
privileges, including immunities, granted at the discretion of the Ottoman Empire, to being 
unequal treaties which had the effect of subjugating the Empire. 
The 1838 Balta Liman Convention between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain, for 
instance, had the effect of abolishing Ottoman monopolies and fixing import and export 
duties and reaffirming immunities of British subjects from the jurisdiction of Ottoman courts.  
It provided that, 
[a]ll rights, privileges ,and immunities which have been conferred on the subjects or ships of 
great Britain by the existing Capitulations and Treaties, are confirmed now and for ever, except 
in as far as they may be specifically altered by the present Convention.605 
The Ottoman Empire experience is significant to this study as it highlights that non-European 
sovereignty has always been deficient. Even though the Ottoman Empire received partial 
recognition from European states, the capitulations it had granted were later used to 
subjugate the Empire in that they evolved from being privileges granted voluntarily by the 
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Empire to one-sided treaties which were only concerned with the rights of the European 
states. 
In the context of immunities, European states sought to strengthen the immunities enjoyed by 
their citizens in non-European ‘states’ such as the Ottoman Empire because although the 
Empire was partially recognised, it was considered that its standards of civilization did not 
measure up to that of European states. As such, the European states did not want their 
citizens to be subjected to a justice system which they considered to be ‘backward’ hence 
they sought to rely on the capitulations to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over their own 
citizens’ actions  in non-European ‘states’.606  The non-European ‘states’ on their part 
considered these capitulations to have developed into instruments of domination and 
inequality hence they sought to have them abolished.607 
The European states were however not keen to abolish the capitulations and imposed some 
conditions on the non-European ‘states’ in order for the abolition to take place. Non- 
European ‘states’ were required to put in place some reform in their justice systems .This 
would result in the abolition of the capitulatory regime, in addition to the non-European state 
in question being admitted into the family of nations, on the basis of having complied with 
the European standard of civilisation.608  As explained by Özsu in the context of the Ottoman 
capitulations, 
So long as comprehensive reforms were not undertaken for the purpose of introducing new codes 
and overhauling the administration of justice, the capitulations would remain indispensable for 
ensuring that nationals of non-Muslim States operating in the empire…were subject only to 
‘civilized’ European law.609 
In a similar vein, a 19th century British official, commenting on the possible abolition of 
consular jurisdiction in Tunis following the occupation of Tunis territory by France and the 
subsequent introduction of the French justice system said, 
The institutions which have grown up under the Capitulations with Turkey have been found 
essential for the protection of foreigners under the peculiar circumstances of the Ottoman 
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Empire…the necessity for them disappears when Tribunals organised and controlled by an 
European Government take the place of the Mussulman Courts.610 
The requirements for the abolition of the capitulatory regime validate Anghie’s theory on the 
colonial origins of the doctrine of sovereignty. Anghie asserted that the distinction between 
civilised and uncivilised states as postulated by the positivist jurists is the one which 
determined whether or not a community belonged to the family of nations and therefore 
could be regarded as a sovereign state.611  This helped the positivists to address the issue of 
‘states’ such as the Ottoman Empire, and the then Japan and Siam which had never been 
colonised and thus had nominally retained their independence. Despite being independent 
and meeting other criteria for statehood which was essential  to be considered part of the 
family of nations and therefore sovereign, these ‘states’ which received partial recognition 
were still considered to be lacking in civilisation hence they were excluded from the proper 
application of the principles of international law, especially the sovereignty doctrine.612 In 
order for them to be fully admitted into the family of nations, they had to agree to some 
reforms and concessions which essentially furthered the colonial interests of the European 
states. The result of this was to deprive non-European communities of their internal 
sovereignty. As noted by Anghie, 
a different set of principles applied in the case of non-European states, which significantly 
compromised their internal sovereignty and their cultural distinctiveness in order to be accepted 
as legal subjects of the system…the actions non-European states had to take to enter into the 
system negated the rights which they were supposed formally to enjoy upon admittance.613 
In the case of Turkey, the abolition of the Ottoman capitulatory regime was only successfully 
negotiated at the Conference of Lausanne after the country agreed to carry out a number of 
legal reforms and numerous other concessions.614 The Ottoman Empire capitulations have 
been examined in detail as it is considered that their history, evolution and abolition best 
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mirrors the way non-European sovereignty has always been deprived in the context of 
immunities, and how the end of the distinction between ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ as 
authored by the positivists did not mean an end to the ‘standard of civilisation.’ As the 
Turkish experience shows, although all states are now equal sovereigns, the non-European 
states acquired this equality through negating their own internal sovereignty and cultural 
peculiarity.615 
The Turkish experience resonates with Anghie’s argument that the colonial confrontation 
was central to the development of important doctrines of international law, including most 
importantly the sovereignty doctrine. As explained by Anghie, the end of colonialism did not 
mean an end to colonial relations. In order for the system of capitulations to be abolished, 
and for the non-European ‘states’ to be accepted into the family of nations, the non-European 
‘states’ had to agree to conditions set by European states. In so doing, they gained political 
sovereignty but lost their cultural uniqueness.616 As a result, it can be argued that although 
colonialism is now a thing of the past, the ‘double standard’ which was characteristic of this 
period continues to apply in a number of aspects of international law. 
It is submitted that the Turkish example makes for a strong argument that non-European 
states did not emerge from the colonial confrontation as fully sovereign states. The 
sovereignty gained was political and not economic sovereignty.617  Even so, the political 
sovereignty was not full sovereignty as the non-European states still feel the need to reassert 
their sovereignty in order to avoid postcolonial interferences, as shown by the rise of 
universal jurisdiction in Africa discussed in Chapter Four. 
5.4  IMMUNITY AND ICC IMPLEMENTATION LEGISLATION IN EUROPE 
Unlike universal jurisdiction which has undergone different phases in its application, the 
principle of immunities has always been a part of international law, but immunities were not 
available to non-European states during the colonial encounter. With the end of colonialism, 
the principle of immunities now applies in respect of Heads of State and officials from all 
states.  The rise of universal jurisdiction in Europe in the 1990s led to a disregard of the 
personal immunities of state officials. As was discussed in Chapter Three, the 1993 universal 
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jurisdiction legislation of Belgium considered the issue of immunities to be irrelevant for 
purposes of exercising universal jurisdiction. However, following the decision in the Arrest 
Warrant case, and political pressure from states such as the United States, Belgium amended 
its universal jurisdiction legislation, and ultimately repealed it, in 2003. The universal 
jurisdiction legislation from other European states such as Spain did recognise the 
immunities of state officials and Heads of State. Notwithstanding this, Spain, Germany and 
France did indict African state officials, disregarding their immunities.618 
A closer analysis of the practice of European states highlights that the immunities that were 
disregarded were mostly those of officials from the politically weaker states, with 
prosecutors in European states such as Germany using their prosecutorial discretion to 
determine that officials from politically powerful states such as the US and China were 
immune from prosecution. On the other hand, using the same prosecutorial discretion it was 
determined in some instances that African officials were not immune even though their home 
states had clearly asserted this immunity on their behalf.619 A prime example is the refusal by 
the German Federal prosecutor to exercise universal jurisdiction against former Chinese 
President Jiang Zemin on the basis that he enjoyed immunity in 2003, but later on refusing to 
recognise the immunity of the Rwandan chief of protocol attached to the President, Rose 
Kabuye in 2008.620 
5.4.1 Belgium 
Belgium’s universal jurisdiction legislation of 1993 did not recognise claims of immunity as 
a defence.621 On the basis of this law, in April 2000, a Belgian investigative magistrate issued 
and circulated a warrant of arrest against the then Foreign Affairs Minister for the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, based on the Belgian law. This warrant was issued pursuant 
to an action brought by a group of DRC exiles, accusing Mr. Yerodia Ndombasi of having 
made public speeches inciting racial hatred prior to his being appointed as minister. The 
magistrate issued a warrant of arrest against Mr. Ndombasi on the basis that he had allegedly 
committed crimes against humanity and crimes in breach of the four Geneva Conventions of 
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1949.622 The DRC then approached the ICJ to resolve its dispute with Belgium resulting from 
the issuing of the arrest warrant.  
The court ruled that the arrest warrant was illegal and that it should be cancelled because it 
violated the immunity and inviolability that Mr. Ndombasi was entitled to enjoy as a Foreign 
Affairs Minister. In making its ruling the court outlined the customary international law 
position with respect to immunities of state officials. It held that, 
 The court has carefully examined State practice, including national legislation and those few 
decisions of national higher courts such as the House of Lords or the French Court of Cassation. 
It has been unable to deduce from this practice that there exists under customary international 
law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and 
inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having 
committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.623 
Following the ICJ’s decision in the Arrest Warrant case, and political pressure from 
politically powerful states whose high ranking officials had been the target of investigations 
in Belgium based on its law, Belgium amended the law in April 2003.The amended law 
included immunity provisions to bring it in conformity with international law.624 As a result of   
increased diplomatic pressure, the Act was repealed in August 2003, and a new law on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction was enacted.625 This law reaffirmed the immunity of state officials, 
and provided that the federal prosecutor must decline to prosecute in a number of instances, 
most notably where the alleged perpetrator is entitled to immunity.626  In September 2003, the 
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Belgian Supreme Court held that a case against former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
was inadmissible on the basis of the ICJ decision in Arrest Warrant.627 
As was noted above, Belgium’s universal jurisdiction legislation of 1993 was the only one in 
Europe which did not recognise the immunities of state officials. In this vein, this thesis 
argues that the international criminal law narrative of a rise and fall in immunities is not 
correct. Rather, immunities have always been available and states have always claimed 
immunities for their officials. However, at the height of the application of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction in Europe, the immunities of officials from politically weaker states 
particularly those from African states were disregarded. It is submitted that this is evidence 
of the double standard that arguably exists in the application of international criminal law. 
5.4.2 Spain 
The Spanish universal jurisdiction legislation, Organic Law no 6/1985, though expansive, did 
not provide for absolute universal jurisdiction as it recognised two forms of immunity for 
state officials.628  These are the immunity of representatives of other states and their official 
delegations as well as officials of other states present at Germany’s invitation; and the 
general rules of international law on sovereign immunity.629 The Spanish courts declined to 
exercise jurisdiction on the basis of article 20 of the Organic Law in a number of cases. 
These include cases filed against the then incumbent Cuban President Fidel Castro, the 
president of Equatorial Guinea Obiang Nguema and then President of Venezuela Hugo 
Chavez.630 
In 2008, a Spanish investigative judge excluded the Rwandan President Paul Kagame from 
an indictment of former and current high –ranking Rwandan officials for alleged 
international crimes including genocide and crimes against humanity, on the basis that he 
was immune by virtue of his status as President.631 The Spanish judge however did not 
provide reasons why the immunity of the indicted officials had been disregarded. These 
                                                 
627 Bhuta & Schurr ibid 39; Drumbl ‘International Law and Exceptions’ 239.Although the law on universal 
jurisdiction was repealed in August 2003; provisions of the repealed act dealing with international crimes were 
incorporated into the criminal code (Bhuta & Schurr 37). 
628 Bhuta & Schurr ibid 87. 
629 Article 20 (1) and 2 of Organic Law no 6/1985. 
630 See de la Rasilla del Moral ‘The swan song of universal jurisdiction in Spain’ 785. 
631 Ibid. See also Jalloh ‘Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription?’ 30. 
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included the Rwandan ambassador to India, the Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Defence 
Forces and the Chief of Protocol attached to the Presidency, all of whom were considered by 
Rwanda to be immune from such indictment.632  
These indictments, and the earlier indictments in 2006 by a French investigative magistrate 
of nine Rwandan officials, ignited the tensions between African and European states 
regarding the application of the principles of universal jurisdiction and immunities. It ought 
to be noted that the denial of immunity by Spanish courts was only in relation to African 
officials.633 All cases against European and American officials, and more recently cases 
involving Chinese officials, were dismissed on the basis of the ruling in the Arrest Warrant 
case, and the reform of the universal jurisdiction legislation in Spain. 
5.4.3 Netherlands 
The International Crimes Act (ICA) recognises immunity for Heads of State and ministers of 
foreign affairs.634 The immunity is restricted to the period during which they occupy office. 
Apart from Heads of State and ministers of foreign affairs, other officials are entitled to 
immunity under the Act as provided for by customary international law and any convention 
that Netherlands may be a party to.635 The exercise of universal jurisdiction by Netherlands 
has not been controversial in the context of its recognition of the immunities of state officials. 
This has been attributed to the Belgian experience, which had a significant impact on the 
development of the universal jurisdiction legislation in Netherlands, which was enacted after 
the amendment of the universal jurisdiction legislation in Belgium, and the judgment in the 
Arrest Warrant case. 
5.4.4 Germany 
The German CCAIL does not directly address the issue of immunities.636 However the 
Judiciary Act upholds the immunities of state officials.637 The federal prosecutor declined to 
prosecute former Chinese President Jiang Zemin on this basis in 2003, finding that he 
                                                 
632 Jalloh ibid.  
633 De la Rasilla del Moral ‘The Swan Song of Universal Jurisdiction in Spain’ 785. 
634 See Bhuta & Schurr ‘Universal Jurisdiction: State of the Art’ 72; Kaleck ‘From Pinochet to Rumsfeld’943. 
635 See International Crimes Act section 16; Bhuta & Schurr ibid; Kaleck ibid. 
636 Bhuta & Schurr ibid 64. 
637 Bhuta & Schurr ibid; article 20 (1) and (2) of the Judiciary Act (1972) as amended by article 1 of the Law of 
11 July 2002. 
152 
 
enjoyed immunity from prosecution .It has been argued that in so doing the federal 
prosecutor adopted a broad interpretation of the ICJ’s judgment in the Arrest Warrant case 
by determining that personal immunity applied to both former and current Heads of State and 
foreign affairs ministers.638 
It is submitted that Germany’s application of prosecutorial discretion in this regard is 
indicative of the perceived double standard in international criminal law. Whilst the federal 
prosecutor declined to prosecute the former Chinese minister on the basis that he was 
immune from prosecution, the Rwandan Chief of protocol in the Presidency Rose Kabuye 
was arrested in Germany in November 2008.This was pursuant to an arrest warrant issued 
against her and other officials in 2006 by a French investigative magistrate. Kabuye was later 
transferred to France to face charges of terrorism.639 The arrest resulted in tensions between 
the Rwandan and German governments, with Rwanda claiming that it was a violation of 
Rwanda’s sovereignty as Kabuye was immune to arrest, and the German prosecutors 
claiming that she did not enjoy diplomatic immunity as she was not part of an official 
delegation.640 
The arrest of Kabuye, in contrast to the German federal prosecutor’s decision to decline to 
prosecute in a number of cases involving high profile officials from politically powerful 
states, resonates with the argument made in this Chapter that the application of immunities 
declined only in respect to officials from the politically weaker states, most notably African 
states. 
5.4.5 United Kingdom (England and Wales) 
The main legislative instrument authorising the exercise of universal jurisdiction by courts in 
the United Kingdom, the ICC Act of 2001, is silent on the issue of immunities. However, the 
State Immunity Act of 1978 provides for the immunity of incumbent Heads of State and 
ministers of foreign governments. It states that the act confers immunities and privileges to, 
                                                 
638 Bhuta & Schurr ibid; Kaleck 951. 
639 Jalloh ‘Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription?’ 36; Al Jazeera English 10/11/2008 ‘Rwanda angered 
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640 Daily Nation 11/11/2008 ‘Kagame says Kabuye arrest violates sovereignty’ available at 
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‘(a) the sovereign or other Head of …State in his public capacity, (b) the government of that 
State…’641 
There are a number of cases in which the UK courts have upheld the immunity of Heads of 
State and other senior state officials on the basis of section 14 (1) of the State Immunity Act. 
Complaints filed against former Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and the former U.S 
President George Bush were dismissed on the grounds that they enjoyed immunity before the 
domestic courts of the United Kingdom.642  Immunity has also been upheld in the applications 
for arrest warrants against then Israeli Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz in 2004, and the then 
Chinese Trade Minister Bo Xilai in 2005.643 
The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of upholding the immunity of state officials in 
Europe. Even before the ICJ outlined the customary international law position on the 
immunities of state officials in the Arrest Warrant case, the UK House of Lords had 
considered the scope of both functional immunity and personal immunity at length. In 
Pinochet no.1 and Pinochet no.3, the Lordships held that Pinochet could not claim immunity 
as a defence, but that if he had still been a Head of State, then he would have been immune 
from proceedings in the United Kingdom courts.644 
No case can be found in the United Kingdom where an incumbent Head of State has been 
indicted. In this regard, it is submitted that the application of personal immunity by the courts 
of the United Kingdom is evidence that immunities have not fallen but that they have always 
been available at international law. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the history of the principle of immunities and its meaning, scope 
and rationale, and highlighted that African sovereignty, when it has been granted, has always 
been deficient. Historically this deficiency was manifest through the application of 
                                                 
641 Section 14 (1) of the State Immunity Act of 1978; Kaleck 942. 
642 See Bhuta & Schurr’ Universal Jurisdiction: State of the Art’ 94; Application for Arrest Warrant against 
Robert Mugabe (Bow St. Mag. Ct 14 Jan 2004) 
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644 In Pinochet no .1 Lord Nicholls said ‘…there can be no doubt that if Senator Pinochet had still been the Head 
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international law principles including that of immunities, which were deemed to be 
inapplicable to non-European communities as they were considered to be uncivilised and 
therefore non-sovereign. In this regard, it is submitted that Anghie’s theory on the colonial 
origins of the sovereignty doctrine is pivotal to comprehending the misunderstandings 
between African states and European states, and the ICC regarding the application of the 
principle of immunities. Anghie’s theory resonates with the history of the development of the 
principle of immunities, particularly the history of capitulations. The evolution of 
capitulations granted by partially recognised ‘states’ such as the Ottoman Empire to 
Europeans, from being privileges granted as trade incentives to one sided treaties which were 
used to subjugate the non-European states, validates Anghie’s argument that non-European 
states were historically treated as objects and not subjects of international law.  
When European states exercise universal jurisdiction against African state officials, and 
when the ICC indicts African Heads of State, African states view this as an affront to their 
sovereignty.645 The misunderstandings between African states and European states, and 
African states and the ICC regarding the application of immunities, arguably stem from the 
different ways in which African states and European states have historically obtained and 
enjoyed the protection of the principle of  sovereignty, leading to differences in the way they 
understand and invoke the doctrine.646  It is asserted that as a result of African states having 
been historically deprived of their sovereignty, they see the need to re-assert this sovereignty 
to avoid post-colonial influence from their former colonisers by taking steps which include 
reclaiming the immunities of their Heads of State and state officials. 
Although African states were historically deprived of their sovereignty and ultimately 
fundamental principles including immunities were deemed to be inapplicable to them, the 
principle of immunities has always been a part of international law from the ancient Greek 
times. An examination of the universal jurisdiction legislation in selected European countries 
above has shown that apart from the repealed Belgian legislation on universal jurisdiction, 
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the legislation in European states made provision for the immunity of Heads of State and 
state officials. It is therefore submitted that unlike universal jurisdiction, the principle of 
immunities has not gone through different phases in its application. Rather, there has 
arguably been a double standard in the application of the principle, with European state 
practice showing that immunities have been disregarded in respect of politically weaker 
states, with African state officials making up the majority. It would therefore be incorrect to 
argue, as some scholars have done, that there has been a rise and fall in immunities. 
In this regard, it shall be argued in Chapter Six that when African states insist that their 
officials are entitled to immunity, they are not deviating from the norm. Contrary to 
assertions by some scholars that immunities have fallen, immunities have always been a part 
of international law and states have always claimed immunities for their officials. Due to the 
colonial history however, African states were unable to claim immunities for their subjects as 
they were regarded to be uncivilised and therefore not sovereign as explained by Anghie. 
African states are therefore not seeking to claim immunities which have fallen; they are 
simply reclaiming and re-asserting immunities which have always been available at 
international law, but which they were not able to claim due to the ‘standard of civilisation’ 
and ‘dynamic of difference’ as explained by Anghie. 
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                                        CHAPTER SIX 
IMMUNITY AND THE IMPLEMENTATION LEGISLATION 
IN AFRICA 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 As was explained in Chapter Five, the application of the principle of immunities has in 
recent years led to tensions between African states and European states, and to a deterioration 
of the relationship between the AU and the ICC. African states have claimed that when 
European states exercise universal jurisdiction against African state officials, and when the 
ICC indicts incumbent African Heads of State, this disregards the immunities which these 
officials ought to enjoy at international law.647 The issuing of nine arrest warrants against 
certain Rwandan officials by a French investigative magistrate in 2006 and the indictment of 
forty current and former Rwandan officials by a Spanish investigative magistrate in 2008 led 
to tensions between African states and European states regarding the application of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction. In both instances, Rwanda insisted that the indicted 
officials enjoyed immunity.648  
The relevance of the immunity question was further heightened by the indictment of 
Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir in 2009 by the ICC, and the confirmation of proceedings 
against the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto in 2012. The AU 
Assembly noted with respect to the proceedings against the Kenyan President and his deputy 
before the ICC in its 2013 Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the ICC that it, 
                                                 
647 AU-EU Expert Report on Universal Jurisdiction para 37-38; AU Assembly Decision on Africa’s Relationship 
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Underscores that this is the first time that a sitting Head of State and his deputy are being tried in 
an international court and STRESSES the gravity of this situation which could undermine the 
sovereignty, stability and peace in that country and in other Member States 649 
According to the AU Assembly, this indictment of sitting Heads of States was contrary to the 
customary international law position on the immunities of sitting Heads of State and other 
senior officials. It stated in paragraph 9 of the Decision that it ‘Reaffirms the principles 
deriving from national laws and customary international law by which sitting Heads of State 
and other senior state officials are granted immunities during their tenure of office.’650 
The misunderstanding between African states and European states, and African states and the 
ICC is likely to continue for a long time to come. This is because of the uncertainties 
regarding the exact scope of immunities in international law. It is not clear as to what extent 
the immunities, particularly personal immunity, enjoyed by Heads of State and state officials 
can be used as a bar to their prosecution for international crimes. In response to the perceived 
disregard of the immunities of African Heads of State and state officials by Western states 
and the ICC, the AU has embarked on a project to re-assert the immunities of Heads of State 
and officials of its member states. It has been argued by a number of scholars that the re-
assertion of immunities by African states is a deviation from the norm. This chapter argues 
that African states are simply re-asserting immunities which have always been available to 
them at international law but which they were previously unable to claim during the colonial 
confrontation. 
An examination of the history of the principle of immunities in Chapter Five has highlighted 
that African sovereignty, when it has been granted, has always been deficient, and that during 
the colonial encounter the doctrines of international law such as that of immunities did not 
apply to African communities. It shall be argued in this chapter that the concerns expressed 
by African states with respect to the application of the principle of immunities by European 
states and by the ICC ought to be understood against the background of the historical 
development of the principle of immunities, and Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of 
                                                 
649 See para 5 of the 2013 AU Assembly Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the ICC (Ext 
/Assembly/AU/Dec.1 Oct 2013). 
650 See para 9 of the Decision. 
158 
 
international law. In recent years African states under the ambit of the AU have reiterated the 
importance of respecting the immunities of their Heads of State and officials.651 
The question to be asked in this regard is why the AU is pushing to re-assert the immunities 
of African Heads of State and officials, at a time when there has been a push for universal 
jurisdiction on the African Continent as discussed in Chapter Four. It shall be submitted in 
this chapter that the push for immunities by African states is part of efforts to re-assert their 
sovereignty by ensuring that their Heads of State and state officials are not subjected to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC and non-African states respectively. The AU has moved to strengthen 
its regional justice mechanisms in order to avoid the jurisdiction of Western states and the 
ICC, whilst at the same time reclaiming immunities for the Heads of State and officials of its 
member states. 
As has been noted in Chapter Five, a distinction ought to be drawn between the application 
of immunities before domestic courts and before international courts and tribunals 
respectively. However, this thesis also considers the immunity question before the ICC 
because although the jurisdiction of the ICC is distinct from that of domestic courts, the 
questions arising from efforts by the ICC to prosecute African Heads of State for alleged 
human rights violations are closely related to those arising from the application of the 
principles of universal jurisdiction and immunities by domestic courts of non-African states. 
African states have addressed the issue of immunity both at the regional and domestic level. 
At the regional level, the AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction provides for the 
immunity of Heads of State and state officials in article 16 (1). In addition, article 46A   bis 
of the Protocol on amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights provides for the immunity of Heads of State and other senior state 
officials before the proposed court. At the domestic level, a number of African states have 
included immunity provisions in their universal jurisdiction legislation provisions. These 
immunity provisions relate to both prosecutions before domestic courts of the respective 
African states, and to issues of cooperation with the ICC.  
This chapter shall examine the immunity provisions in the AU Model Law on Universal 
Jurisdiction and the Protocol on amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African 
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the Abuse of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction (1/7/2008) Assembly/AU/dec.199 (XI). 
159 
 
Court of Justice and Human Rights, followed by the immunity provisions in the ICC 
implementation legislation in South Africa; Kenya; Uganda; Senegal and Mauritius. When 
South Africa announced that it intended to withdraw from the Rome Statute in 2016, one of 
the reasons given by the Minister of Justice for the intended withdrawal was that the 
immunity provisions of the Rome statute and the country’s ICC Act were in conflict with 
South Africa’s customary international law obligations to respect the immunity of sitting 
Heads of State and other senior state officials.652 An examination of the immunity provisions 
of the regional legislative instruments and the domestic ICC implementation legislation in 
Africa is therefore of both academic and practical relevance because the issue of immunities, 
particularly personal immunities, has taken centre stage in international law in recent years. 
Notably, there has been considerable debate amongst scholars as to whether or not the 
Sudanese president Omar Al Bashir is immune from arrest and surrender by states in 
cooperation with the ICC.653  
 It shall be asserted that the problem with the international criminal law narrative as it stands 
is that it treats colonialism as being peripheral to the discipline, rather than being central to 
the development of international law as rightly argued by Anghie. In this regard, the chapter 
shall attempt to address the scholarly silence on the impact that colonialism has had in the 
shaping of contemporary international law as seen through the lens of the application of the 
principle of immunities in Africa. Scholars commenting on the efforts by African states to 
reclaim immunities for their officials have focused on the assertion that when African states 
claim immunities for their Heads of State and officials they are deviating from the norm as 
immunities have fallen.654 
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6.2  IMMUNITY AND THE REGIONAL IMPLEMENTATION LEGISLATION   
IN AFRICA 
In recent years, African states have been making efforts to re-assert immunities for their 
Heads of State and state officials. This has taken place against the background of African 
states claiming that when European states exercise universal jurisdiction against African state 
officials, and when the ICC indicts sitting African Heads of State, this is a disregard of the 
immunities which the state officials and Heads of State in question ought to enjoy at 
international law. The legislative instruments at both the regional and domestic levels have 
immunity provisions which address the question of the relevance of immunity before 
domestic courts. In some instances, the provisions address the question of immunity in 
relation to arrest and surrender in cooperation with the ICC. States have however not 
addressed the issue of immunity in a uniform manner. The issue of the scope of immunities is 
therefore likely to remain subject to debate for a long time to come. This section shall 
examine the African regional legislative instruments on immunity. 
6.2.1 The AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction  
Article 16 (1) of the AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction provides that, 
Foreign state officials entitled to jurisdictional immunity under international law shall not be 
charged or prosecuted under this law ,except in situations where these crimes are covered by a 
treaty to which the State and the State of nationality of such officials are parties and which 
prohibits immunity.655 
Article 16(1) prohibits domestic courts from exercising jurisdiction over officials who enjoy 
immunity at international law. Although the immunity provision is in conformity with the 
customary international law position on the immunity of state officials as enunciated in 
Arrest Warrant, it is confusing in that it does not clarify the exact circumstances in respect of 
which the exception to the immunity provision shall apply.656 There is also no consensus 
between the model law and some sub-regional and domestic instruments on this issue of 
immunity. The Great Lakes Protocol, for instance, expressly provides for the irrelevance of 
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any immunity which the accused might enjoy at international law.657 The domestic 
instruments for South Africa and Mauritius also contain similar provisions.658 This contrast is 
a manifestation of the uncertain relationship between the two principles of universal 
jurisdiction and immunities. 
It has been argued by Dube that the AU Model Law was a response by the AU to the 
perceived unfair targeting of African state officials by European states in the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction. As African states under the auspices of the AU have frequently raised 
the concern that the exercise of universal jurisdiction against African state officials by 
European states is an affront to their sovereignty, Dube argues that section 16 was tailored to 
ensure that the immunity of African Heads of State and other senior state officials would be 
upheld.659 This argument by Dube is convincing when one considers subsequent efforts by the 
AU to reclaim immunities for Heads of State and officials of its member states, including the 
2013 AU Assembly Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the ICC and the immunity 
provision in the 2014 Protocol on amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
6.2.2 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights 
The Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights was adopted in June 2014.It contains a provision granting immunity to 
Heads of State and senior state officials from the jurisdiction of the proposed African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights. Article 46 A bis provides that, 
No charges shall be commenced or confirmed before the Court against any serving AU Head of 
State or Government or anybody acting or entitled to act in that capacity, or other senior officials 
based on their functions, during their tenure of office.660 
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This immunity provision has been widely criticised by scholars as well as civil society on the 
basis that it is likely to promote impunity when the proposed court becomes operational. 
Amnesty International, for instance, said that, 
The decision by the Assembly of the African Union (AU) to grant sitting African leaders 
immunity from prosecution for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity is a backward 
step in the fight against impunity and a betrayal of victims of serious violations of human 
rights.661 
Jalloh and Bantekas have argued that, 
giving immunity to African leaders undercuts the AU’s criticism of the ICC’s system of 
‘selective justice’ and suggests that the proposed African Court is little more than a thinly veiled 
attempt to challenge the ICC’s authority over high-ranking African politicians.662 
It is submitted that from a human rights perspective, the immunity provision is problematic 
in that it is at odds with the AU’s stated commitment to prevent impunity on the continent. 
As argued by Du Plessis, 
Article 46A bis is transparently at odds with the AU’s own Constitutive Act. It also conflicts 
with previous official AU statements relating to the expansion of the African Court to the effect 
that impunity for international crimes is intolerable and that the perpetrators of such crimes must 
be held accountable.663  
In addition, given that in terms of customary international law Heads of State and other 
senior state officials are immune to the jurisdiction of domestic courts even when they are 
accused of having committed international crimes, this immunity provision might leave 
victims of human rights violations with nowhere to turn to on the continent for justice. 
It is important at this point to examine whether or not from a legal point of view, the 
immunity provision can be said to be one that promotes impunity. Du Plessis has examined 
Article 46A bis at length, and he has convincingly argued that the immunity which is referred 
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to in the immunity provision appears to be personal rather than functional immunity.664  He 
concludes from this assertion that in the legal sense, article 46A bis does not promote 
impunity because personal immunity applies only for as long as an individual continues to 
occupy office. It is submitted that it would therefore be incorrect, legally, to argue that the 
immunity provision will have the effect of promoting impunity on the continent. 
6.3. ICC implementation legislation in selected African states 
The ICC implementation legislation universal jurisdiction of the selected African countries 
discussed in Chapter Four address the issue of immunity of Heads of State and state officials. 
Some of them have incorporated provisions on immunity before the domestic courts whilst 
others provide for immunity with respect to the arrest and surrender of individuals in 
cooperation with the ICC. These provisions shall be examined in detail below. 
6.3.1 South Africa 
The ICC Act  
The ICC Act is silent on the issue of immunity in relation to cooperation with the ICC. It 
only provides in section 8 (1) for the procedure to be followed when South Africa receives a 
request for arrest and surrender from the ICC. The request must be forwarded to the Director-
General of the department for Justice and Constitutional Development with the requisite 
documents.665 The Director-General will then forward the request and documents to a local 
magistrate for endorsement of the warrant.666  
The ICC Act addresses the question of immunity before South Africa’s courts in section 4 (2) 
(a) which provides that, 
Despite any other law to the contrary, including customary and conventional international law, 
the fact that a person-(a) is or was a Head of State or Government, a member of government or 
parliament, an elected representative or government official…is neither (i) a defence to a crime; 
nor (ii) a ground for any possible reduction of sentence once a person has been convicted of a 
crime.667 
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A number of scholars have asserted that this provision effectively removes the personal 
immunity of Heads of State and other senior government officials, and in this regard it is in 
conformity with section 27 (2) of the Rome statute of the ICC which provides for the 
irrelevance of an accused’s personal immunities before the court. Dugard and Abraham 
argued that section 4 (2) (a) is a manifestation of the legislature’s intention to divert from 
what they refer to as the ‘unfortunate’ Arrest Warrant decision.668  
Du Plessis asserted that,  
In terms of the Act, South African courts, acting under the complementarity scheme, are thus 
accorded the same power to ‘trump’ the immunities which usually attach to officials of 
government as the International Criminal Court is by virtue of article 27 of the Rome Statute669 
According to Chenwi, section 4 (2) of the ICC Act is in conformity with the Rome statute on 
the issue of immunities, and it 
diverges from customary international law, but rightly so in this context, by excluding immunity 
for certain government officials or for their status to be used as a basis for the reduction of their 
sentence following convictions.670 
Gevers has however convincingly argued that section 4 (2) (a) refers to functional rather than 
personal immunity. According to him, the immunity provision in the ICC Act is based on 
article 27 (1) of the Rome statute which refers to functional immunities and not on section 27 
(2) which provides for the irrelevance of personal immunities before the courts.671  It is 
important to note in this regard that the Constitution of South Africa recognises customary 
international law as part of South African law, providing that, ‘Customary international law 
is law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of 
Parliament.’672 
If section 4(2) (a) of the ICC Act is interpreted as meaning that the personal immunities  of 
state officials are removed, this would be inconsistent with the obligation of South Africa to 
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give effect to such immunities.673  The interpretation would also be inconsistent with section 
233 of the Constitution which provides that,  
When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law.674 
As Akande has observed, state practice and opinio juris are unanimous on the issue that 
personal immunities apply before domestic courts regardless of the nature of the crime in 
question, and there exists no case in which a domestic court held that the personal immunities 
of an official are irrelevant due to the nature of the crime.675 In this regard, this thesis submits 
to the argument made by Gevers that the immunities which are referred to in section 4 (2) (a) 
of the ICC Act are functional immunities and not personal immunities.676 
6.3.2 Kenya 
The IC Act 
Kenya’s IC Act is silent on whether or not the official position of an accused person is 
relevant for domestic prosecutions. It however provides extensively for the relevance of 
immunity with regard to requests for arrest and surrender of an accused person to the ICC. It 
provides in Section 27 (1) that, 
[t]he existence of any immunity or special procedural rule attaching to the official capacity of 
any person shall not constitute a ground for (a) refusing or postponing the execution of a request 
for surrender or other assistance by the ICC;(b holding that a person is ineligible for surrender, 
transfer, or removal to the ICC or another State under this Act; or (c) holding that a person is not 
obliged to provide the assistance sought in a request by the ICC.677 
It ought to be noted however that the Act distinguishes between requests relating to officials 
of state parties to the ICC and those relating to non-party states. It provides in section 23 (2) 
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that where a request is in respect of an official of a non-party state or an organisation, a 
request must be made for the waiver of the immunity of such a person.678 
The application of this section is however subject to section 115 of the Act, which provides 
that, 
If a request by the  ICC for assistance to which this part applies concerns persons who, or 
information or property that, are subject to the control of another State or an international 
agreement, the Attorney-General shall inform the ICC to enable it to direct its request to the 
other State or international organization.679 
Gevers has argued that the provisions of the Act in this respect are commendable in that they 
clarify the relevance of personal immunities with regard to requests for cooperation with the 
ICC. In addition the Act addresses, though not perfectly, the contentious issue of the 
contradictory provisions in article 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute regarding the immunity 
issue.680  
Section 27 of the IC Act provides that the immunity of an individual shall not bar the arrest 
and surrender of such an individual not only to the ICC but to a third state as well.681 Gevers 
has asserted that in view of the customary international law position as enunciated in the 
Arrest Warrant case, Kenya would breach its obligations under customary international law 
were it to effect such an arrest and surrender to a third state.682 It is pertinent to note at this 
point that despite the commendable provisions in Kenya’s IC Act, the country has recently 
been at the forefront of calling for a mass withdrawal of African states from the Rome Statute 
of the ICC.  
6.3.3 Uganda 
The ICC Act 
Uganda’s ICC Act is silent on the issue of immunity for domestic prosecutions, but like the 
Kenyan legislation, it does provide for the relevance of immunity in requests for cooperation 
by the ICC. Section 25(1) provides that, 
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[t]he existence of any immunity or special procedural rule attaching to the official capacity of 
any person is not a ground for – (a) refusing or postponing the execution of a request for 
surrender or other assistance made by the ICC; (b) holding that a person is ineligible for arrest or 
surrender to the ICC under this Act; or (c) holding that a person is not obliged to provide the 
assistance sought in a request by the ICC.683 
The Act is similar in wording in this respect to section 27 of Kenya’s International Crimes 
Act, with the difference being that Uganda’s Act does not make reference to surrender to 
another state.684 Another striking similarity is that the operation of section 25 is subject to 
article 98 of the Rome Statute, as it is  conditional upon section 24 (6).685 This section 
provides that, 
If the Minister [of Justice] is of the opinion that the circumstances set out in article 98 of the 
Statute apply to a request for provisional arrest, arrest and surrender or other assistance ,he or she 
shall consult with the ICC and request a determination as to whether article 98 applies.686 
As Gevers has observed, it is not clear from the wording of section 24 (6) how the 
consultative process should take place.687 This provision is similar to section 115 of Kenya’s 
International Crimes Act in that it also addresses the contradictory provisions in section 27 
and section 98 of the Rome Statute. However, unlike Kenya’s ICA, Uganda’s ICC Act does 
not distinguish between requests relating to officials of state parties and those of non-state 
parties. 
6.3.4 Mauritius 
The ICC Act 
The ICC Act has a similar provision to that found in South Africa’s ICC Act with regards to 
the relevance of immunities in domestic prosecutions. It provides in section 6 (1) that, 
It shall not be a defence to an offence under section 4 nor a ground for a reduction of sentence 
for a person convicted of an offence under that section to plead that he is or was Head of State, a 
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member of Government or Parliament, an elected representative or a government official of a 
foreign state.688 
It is submitted that like the provision in South Africa’s ICC Act, section 6 (1) refers to 
functional rather than personal immunities. As Kayitana has convincingly argued, if the 
immunity provision in South Africa’s Act were to apply to personal immunities, this would 
go against the rationale of the principle of personal immunities.689 In addition, the 
interpretation that the immunity provision relates to functional rather than personal immunity 
is the one which is consistent with the customary international law position on the relevance 
of immunities before domestic courts. 
With regards to the relevance of immunities in cooperation with ICC requests, the Act does 
not address the issue. It simply outlines the procedure to be followed where the ICC has 
requested for assistance. Section 11 provides that, 
(1) Any request from the International Criminal Court for the arrest or provisional arrest and 
surrender of a person for whom a warrant of arrest has been issued by the International Criminal 
Court shall be directed to the Attorney-General… (2)The Attorney-General shall, on receipt of 
the request, forward it and the accompanying documents to a Judge, who shall endorse the 
warrant of arrest for execution in Mauritius.690 
The Act makes reference to Article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, providing in section 
14 (1) that, 
Where the Attorney-General considers that the execution of a request for the arrest and surrender 
of any person may be in conflict with the obligations of Mauritius to a foreign country under 
international law or international agreements referred to in Article 98 of the [Rome] Statute he 
shall consult with the International Criminal Court.691 
The Act further provides that if the Attorney-General is satisfied that a request by the ICC 
does not conflict with the obligations of Mauritius; s/he shall sign a certificate to this effect. 
It is submitted that the fact that the Act does not directly address this issue of the 
contradictory provisions of section 27 and 98 of the Rome statute but instead provides for 
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consultation with the ICC, is evidence that Mauritius considers itself to be fully bound by the 
decisions of the ICC in this regard. 
6.3.5 Senegal 
Law no 2007-02 of 12 February 2007 modifying the Penal Code; and Law no 2007-05 of 
12 February 2002 modifying the Criminal Procedure Code 
The Senegalese laws which amended the country’s Penal Code and Criminal Procedure 
Code, and enabled the country to give effect to the complementarity provision of the Rome 
statute do not address the issue of immunity before the courts.692  They are also silent on the 
issue of immunity with respect to cooperation with the ICC.693 Articles 677-1to articles 677-
11 which were incorporated by the 2008 amendment to the constitution provide for issues of 
cooperation with the ICC, although they are also silent on the issue of immunities.694 The 
Constitution of Senegal however provides for the functional immunity of the President and 
members of government. It provides in article 101 that the President is immune to all acts 
linked to his official functions except for the crime of treason, in which case only the High 
Court of Justice which is made up of mostly members of Parliament will have jurisdiction 
over the matter.695  In 2005, the Appeals Court of Dakar relied on this provision and ruled that 
Hissene Habre could not be extradited to Belgium because the immunity accorded to the 
Senegalese President in Article 101 also applied to him even though he was no longer 
President of Chad.696  
The Statute of the EAC however provides for the irrelevance of the official position of an 
accused person. It provides in Article 10 (3) that, 
The official position of an accused, whether as Head of State or Government, or as a responsible 
government official, shall not relieve him or her of criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor 
shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.697 
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As a former Head of State, Hissene Habre could not claim functional immunity as a defence 
before the EAC. The statute of the EAC does not make any reference to the ICC. This is 
significant as this court was established as part of efforts by the AU to reassert the 
sovereignty of its member states by strengthening regional justice mechanisms and avoid the 
jurisdiction of Western states and that of the ICC. 
It can be argued that the trial of Hissene Habre before the EAC is evidence that African states 
view immunity as one of the central aspects of their sovereignty, hence they want to be in a 
position to determine when immunities should be applied and when they should be 
disregarded in respect of their officials and leaders. The trial of Hissene Habre before the 
EAC was the first instance in which an African court exercised jurisdiction based solely on 
the universality principle, and the first in which the immunity of a former Head of State was 
held to be irrelevant. A distinction ought to be drawn between the trial of Hissene Habre and 
that of Charles Taylor, the former Liberian President, by the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL). As was explained in Chapter Four, the EAC was established by Senegal with the 
support of the AU, but it is integrated in the Senegalese domestic legal system. The SCSL on 
the other hand was an international tribunal established by an agreement between the 
government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations.698 
6.4 SOVEREIGNTY AND THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF 
IMMUNITIES IN AFRICA 
As was explained above, there have been tensions between African states and European 
states, and African states and the ICC, regarding the application of the principle of immunity 
with respect to African leaders and state officials. It is submitted that the misunderstandings 
resulting from the application of this principle ought to be understood against the background 
of the doctrinal link between sovereignty and immunity, and Anghie’s theory on the colonial 
origins of international law. Efforts by African states to re-assert immunities for their Heads 
of State and officials have been met with criticism, with scholars arguing that this is a 
deviation from the norm as the principle of immunities is on the decline. In this regard, this 
thesis argues that African states are merely claiming immunities which have always been a 
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part of international law, but which they could not claim due to the ‘standard of civilisation’ 
and the ‘dynamic of difference’ as explained by Anghie. 
The reason why African states are making efforts to re-assert immunities for their Heads of 
State and officials is because they want to reaffirm their sovereignty which they were 
previously denied, and avoid the jurisdiction of European states and that of the ICC. African 
states, weary of their colonial past, want to re-assert their sovereignty to ensure that there is 
no interference in their affairs from their former colonisers. In so doing they are however 
perceived as holding on to a principle which is on the decline and it is submitted that this is 
because scholars treat colonialism as being peripheral, rather than as a central aspect of the 
discipline of international law. This section shall attempt to address the scholarly silence on 
the impact that the colonial encounter has had on the development of contemporary 
international law as seen through the lens of the application of the principle of immunities in 
Africa. 
An examination of the history of the Turkish capitulations in Chapter Five has highlighted 
that African sovereignty has always been deficient and that during the colonial encounter 
African states were not able to claim immunity for their subjects as they were excluded from 
the realm of international law. It is submitted in this regard that Anghie’s theory on the 
colonial origins of international law enables us to understand why African states are keen to 
re-assert the immunities of their Heads of State and state officials, despite the repeated 
statements by the AU that African states are committed to fight impunity on the continent. 
The AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction for instance recognises in its Preamble that, 
‘Certain crimes are of most serious concern to the African Union and the international 
community as a whole and they must not go unpunished.’699 
Despite this stated commitment to fight impunity, the Model Law itself has an immunity 
provision which prohibits domestic courts from exercising universal jurisdiction against 
officials who enjoy immunity at international law. 
Anghie has argued that the end of colonialism did not result in the complete emancipation of 
non-European states. According to Anghie, the continued subjugation of non-European states 
by their former colonisers is manifest through the structure of international institutions such 
as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund which highlight that Western powers 
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still exercise dominance over the former colonies.700 Anghie explains in great detail how the 
creation of the Mandate System of the League of Nations and the structure of the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund are evidence of the continued domination of former 
colonies by the politically powerful states, contrary to the narrative that international law is 
now truly universal as all states are now able to freely participate in international 
institutions.701  According to him, the process of decolonisation itself was fraught with the 
continued subjugation of non-European states, even though this process was meant to 
emancipate the former colonies.702 
A detailed examination of the Mandate system and the economic aspect of international law 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, Anghie’s argument in this regard is relevant in 
that it provides an insight as to where the African states are coming from when they claim 
that universal jurisdiction as exercised by European states and the work of the ICC in Africa 
are neo-colonial tools being used by European states to revive the legacy of colonialism on 
the continent. According to Anghie, 
non-European sovereignty is distinctive on account of the mechanisms and processes that 
brought it into being, despite the appearance of equality between European and non-European 
sovereignty-an appearance that supports the dominant theoretical paradigm of international law, 
which examines the question of how order is created among equal and sovereign states, rather 
than attempting to question the character of this equality.703 
It is submitted that due to their colonial history and the distinctive nature of their sovereignty, 
African states constantly feel the need to re-assert their sovereignty. That is why they are 
keen to re-assert the immunities of their Heads of State and state officials despite the stated 
commitment by the AU to combat impunity on the continent, and at a time when there is a 
rise of universal jurisdiction on the continent. When European states exercise universal 
jurisdiction against African state officials, and when the ICC makes efforts to prosecute 
African Heads of State for alleged human rights violations, African states do not view this as 
efforts to promote accountability. Instead, they view this as a disregard of immunities which 
the African Heads of State and state officials in question ought to enjoy at international law. 
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As Du Plessis has rightly argued, this disregard of immunities is perceived by African states 
as an affront to their sovereignty.704 
It is significant that the AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction makes no reference to the 
ICC. Although it provides for the immunity of Heads of State and state officials before 
domestic courts, it is silent on the issue of cooperation with the ICC. This resonates with 
Anghie’s argument that the end of colonialism did not result in an end to colonial relations. 
The attitude of African states towards the ICC, which they view as a neo-colonial tool being 
used by Western states to revive the legacy of colonialism in Africa, reflects the growing 
African misgivings towards the work of the ICC in Africa. The Model Law was adopted in 
2012, at a time when relations between African states and the ICC were arguably at an all-
time low, in the wake of the ICC confirming proceedings against the Kenyan President 
Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto.  
The AU Assembly asserted in its 2013 decision on Africa’s relationship with the ICC that the 
indictment and trial of sitting Heads of States is an affront to the sovereignty of the African 
states involved, and decided that sitting Heads of State should not be charged or tried before 
an international court or tribunal.705  It is submitted that Anghie’s argument is also relevant to 
contemporary international  institutions such as the ICC.As has been argued in Chapter Two, 
one of the reasons why there is growing African discontent with the ICC is because the ICC 
has expanded the application and understanding of the principle of complementarity. It has 
gone from being a Court of last resort to actively selecting high profile cases for 
prosecution.706  
 Du Plessis and Gevers have convincingly argued that, 
the support for the ICC was not only predicated on a ‘complementary’ relationship with ‘national 
criminal justice systems’, but it was desired so that the ‘Court should contribute  to furthering the 
integrity of States generally as well as the equality of States within the general principles of 
international law.’707 
They argue further that instead of furthering the equality of states, 
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the ICC’s work, particularly in the shadow of the Security Council, has been perceived in Africa-
and at least portrayed by the African Union as deeply divisive. It has given certain African 
States, including South Africa, the opportunity to highlight that the international community 
continues to operate on the basis of an inequality of states.708 
In this regard, it is submitted that there is a gap in the available literature on the role that 
colonialism has played in shaping international law, and on the impact that the colonial 
confrontation continues to have on contemporary international law. It is this gap that the 
thesis attempts to address in this chapter. The concerns expressed by African states that the 
disregard of the immunity of their leaders and state officials by European states, and by the 
ICC, ought to be considered against the background of how colonialism remains central to 
the development of international law, as seen through the lens of the application of the 
principle of immunities in Africa, and an examination of the functioning of international 
institutions such as the ICC. According to Du Plessis and Gevers,  
While the ICC has made strides transcending its statist limitations, it has done little to resist the 
Great Power politics that were incorporated into the Rome Statute in the form of the Security 
Council’s power of referral and deferral of cases to the ICC.709 
In response to the perceived unfair targeting of African Heads of State and state officials by 
European states and the ICC, African states have sought to come up with an alternative to 
avoid universal jurisdiction as exercised by European states, and the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
The immunity provision in the Protocol on amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African court of Justice and Human Rights, though admittedly extreme, is an example of 
efforts by the AU to re-assert the sovereignty of its member states. The immunity provision is 
the AU’s solution to the perceived disregard of the immunities of the leaders and state 
officials of African states. 
Du Plessis has asserted that the immunity provision was triggered by the confirmation of 
proceedings against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto by the 
ICC in 2012.He notes that prior to this development, the draft Protocols on the proposed 
court did not include immunity provisions.710  The inclusion of the immunity provision in the 
2014 amendment was a result of the 2013 AU Assembly decision on Africa’s Relationship 
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with the ICC which resolved that the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto must be stopped.711 The 
inclusion of Article 46A bis was therefore motivated by the AU’s desire  to re-assert 
immunity for Heads of State and officials of its member states in order to counter the 
perceived disregard of their immunities  not only by the ICC, but by European states 
exercising universal jurisdiction against African state officials and thereby re-assert the 
sovereignty of member states.712  
In this regard, it is submitted that when the immunity provision was included in the Malabo 
Protocol, African states were not deviating from the norm by claiming immunity for their 
Heads of State and senior state officials. As was noted in Chapter Five, the principle of 
immunities is a well-established one with a long standing history. It has always been a part of 
international law but due to the colonial and racial nature of the history of international law, 
non-European states were unable to apply this principle. Arguments have been made by some 
scholars that African states should not deviate from the norm by insisting on immunities for 
their Heads of State and state officials because the principle of immunities has fallen. 
Notably Jalloh, commenting on concerns expressed by African states that European states 
were disregarding the immunity of their officials, asserted that, ‘…Africa should not be 
allowed to fall back on outmoded notions of immunity to shield its leaders from trials for 
alleged crimes before national courts.’713 
It is submitted that contrary to this assertion by Jalloh, the notion of immunity is not at all 
outmoded. The customary international law position on immunities of state officials as 
outlined by the ICJ in Arrest Warrant still stands. There is therefore no deviation from the 
norm on the part of African states claiming and re-asserting the immunities of their Heads of 
State and state officials, as is the case with Article 46 A bis. 
The examination of domestic immunity legislation in Europe in Chapter Five has highlighted 
that European states, with the exception of Belgium whose universal jurisdiction legislation 
did not recognise immunities, have been consistent in upholding the immunities of Heads of 
State before their domestic courts. Although in some instances European states such as 
Germany have disregarded the immunities of African state officials, generally it can be 
argued that European states have always upheld, and claimed, immunities for their Heads of 
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State and officials.714 This status quo has not been questioned by scholars of international law. 
On the contrary, African states have been criticised for asserting the immunities of their 
officials. This points to the historically Eurocentric focus of international law and the double 
standard that arguably exists in the application of international criminal law as explained in 
detail in Chapter Four. 
In concluding this section, it is submitted that the re-asserting of immunities of African 
leaders and state officials takes place against the background of Africa’s colonial past which 
denied African states their sovereignty as explained by Anghie. In some instances, such as 
Article 46A bis of the amendment to the Protocol on the statute of the proposed court, the 
steps taken by the AU to re-assert immunities for Heads of State and other senior state 
officials on behalf of its member states are admittedly extreme. However, these efforts 
should not just be dismissed as political rhetoric by African states. Rather, they ought to be 
considered holistically in light of the colonial and racist history of international law which 
resulted in non-European sovereignty being distinctive. As Anghie has asserted, 
The colonial and post-colonial realities of international law have been obscured and 
misunderstood as a consequence of a persistent and deep seated set of ideas that has structured 
traditional scholarship on the history and theory of international law.715 
The attitude of African states to universal jurisdiction as exercised by European states, and to the 
work of the ICC in Africa can thus only be comprehended as part of the broader framework of the 
history of colonialism and sovereignty and how the colonial confrontation continues to have an 
impact on contemporary international law. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the regional and domestic legislative provisions on immunity in 
Africa. The examination has highlighted that African states are strengthening their resolve to 
re-assert immunities for their Heads of State and senior state officials. This resolve is in 
reaction to the perceived unfair targeting of African state officials by European states in their 
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exercise of universal jurisdiction, and to the perceived unfair targeting and disregard of the 
immunities of sitting African Heads of State by the ICC. 
 The conclusion to be drawn from the immunity provision in the AU Model Law on 
Universal Jurisdiction and in Article 46A bis of the Protocol on amendments to the Protocol 
on the statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights is that African states are not 
deviating from the norm by re-asserting immunities for their Heads of State and officials. 
Instead, they are simply claiming the immunities which have always been a part of 
international law but which they were unable historically to claim due to the ‘dynamic of 
difference’ and ‘standard of civilisation’ as explained by Anghie. 
 Africa’s stance on immunity, particularly at the regional level has been widely criticised on 
the basis that the immunity provisions in the AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction  and 
in the amendment to the Protocol on the statute of the proposed court is a step backwards for 
the fight against impunity on the continent.716 This Chapter has argued that although some of 
the measures that have been taken by the AU to reclaim the immunity of African Heads of 
State and senior officials are extreme, there is nothing untoward in African states claiming 
immunity for their Heads of State and senior state officials. Immunities have always been a 
part of international law but African states were unable to claim them as they were deprived 
of their sovereignty.  
It is asserted that the reason why efforts by African states to re-assert the immunity of their 
Heads of State and senior officials have been criticised on the basis that African states are 
holding on to a principle which is on the decline, is because international law treats 
colonialism as being a peripheral rather than a central feature of the discipline of 
international law.  
As explained by Anghie, sovereignty, which is the fundamental principle of law upon which 
all the other principles of international law are arguably based, was forged out of the colonial 
encounter.717  It is therefore argued in this Chapter that in order to understand the present day 
nature of international law and international relations, regard ought to be had to the colonial 
and racial nature of the history of international law. The attitude of African states towards 
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European states and the ICC regarding the application of international criminal law can best 
be understood within the context of how the colonial confrontation was instrumental in 
shaping the development of important doctrines of international law. The impact that 
colonialism has had on the development of international law is manifest in the application of 
the sovereignty doctrine in Africa as seen through the lens of the application of the principles 
of universal jurisdiction and immunity, and Africa’s relationship with the ICC. 
As has been explained above, there is considerable debate regarding the exact scope of 
immunity ratione personae, despite the ICJ having clarified the customary international law 
position on the subject of immunities in the Arrest Warrant case. The judgment in the Arrest 
Warrant case has been criticised by a number of scholars who argue that it is a step 
backwards in the fight against impunity.718 It is submitted that despite its shortcomings, the 
judgment remains the leading authority on the subject of the scope of personal immunities of 
heads of state and state officials. The immunity provisions in the AU Model Law on 
Universal Jurisdiction and in the amendment on the Protocol to the statute of the proposed 
court are therefore in conformity with international customary law.  
It is regrettable that there is lack of clarity on Africa’s position on immunity before domestic 
courts and with respect to the issue of cooperation with the ICC. This is because the 
immunity provision in the AU Model Law is at odds with those of some sub-regional 
instruments such as the Great Lakes Protocol, and some domestic instruments such as the 
ICC Act of South Africa and Mauritius respectively.  
In concluding this chapter, it is asserted that the push by the AU to re-assert the immunity of 
the Heads of State and state officials of its member states takes place against the background 
of Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of international law. Due to the distinctive 
character of the sovereignty of African states, they frequently rely on reinforcing their 
sovereignty in order to address the perceived inequalities between them and their former 
colonisers.719 Scholars however treat this push for immunity as a deviation from the norm and 
                                                 
718 See for example Roht-Ariaza The Pinochet Effect 188. See also Du Plessis & Bosch ‘Immunities and 
Universal Jurisdiction’ 258 asserting that ‘It appears that when presented with a test case, the majority failed to 
rise to the task of ending impunity by immunity, or at the very least of providing cogent reasons consistent with 
state practice to explain why the legacy should continue.’ 
719 For a detailed discussion on this issue see generally R Anand ‘Role of the “New” Asian-African Countries in 
the Present International Legal Order’ (1962)56 American J of Int L 383 and Abi-Saab ‘The Newly Independent 
States and the Rules of International Law: An Outline’ 95. 
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It is submitted that this is because colonialism is treated as being peripheral rather than being 
a central to the development of international law. As argued by Anghie, 
far from being ancillary to the discipline, colonialism is central to its very constitution. Formal 
sovereignty is very important, and provides Third World states with a vital means of protecting 
and furthering their interests. But the enduring vulnerabilities created by the process by which 
non-European states acquired sovereignty pose an ongoing challenge, not only to the peoples of 
the Third World, but also to international law itself.720 
The push for immunities by African states therefore ought to be understood within the 
context of the colonial and racial nature of the history of international law. The history of the 
development of the principle of immunities and the exclusion of non-European communities 
from the application of this principle provides an insight into why African states want to 
reaffirm their sovereignty by re-asserting immunity for their Heads of State and officials. 
Efforts by African states to reclaim the immunities of their Heads of State and officials 
should therefore not be dismissed as mere political rhetoric, but they should be considered 
holistically, regard being had to the colonial and racial nature of the history of international 
law and the impact that the colonial confrontation continues to have on the discipline. 
  
                                                 
720 Anghie 2007 195. 
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                                     CHAPTER SEVEN 
                                         CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 The thesis has examined the relationship between international criminal law and sovereignty 
in Africa as seen through the lens of the application of the principles of universal jurisdiction 
and personal immunities, and the attitude of African states towards the work of the ICC in 
Africa. The different chapters have drawn different conclusions, and a detailed discussion of 
the conclusions drawn is not warranted here. This chapter will give a summary of the main 
research findings, and make proposals for the way forward regarding the application of 
international criminal law in Africa. 
It is proposed that in order to address African states’ concerns regarding the application of 
international criminal law by Western states and the ICC, African states should focus on 
strengthening their domestic and regional justice mechanisms. As was argued in Chapter 
Four, this would help to address the concern of double standards raised by African states. 
The recent successful trial of Hissene Habre by the EAC sitting in Senegal is evidence that 
African states are capable of addressing impunity on the continent; hence efforts by African 
states to strengthen their regional justice mechanisms ought to be taken seriously instead of 
being dismissed as self-serving.  
In this regard, it is acknowledged that in order for a purely domestic and regional approach to 
international criminal law to be a viable alternative to universal jurisdiction as practiced by 
Western states, and to the jurisdiction of the ICC, African states ought to address the 
concerns related to the effectiveness of the proposed African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights. These include lack of resources and lack of clarity regarding the exact scope of 
jurisdiction for the proposed international criminal chamber. 
With regards to the ICC, it is imperative that a solution should be found to the impasse 
between the AU and the ICC on the immunity issue to avoid the further deterioration of the 
relationship between the AU and the ICC, and possible withdrawals from the Rome Statute 
by African states other than Burundi. A number of options have been suggested in this 
regard, including that there should be a decision from the ICC’s Appeals Chamber which 
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would bring finality to the matter; that the state parties to the ICC should indicate their 
interpretation of the application of article 27 and 98; and that the ICJ should provide clarity 
on the issue of Head of State immunity before the ICC.721 The possible options available to 
African states will be analysed in detail below. 
7.2  SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS. 
7.2.1 African states and ‘non-Western sovereignty’ 
An examination of the natural law; positivism and TWAIL theories on the development of 
the sovereignty doctrine has shown that African sovereignty, when it has been granted, has 
always been deficient. Flowing from the perception that non-European communities were 
‘backward, savages’, non-European communities were treated as objects rather than subjects 
of international law, and they were excluded from the realm of international law.722  
A critical review of the natural law theory on sovereignty shows that natural law theorists did 
not consider the doctrine of sovereignty as applicable in relation to non-European 
communities. To them, it was unimaginable that sovereignty could be discussed with respect 
to non-Europeans. With the exception of Vitoria, natural law jurists such as Jean Bodin 
considered sovereignty only in relation to the European world. It is through Vitoria’s De 
Indis that the primitive origins of the role played by colonialism in the development of 
international law, particularly the sovereignty doctrine, can be traced.723 Vitoria’s refusal to 
consider the Indians as being sovereign, notwithstanding that he refused to consider them as 
‘animals’ is evidence that the deprivation of non-Europeans of their sovereignty started long 
before the colonial confrontation of the 19th century.724 
The ‘standard of civilisation’ and the ‘dynamic of difference’ as postulated by the positivist 
jurists is also evidence that African communities were historically denied sovereignty. Non-
European communities were not considered to be sovereign by the positivists because they 
perceived them to be uncivilised, or that their civilisation did not meet the European standard 
                                                 
721  See for example Knottnerus ‘The Immunity of Al Bashir: The Latest Turn in the Jurisprudence of the ICC’; 
D Akande ‘An International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the ICC Head of State Immunity Issue’ EJIL 
Talk 31/3/2016 available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/an-international-court-of-justice-advisory-opinion-on-the-
icc-head-of-state-immunity-issue/ (accessed 30/6/2018). 
722 Anghie 2007 54. 
723 Ibid 30, explaining that the significance of Vitoria’s De Indis extends to our own times. 
724 Ibid 26. 
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of civilisation. As a result, they were excluded from the realm of international law. 
According to Anghie, 
Non-European states were excluded from the realm of international law, now identified as being 
the exclusive preserve of European states, as a result of which the former were deprived of 
membership and the ability to assert any rights cognizable as legal. In its most extreme form, 
positivist reasoning suggested that relations and transactions between the European and non-
European states occurred entirely outside the realm of international law.725 
Positivists referred to non-Europeans using derogatory language such as ‘barbarians’ in order 
to emphasise their perceived backwardness and thereby justify the colonial confrontation.726  
The history of capitulations which were granted to European states by partially recognised 
‘states’ such as the Ottoman Empire and China also highlight that African sovereignty (when 
it has been granted) has always been deficient. The capitulations which were initially 
voluntarily granted to European ‘states’ were later used as one-sided treaties to subjugate the 
partially recognised ‘states’. European states insisted on immunities for their citizens from 
the jurisdiction of the courts in the partially recognised ‘states’ because they considered the 
legal systems in these ‘states’ to be lacking in civilisation.727 However as was explained in 
Chapter Five, this immunity was not immunity proper but de facto immunity, as international 
law was not deemed to be applicable to non- European ‘states’. 
In order for the capitulatory regime to be abolished and for the partially recognised ‘states’ to 
be accepted into the ‘family of nations’, they had to agree to concessions as stipulated by the 
European states.728 As explained by Anghie, the partially recognised ‘states’ gained their 
sovereignty but in the process gave up their cultural distinctiveness.729 The sovereignty gained 
was therefore not full sovereignty, and hence  despite the ‘standard of civilisation’ and 
‘dynamic of difference’ being obsolete as all states are now free to participate in international 
law as equal subjects, non-European sovereignty retains a distinctive character.730 This is 
attributable to the colonial and racial history of international law. 
                                                 
725 Ibid 54. 
726 Ibid 40 fn 19; Anghie ‘The Evolution of International Law’ 745. 
727 Özsu ‘Ottoman Empire’ 440. 
728 Ibid 445; Anghie 2007 86. 
729 Anghie ibid. 
730 Ibid 194. 
183 
 
Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of international law asserts that the colonial 
confrontation was central to the development of international law including the fundamental 
sovereignty doctrine. He asserts that despite colonialism having come to an end, it continues 
to play a pivotal role in the development of international law and international relations. 
Through a critical examination of the Mandate system of the League of Nations, Anghie 
argues that the process of decolonisation itself was characterised by the continued 
subjugation of non-European ‘states’, and as a result of this non-European sovereignty 
remains distinctive.731 According to Anghie, the inequalities between the former colonisers 
and former colonies are inherent in the operation of contemporary institutions such as the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.732 It is submitted that this argument also 
applies to the ICC. 
Anghie’s argument is validated by the concerns raised by African states with respect to the 
efforts by the ICC to prosecute African Heads of State for alleged human rights violations. 
African states have claimed that the ICC, and universal jurisdiction as practised by European 
states, are the two jurisdictional tools by which Western states seek to continue the legacy of 
colonialism in Africa.733 African states are still sensitive to their colonial past, hence they see 
any attempts by European states to exercise universal jurisdiction against their officials, and 
the work of the ICC in Africa, as a form of neo-colonialism and continued deprivation of 
their sovereignty. In this regard, African concerns ought to be taken seriously within the 
context of the colonial and racial history of international law, and not be dismissed as mere 
political rhetoric by scholars.  
It is worth noting that Africa’s discontent with the application of international criminal 
justice did not start with the ICC. African states have in the past expressed dissatisfaction 
with the ICJ. In 1966 the ICJ ruled in the South West Africa Case that African states, which 
were represented by Ethiopia and Libya, had no legal standing to question the apartheid 
policy and human rights violations perpetrated by South Africa in the then South West 
                                                 
731 Ibid 196-197. 
732 Ibid. 
733 Jalloh ‘Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription?’ 4. 
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Africa.734 This drew adverse reactions from African states and Gevers, commenting on the 
intended withdrawal from the ICC by South Africa said, 
The similarities between African states’ criticisms of these two quite different courts separated 
by half a century invite us to consider whether there is anything to be gleaned from African 
states’ sense of the failure of the ICJ in 1966, and their criticism of the ICC today, which lies at 
the heart of South Africa’s decision to withdraw from it.735 
It can be argued in this regard that Africa’s discontent with the ICC is not novel, but it is 
characteristic of the attitude of African states towards international institutions, which is 
caused by the continent’s sensitivity to its colonial past. As Gevers has rightly argued ‘…it is 
the spectre of history itself that raises the question of the ICC’s relationship to colonialism, 
not simply self-interested African states.’736  
It is submitted that this assertion by Gevers also applies to the relationship between African 
states and European states with regards to the application of the principles of universal 
jurisdiction and personal immunities. 
7.2.2 The continued impact of colonialism on international relations 
One of the main arguments that Anghie makes is that although the end of colonialism was a 
significant development in international law, it did not necessarily mean an end to colonial 
relations.737 This is true in light of the reaction by African states to the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by European states against African states, and to efforts by the ICC to prosecute 
African leaders. As was explained in Chapter Two, during the colonial encounter African 
communities did not enjoy sovereignty. At the dawn of decolonisation, the newly 
independent African states sought to use the doctrine of sovereignty as a means to avoid any 
form of interference in their internal affairs by their former colonisers. Abi-Saab has asserted 
                                                 
734 South West Africa, Second Phase 1966 ICJ Reports 6. See also Dugard International Law: A South African 
Perspective 456;  Gevers ‘SA & the ICC: Justice or Just Us?’ Con Magazine (8/11/2016) available at 
www.theconmagazine.co.za/2016/11/18/sa-the-icc-justice-or-just-us/ (accessed 27/6/2018). 
735 Gevers ibid. 
736 Ibid. 
737 Anghie ‘The Evolution of International Law’ 748-749. 
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that African states sought to strengthen their sovereignty because they were aware that they 
had for a long time been deprived of it.738 
The attitude of African states towards the application of the principles of universal 
jurisdiction and personal immunities by European states, and to the work of the ICC in 
Africa, resonates with the argument made by Anghie and other TWAIL scholars such as 
Gathii that the end of colonialism did not mean the end to colonial relations.739  African states 
have claimed that the ICC, and universal jurisdiction as practiced by European states, is neo-
colonial.740  
When European states exercise universal jurisdiction against African states officials, and 
when the UN Security Council refers cases involving African Heads of State to the ICC, they 
do not purport to tell them that they are less sovereign. However, because African states have 
historically obtained sovereignty differently, they see this exercise of jurisdiction over 
African state officials and Heads of State by European states and the ICC respectively as an 
affront to their sovereignty. It can be argued that African states have to relive the trauma of 
colonialism, a period during which they were subjugated and regarded to be uncivilised and 
inferior to their European counterparts. 
In this vein, it is asserted that the concerns raised by African states ought to be considered 
holistically in the context of the colonial history of international law. As argued by Anghie, 
contrary to the narrative that colonialism is a peripheral aspect of international law, it is 
central to the development of the discipline.741 In a similar vein, Megret has rightly argued 
that colonialism cannot easily be divorced from international law because it helped to shape 
the very fundamental aspects of the discipline.742 Therefore, the claim by African states that 
the indictment of African Heads of States by the ICC and the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction against African state officials by European states is neo-colonial, and that it 
disregards their sovereignty and the immunities of the African Heads of State and state 
officials in question; ought to be understood against the background of Anghie’s theory on 
the colonial origins of international law. 
                                                 
738 Abi-Saab ‘The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law: An Outline’103. 
739 Gathii ‘Twail: A Brief History of its Origins’ 34. 
740 Jalloh ‘Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription?’ 4. 
741 Anghie 2007 37-38. 
742 Megret ‘Where does the Critique of International Human Rights Stand?’  9. 
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7.2.3 ‘African sovereignty’ and the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa  
The thesis asserted in Chapter Four that the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa since 2002 
takes place against the background of Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of international 
law. In Chapter Six, it was similarly asserted that the push by African states to re-assert 
immunities for their Heads of State and state officials ought to be understood against the 
background of Anghie’s theory on the colonial origins of international law. Both the rise of 
universal jurisdiction in Africa, and efforts by African states to re-assert the immunities of 
their state officials and Heads of State, are part of efforts to strengthen their sovereignty and 
thereby avoid the jurisdiction of non-African states, and that of the ICC. This explains why 
the principle of universal jurisdiction is on the rise in Africa at a time when the AU has 
repeatedly expressed concern regarding the application of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction by European states, and why there is a push to re-assert immunities by African 
states when the AU has repeatedly stated its commitment to fight impunity on the continent. 
The enactment of ICC implementation legislation at the domestic level in Africa beginning 
with South Africa in 2002 and subsequently by countries including Kenya; Uganda; 
Mauritius and Senegal; and the adoption of the AU Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction in 
2012, is evidence that African states want to re-assert their sovereignty. It can be argued that 
by strengthening their regional and domestic justice mechanisms, African states seek to 
correct the injustices of the past where they were treated as objects rather than subjects of 
international law. The recent trial and conviction of the former Chadian leader Hissene Habre 
by the EAC sitting in Senegal has demonstrated to the world that Africa is indeed capable of 
dealing with impunity without external help. The efforts by African states to re-assert their 
sovereignty should therefore not just be dismissed as self-serving, but they should be 
considered seriously as it has been demonstrated that Africa is able to deal with human rights 
violations. 
It is pertinent to note that to date, Habre’s case is the only one in which a domestic court in 
Africa has exercised jurisdiction based solely on the universality principle.743 Notwithstanding 
this, the enactment of ICC implementation legislation on universal jurisdiction by a number 
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of African states is evidence that African states are committed to deal with impunity on the 
continent. It should also be noted that Habre’s case is not the only one in which a former 
African Head of State was tried and convicted for atrocities committed in Africa. In 1998, the 
ICTR convicted former Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda of crimes including 
genocide and crimes against humanity.744 In 2012, the SCSL convicted the former Liberian 
President Charles Taylor of war crimes.745 Habre’s case is however an important milestone in 
Africa as it was the first one in which a domestic court tried and convicted a former Head of 
State for human rights violations.746 The ICTR was established by the UN Security Council, 
and the SCSL was structured as an autonomous organisation.747 In addition, as aptly noted by 
Hogestol, ‘The involvement of the AU in bringing Habre to justice also means that Habre is 
the first person to be tried under an African international criminal justice mechanism.’748 
A number of scholars, commenting on the establishment of a criminal chamber with 
jurisdiction to try international crimes in the proposed African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights ,have asserted that Africa does not have the capacity to try international crimes.749 It is 
submitted that although admittedly there are a number of issues that need to be addressed 
before the Court comes into operation, the proposed criminal chamber is a positive 
development. As has been rightly argued by Gevers, the criminal chamber will help in 
addressing the issue of the double standard that arguably exists in international criminal law 
along colonial lines.750 It is arguably more desirable to have a framework in place to deal with 
international crimes at the regional level, notwithstanding that there are issues which need to 
be addressed before the Court comes into operation than to have no framework in place at all. 
 
                                                 
744 See The Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda ICTR 97-23-S (Judgment and Sentence). 
745 See The Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor SCSL-03-01-T; The Prosecutor v Charles Ghankay Taylor 
SCSL-03-01-A. 
746 Perrez-Leon-Acevedo ‘The conviction of Hissene Habre by the Extraordinary African Chambers’. 
747 Ibid. 
748 Hogestol ‘The Habre Judgment at the Extraordinary African Chambers’147. 
749 See for example Murungu ‘Towards a Criminal Chamber in the African Court of Justice and Human Rights’; 
Du Plessis ‘Implications of the AU Decision to give the African Court jurisdiction over international crimes’ 1, 
asserting that ‘…the process of expanding the African court’s jurisdiction is fraught with many legal and 
practical complexities.’ See also Woolaver ‘International and Domestic Implications of South Africa’s 
Withdrawal from the ICC’. 
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7.2.4 The perceived existence of a double standard in the application of international 
criminal law 
African states have repeatedly claimed that there are double standards in the application of 
international criminal law along colonial lines. With respect to the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by European states, the AU has claimed that the European states were unfairly 
targeting African state officials.751 The AU has also claimed that the ICC is unfairly targeting 
African Heads of state in its operations.752 
A number of scholars including Gevers have argued that there is indeed evidence of a double 
standard in the application of international criminal law. Gevers made this argument in the 
context of the complementarity provision of the Rome statute, observing that the office of the 
prosecutor has repeatedly declined to investigate matters from Western countries on the basis 
that the matters were already being investigated by the home states of the accused.753 This is 
in contrast to situations arising out of Africa, where challenges have been raised by Libya 
and Kenya on the basis of the complementarity principle.  
In March 2011, Kenya challenged the admissibility of the cases against Uhuru Kenyatta; 
William Ruto; Joshua Arap Sang and Francis Muthaura. Kenya challenged the admissibility 
of these cases on the basis that the adoption of a new constitution and other legal reforms 
following a disputed presidential election held in December 2007 were grounds for the cases 
to be referred back to the country for trial. The ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II dismissed 
Kenya’s complementarity challenge on the basis that despite the legal reforms there was 
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752 Jalloh ‘Regionalizing International Criminal Law?’ 462. 
753 Gevers ‘Back to the Future?’124. 
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insufficient evidence to show that investigations had actively begun in Kenya.754 The Pre-
Trial Chamber’s decision was upheld by the Appeals Chamber in August 2011.755 
In May 2013, Libya challenged the admissibility of the case against Saif Gadaffi on the basis 
that there was an ongoing domestic investigation on the case. This complementarity 
challenge was dismissed by the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I on the basis that Libya had not 
provided enough evidence to show that the domestic investigation pertained to the same 
matter before the ICC.756 This decision was upheld by the Appeals Chamber in May 2014.757 
The Pre-Trial Chamber however ruled that the case against Al-Senussi was inadmissible 
because there was already an ongoing investigation in Libya pertaining to the same case.758 
There have been no complementarity challenges from Western states. This has been 
attributed to the perceived double standard applied by the ICC. As observed by Gevers, the 
ICC has declined to pursue cases from the politically powerful states on the basis of the 
complementarity principle.759 A prime example is the refusal by the then prosecutor Luis 
Ocampo  in 2006 to investigate British war crimes in Iraq on the basis that a preliminary 
                                                 
754 See The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-01/11-96 (Decision on the Application by Kenya 
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investigation had shown that national proceeding were already underway with respect to all 
the alleged crimes.760 This is arguably evidence of the existence of a double standard in the 
application of international criminal law by the ICC. 
The thesis has argued that the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction by 
European states against African states, and the application of the principle of personal 
immunities by European states point to a double standard in the application of international 
criminal law. The same applies to efforts by the ICC to prosecute African Heads of State. A 
critical review of the rise and decline of universal jurisdiction in Europe has highlighted that 
the majority of state officials against whom universal jurisdiction was exercised by European 
states are from Africa.761 With respect to the ICC, it is also true that the majority of the cases 
investigated so far are from Africa.762 The ICC has been accused of overlooking cases from 
politically powerful states. For instance, it has been argued that although there is evidence of 
human rights abuses by Western States including America in Iraq and Israel in Gaza, these 
situations are being overlooked by the ICC due to the perceived double standard in the 
application of international criminal law.763 
A critical review of the implementation legislation on immunities in Europe has also 
highlighted that there is evidence of a double standard in the application of the principle of 
immunities. The majority of state officials whose immunities were disregarded in the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by European states are from Africa. Prosecutors from 
European states such as Germany used their prosecutorial discretion to determine that 
accused persons from European states and other politically powerful states including China 
and America were immune from investigation. However, using the same prosecutorial 
discretion it was determined that officials from African states could not claim immunity, as 
was the case with the then Rwandan Chief of Protocol Rose Kabuye who was arrested in 
Germany in 2006 pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued against her by a Spanish investigative 
magistrate.764 
                                                 
760 Ibid footnote 160.Gevers notes that in 2014 the current prosecutor Fatou Bensouda indicated that a new 
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761 Jalloh ‘Universal Jurisdiction, Universal Prescription?’ 14. 
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It is submitted that this perceived double standard has contributed significantly to the 
tensions between African states and European states, and African states and the ICC, 
regarding the application of international criminal law. As long as this double standard 
persists, African states will always view the application of international criminal law by 
Western states as continued   subjugation by their former colonisers. 
7.3 PROPOSALS 
This thesis has made the point that the legislative provisions on universal jurisdiction and 
immunities in Africa ought to be taken seriously and policy makers in non-African states as 
well as scholars should start paying more attention to the developments in international 
criminal law in Africa. African international law should be taken seriously in the context of 
the colonial and racial history that African states have gone through, and taking into account 
that colonialism is not just an excuse which is being used by African states to evade 
accountability. On the contrary, colonialism is part of the present day international law in that 
it continues to influence the course of international law. It is submitted that the ‘dynamic of 
difference’ is still evident in contemporary international law as highlighted by the review of 
the application of the principles of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities in Europe. 
The question to be asked in this regard is if the colonial and racial history of international law 
is to be taken seriously, what does that mean for the future of international criminal law in 
Africa? Should international law be reformed so that it adjusts to how African states are 
doing things, or should the pretence of a universal international law be abandoned in favour 
of a regionalised international criminal law? It is submitted that the solution lies at multiple 
levels, and the following section shall explore the possible options available to African states. 
It is pertinent to note at this point that because of the history of international law, it is not 
possible to have a truly universal international law which is accepted by all states. 
7.3.1 Regionalising international criminal law  
The regionalisation of international criminal law by African states is part of the solution to 
the problems arising between African states and Western states regarding the application of 
international criminal law. There are a number of possible ways to do this, including pulling 
out of international criminal law, and adopting a Model Law on immunities. 
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7.3.1.1 Pulling out of international criminal law 
One option would be for African states to continue on the current path where they have 
indicated their intention to withdraw from the ICC and concentrate on strengthening their 
regional justice mechanisms. This would mean that African states abandon international 
criminal law in favour of domestic and regional application of international law. Whilst this 
may be desirable considering the concerns raised by African states in the past regarding the 
application of the principles of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities by European 
states, and the work of the ICC in Africa, it is submitted that this would not be the best 
solution in the interest of justice. The Rome Statute of the ICC is a treaty which has been 
formally adopted by states and therefore African states need to take their obligations under 
this treaty seriously.  
What is needed is dialogue on how to address the African states’ concerns regarding the 
perceived unfair targeting of African leaders, and to discuss the contentious issue of Head of 
State immunity before the Court. This issue has ignited considerable debate following the 
indictment of the incumbent Sudanese President Omar al Bashir in 2009 by the ICC. It shall 
be discussed below that the best solution to this impasse would be for the ICJ to bring the 
matter to finality. 
The ICC should  take the concerns of African states seriously regarding its operations .As 
rightly pointed out by Judge Eboe-Esuji, it would not only be naïve but possibly illegal for 
these concerns not to be taken seriously.765 If the Court could revert to its original mandate of 
being a court of last resort, this could address the complementarity challenges raised by 
African states and thereby avoid the possible mass withdrawal from the Rome statute of the 
International Criminal Court by African states. As was mentioned above there are a number 
of issues which need to be addressed before the proposed African Court can be considered to 
be an effective alternative to the ICC.  
In order for a purely domestic and regional approach to international criminal law to be 
viable, it is suggested that the AU should first address the concerns that have been raised 
with respect to lack of resources for the proposed court, the lack of clarity as to the scope of 
jurisdiction for the proposed criminal chamber, and the granting of immunity to Heads of 
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State and other senior state officials before the proposed court.766 It has been argued that the 
proposed Court is desirable in that it will address the allegations of double standards by 
Western states and the ICC in the application of international criminal law.767 It has also been 
argued that the proposed criminal chamber would improve access to justice on the African 
continent due to its proximity to victims of human rights violations.768 It is therefore 
recommended that the AU should address the concerns raised in respect to the proposed 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights so that it can effectively focus on domestic and 
regional application of international criminal law. 
The recent trial and conviction of former Chadian leader Hissene Habre by the EAC sitting in 
Senegal has demonstrated to the world that Africa is capable of finding African solutions to 
African problems. A purely domestic and regional approach to international criminal law in 
Africa is therefore possible if the concerns related to Africa’s readiness to implement the 
proposed African Court of Justice and Human Rights are addressed. In this vein, it is 
submitted that African international law ought to be taken seriously and that efforts by 
African states to strengthen their regional justice mechanisms should not be dismissed as 
attempts at evading accountability. Rather, they should be considered as possible effective 
solutions to the problem of impunity on the continent. 
7.3.1.2 Adoption of a Model Law on immunities by African states 
A second option would be for African states to adopt a Model Law on immunities. At 
present, there is no regional legislative framework on immunities in Africa, although the AU 
Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction does contain an immunity provision in article 16 (1). 
The adoption of a Model Law on immunities would be desirable in that it would clearly set 
out the African position on the subject of immunities. In this regard, it is submitted that it 
would be more desirable to have a flawed Model Law on immunities than to have none at all. 
The Model Law would help to address the concerns raised by African states regarding the 
application of the principle of immunities by Western states and the ICC respectively. 
                                                 
766  Du Plessis ‘Implications of the AU decision to give the African court jurisdiction over international crimes’; 
Woolaver ‘International and Domestic Implications of South Africa’s Withdrawal from the ICC’. 
767 Gevers ‘Back to the Future?’ 124. 
768 C Mabunda ‘The Pros and Cons of the Criminal Jurisdiction of the Proposed African Court of Justice and  
Human Rights’ Africa Institute of SA Briefing no 98 Nov 2013. 
194 
 
It is suggested that this Model Law should clearly state which officials apart from Heads of 
State should benefit from immunity before both domestic courts and the proposed African 
Court of Justice and Human Rights. The immunity provision in the Protocol on Amendments 
to the Protocol on the proposed court does not specify which officials are covered by the 
amendment, leaving room for a broad interpretation of the provision. 
If, as is proposed here, the AU adopts a specialised regional framework on immunities, 
international law should adjust to how African states are doing things. As has already been 
argued, the history of colonialism cannot be divorced from the problems that face modern 
day international law. Instead of just dismissing the concerns raised by African states 
regarding the application of international law, and their efforts to re-assert their sovereignty 
by strengthening their regional justice mechanisms as mere political rhetoric, African 
concerns and efforts ought to be taken seriously. It is asserted that taking African states’ 
concerns and efforts seriously should not just amount to acknowledging that their reaction to 
international criminal law as practised by Western states and the ICC is a result of their 
colonial history. Rather, international law should adjust and acknowledge that the 
regionalisation of international criminal law by African states is part of the solution to the 
problems caused by the differences arising between African states and European states, and 
African states and the ICC. 
 Scholars and policy makers from Western countries should start taking the legislative 
provisions in Africa with regard to universal jurisdiction and immunities seriously. The focus 
should shift from treating the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa as being an insignificant 
development, and regarding efforts by the AU to re-assert immunities for the Heads of State 
and state officials from member states as being a deviation from the norm. Rather, scholars 
and policy makers from Western states, and the ICC, ought to consider how to embrace these 
developments on the African continent in order to enhance the effectiveness of international 
criminal law in the fight against impunity. This would include accepting that African states 
should be given the opportunity to resort to their domestic and regional justice mechanisms 
in the fight against impunity, and that non-African states and the ICC should not interfere 
unless there is evidence that African states are unable or unwilling to ensure accountability 
for human rights violations. 
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7.3.2 The ICC should provide clarity on the issue of Head of State immunity before 
the Court 
 As has been explained in Chapter Two, one of the reasons given by South Africa for its 
intended withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the ICC in 2016 was that the provision of the 
Rome Statute requiring the country to arrest a sitting Head of State (Al Bashir) is in contrast 
with the customary international law position on immunities, and with the domestic 
implementation legislation on immunities. The issue of whether or not President Al Bashir is 
immune from the jurisdiction of the ICC, and from arrest and surrender by African states in 
cooperation with the ICC has been at the centre of the deteriorating relationship between the 
AU and the ICC. 
It is regrettable that the ICC has so far not provided clarity regarding the issue of Head of 
State immunity before the Court. As shall be discussed in detail in the Postscript, the AU 
continues to insist that Al Bashir enjoys immunity on the basis of article 98 of the Rome 
Statute, and the ICC has maintained that he is not immune. The AU Assembly in its 2013 
Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the ICC resolved that no sitting Head of State should 
be indicted or stand trial before an international tribunal.769 It is therefore important for a 
solution to be found to this impasse between the AU and the ICC regarding the immunity 
issue to avoid the further deterioration of relations between the two sides.  
It has been suggested by a number of scholars that the issue of the relationship between 
article 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which has been the main source of tension 
between the ICC and the AU regarding the Bashir issue, should be clarified by the ICC 
itself.770 Knottnerus, for instance, has suggested that the ICC Appeals Chamber should render 
a decision which would bring finality to the matter.771 None of the African states against 
whom the Court has made a ruling on non-cooperation for their failure to arrest Al Bashir 
when he visited their territories has taken the decision to appeal. 
                                                 
769 See para 9 of the Decision. 
770 Article 27 (2) provides for the irrelevance of immunities before the Court, whilst article 98 (1) provides that a 
state must first obtain the cooperation of a non-party state before proceeding with a request for arrest and 
surrender of a national of that non-party state. The contradictory nature of these provisions shall be discussed in 
detail in the postscript to highlight the confusion surrounding the issue of immunity before the ICC. 
771 See Knottnerus ‘The immunity of Al Bashir: The latest Turn in the ICC Jurisprudence’. 
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There is however hope that the ICC Appeals Chamber will render a decision on this issue of 
the relationship between article 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC. In 2017, the ICC 
rendered a decision on non-cooperation against Jordan following its failure to arrest Al 
Bashir when he visited the country in March.772 Jordan is appealing the decision on non-
compliance 773 and as Mudukuti has asserted, 
‘It will be difficult for the Appeals Chamber to avoid addressing the proverbial elephant 
in the room, which is of course the question of Head of States immunity and arrests by 
third party states at the ICC’s behest’ 774 
7.3.3 State parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC should indicate their interpretation 
of the application of article 27 and 98 
Another suggested solution would be for state parties to the ICC to indicate their 
interpretation of the application of article 27 and 98 of the Rome Statute.775 This would 
involve dialogue between the state parties and the ICC to find common ground. Woolaver 
has noted that such dialogue, if successful, could prevent a mass exodus of African states 
from the ICC.776 
The recent AU Assembly decision on the ICC resolved to request, 
The African State Parties to the Rome Statute to request the ICC Assembly of State Parties to 
convene a working group of experts from its member states to propose a 
declaratory/interpretative clarification of the relationship between Article 27 (irrelevance of 
official capacity) and Article 98 (Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to 
surrender) and other contested issues relating to the conflicting obligations of state parties to 
cooperate with the ICC. 
                                                 
772 See Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09 Decision under Article 87 (7) of the Rome Statute on the 
non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al Bashir 
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‘Decision under article 87 (7) of the Rome Statute on the non-compliance by Jordan with the request by the 
Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar al Bashir (12/3/2018). 
774 See A Mudukuti ‘Immunity, Accountability and Politics: The AU’s bid for an ICJ Advisory Opinion’ 
Groningen J of Int L blog (25/6/2018) available at https://grojil.org/2018/06/25/immunity-accountability-and-
politics-the-aus-bid-for-an-icj-advisory-opinion/ (accessed 03/7/2018). 
775 Ibid. 
776 Woolaver ‘International and Domestic Implications of South Africa’s Withdrawal from the ICC’. 
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One way in which African state parties could seek to clarify the relationship would be by 
referring to statements made on the subject of immunities before the ICC. These statements 
would collectively constitute settled practice (usus) which is part of custom, one of the 
sources of international law. Examples would include diplomatic statements such as those 
made by African states such as Malawi and Chad to the effect that their decision not to arrest 
President Al Bashir when he visited their territories was based on an interpretation of article 
98 of the Rome Statute.777 As Dugard has explained, ‘Evidence of state practice is to be found 
in a variety of materials, including …diplomatic correspondence, policy statements by 
government officers, opinions of national law advisers…’778 
African state parties to the ICC could therefore rely on diplomatic statements and state 
practice to support the African position that article 98 absolves states from the duty to arrest 
Bashir in cooperation with the ICC. 
This move by the AU to seek an interpretative /declaratory clarification from the Assembly 
of State parties on the relationship between article 27 and 98 is commendable. The focus 
seems to have shifted from threats of withdrawal by member states to efforts to engage with 
the Court to try and solve contentious issues. It is however highly unlikely that such 
engagement will result in clarification on the relationship between Article 97 and 98.As 
Woolaver has observed, ‘…given that neither the ICC nor the AU is likely to reverse its 
position on Bashir’s immunities, it is perhaps unrealistic to hope that any significant benefit 
could result from such consultations.’779 
7.3.4 The ICJ should provide clarity on the issue of Head of State immunity before the ICC 
A number of scholars including Akande; Knottnerus: and Du Plessis and Gevers have 
recommended that the impasse between the AU and the ICC should be solved by the ICJ 
rendering an advisory opinion on the issue of Head of State immunity before the ICC.780 It is 
                                                 
777 See the Decisions on non-cooperation by Malawi and Chad. 
778 Dugard International Law-A South African Perspective 26. 
779 Woolaver ‘International and Domestic Implications of South Africa’s Withdrawal from the ICC’. 
780 D Akande ‘An International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the ICC Head of State Immunity Issue’ 
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commendable that the AU has taken the initiative in its 2018 decision on the International 
Criminal Court to request the ICJ for an advisory opinion on this issue.781 
At the recent AU summit in January 2018, the AU Assembly agreed to request the ICJ to 
render an advisory opinion on the issue of Head of State immunity. The Assembly requested, 
The African Group in New York to immediately place on the agenda of the United Nations 
General Assembly a request to seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice 
on the question of immunities of a Head of State and Government and other Senior officials as it 
relates to the relationship between Articles 27 and 98 and the obligations of State Parties under 
International law.’782 
The decision taken by the AU to seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ on immunities before 
the ICC is evidence that despite African states’ misgivings with the Court; they are still 
committed to the international criminal justice project. Despite the attempted withdrawal 
from the Rome statute by South Africa and Gambia from the Rome statute in 2016; and the 
actual withdrawal by Burundi in 2017, African states are still willing to engage with the 
Court to find a way forward on the issues where there is no common ground such as the 
immunity issue. Du Plessis, commenting on the 2012 decision by the AU to request the 
commission to consider seeking an advisory opinion from the ICJ said, 
AU member states should be given credit for their tendency to address concerns about the ICC 
(and international justice more generally) within an international legal framework…This is 
testament to both the relevance of international law, and the stock that African states place in its 
ability to resolve matters of international concern in a fair and predictable manner.783 
Some scholars have however expressed the view that the resolution by the AU to seek an 
advisory opinion from the ICJ is an attempt to circumvent the jurisdiction of the ICC and 
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781 Para 5 (ii) of the Decision. 
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engage in forum shopping.’784 The benefits of the ICJ rendering an advisory opinion on this 
matter would however outweigh the concerns raised. Akande has convincingly argued in 
support of the 2012 proposal by the AU to seek an advisory opinion and argued that the 
advisory opinion is important in view of the inconsistency of the ICC jurisprudence on the 
issue of immunities before the ICC. He has also argued that the advisory opinion would help 
in addressing the international law arguments made by the AU and not just the issue of 
immunities in terms of the Rome Statute. Finally, and most significant to this thesis, Akande 
has asserted that because the relationship between the AU and the ICC is characterised by 
mistrust, it is highly unlikely that the AU will accept any decision made by the ICC regarding 
the immunity issue, as the regional body has already rejected all the decisions on non-
cooperation by states rendered by the ICC.785  
Considering the nature of the relationship between the AU and the ICC therefore, perhaps it 
is time for a third party to address the contentious issue of Head of State immunity before the 
ICC.As was argued in Chapter One, the confusion surrounding the immunity issue before the 
ICC has contributed to the turn away from the ICC and the turn to domestic courts and 
universal jurisdiction by African states. It is therefore important for the issue of Head of State 
immunity before the ICC to be clarified to avoid African states shunning its jurisdiction. 
Despite the concerns which have been raised regarding the work of the ICC in Africa, it is 
important that the Court continues to play its role of combating impunity on the continent as 
there is not yet a viable alternative for the region. 
7.3.4.1 The mechanism for approaching the ICJ 
It ought to be noted that the Rome Statute of the ICC does not provide a mechanism by 
which a request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ can be sought regarding a matter that 
has been dealt with by the ICC or one which is pending before the Court.786 However, both 
the UN Charter and the Statute of the ICJ provide the mechanism by which an advisory 
opinion may be sought. Article 96 of the UN Charter provides that, 
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(a) The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice 
to give an advisory opinion on any legal question (b) Other organs of the United Nations and 
specialised agencies, which may at any time be so authorised by the General Assembly may also 
request advisory opinions of the Court arising within the scope of their activities.787 
Article 65 (1) of the Statute of the ICJ provides that, ‘The Court may give an advisory 
opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorised by or in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.’788 
The hurdle that the AU still has to overcome in this regard is to secure a majority vote in the 
UN General Assembly in favour of the request for the advisory opinion,789 and the ICJ upon 
receiving the request for an advisory opinion from the General Assembly will decide whether 
or not it will render the opinion. In Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, the ICJ stated that, 
When seized of a request for an advisory opinion, the court must first consider whether it has 
jurisdiction to give the opinion requested and whether, should the answer be in the affirmative, 
there is any reason why it should decline to exercise any such jurisdiction.790 
It is hoped that the ICJ will deliver the advisory opinion in the near future. This will not only 
bring clarity to this matter but it might also help to restore relations between African states 
and the ICC, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the Court by ensuring that the ICC 
remains a court of last resort which can step in where domestic and regional justice 
mechanisms fail. This would be a more desirable situation compared to one where African 
states completely abandon a universal international criminal law in favour of a purely 
localised approach which only resorts to domestic and regional frameworks of international 
criminal law. 
                                                 
787 See article 96 of the UN Charter. 
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The AU Assembly decision to request for an advisory opinion from the ICJ is arguably the 
most significant so far as it offers possible solutions to the problems arising from the Rome 
Statute. In light of this Decision, there is hope for international criminal law and the ICC in 
Africa. It is hoped that African states will focus on finding solutions to contentious issues 
with the ICC and reconsider their stance on withdrawal from the ICC, because as was 
discussed above, there is not yet a viable alternative to the ICC within the African regional 
justice mechanisms. 
The Assembly also requested the Commission to review its agreements on hosting AU 
summits in order to avoid any ambiguities relating to immunities of Heads of State and state 
officials attending such functions, as was the case when Al Bashir attended an AU summit in 
South Africa in June 2015.791 This is evidence that African states are committed to resolving 
the problems arising from the question of Head of State immunity before the ICC.  
7.3.4.2 Sudan and South Africa/Kenya should register a dispute to the ICJ by consent 
It is suggested that the ICJ could also be approached by either Sudan and South Africa or 
Sudan and Kenya registering a dispute with the court by consent. This is because South 
Africa’s North Gauteng High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled that South Africa 
had a duty to arrest President Al Bashir when he visited the country in 2015. More recently 
on 16 February 2018 Kenya’s Appeal Court held that the failure by the government to arrest 
President Al Bashir when he visited the country in 2010 was in breach of its obligations 
under the Rome Statute, its constitution and the domestic legislation, the ICC Act. The Court 
also ruled that President Al Bashir should be arrested should he visit the country again.792 A 
dispute could be registered with the ICJ by consent on the basis of these court judgments 
which imposed upon South Africa and Kenya the duty to arrest President Al Bashir in 
cooperation with the ICC. 
Article 35(1) of the ICJ statute provides for the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of state 
parties to the Court. Although Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, it is a party to the 
Statute to the ICJ hence it has the legal standing to register a dispute with another State to the 
                                                 
791 Para 5(iii). 
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Court in terms article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ.793 The registering of a dispute by consent 
between either Sudan and South Africa or Sudan and Kenya is an alternative avenue that 
could be taken should the request by the AU to seek an advisory opinion from the ICJ not be 
successful. 
The proposals on the clarification of the issue of immunities before the ICC have been dealt 
with in detail in this section because the clarification of the issue of immunity before the ICC 
is arguably part of the solution to the uncertainty regarding domestic immunity, and universal 
jurisdiction. The clarification of this issue could therefore be a starting point to removing the 
confusion and uncertainty regarding the exact scope of personal immunities before domestic 
courts. 
7.4 CONCLUSION 
The issue which this thesis has sought to interrogate is why the application of international 
criminal law, particularly the principle of universal jurisdiction and personal immunities and 
the distinct, but closely related, efforts by the ICC to prosecute African Heads of State for 
alleged human rights violations has led to tensions between African states and European 
states. It has been asserted that this is because the two sides have historically obtained 
sovereignty differently therefore they understand and invoke the doctrine differently, leading 
to misunderstandings. Another reason for the misunderstandings is the impact that 
colonialism continues to have on the development of present day international law. 
It has been argued that any analysis of the reaction by African states to the application of 
international criminal law by European states, and to the work of the ICC in Africa which 
does not take into account the colonial and racial history of international law would be 
inadequate. As was explained in Chapter Two, sovereignty is arguably the most fundamental 
doctrine of international law as most, if not all, the principles of international law  are 
anchored on the sovereignty doctrine.794 In order to fully comprehend the contemporary 
structure of international law and international relations therefore, it is important to 
understand the colonial history of international law, particularly the impact that the colonial 
confrontation had on the development of the sovereignty doctrine as articulated by Anghie. 
                                                 
793See article 36 (2) of the Statute of the ICJ which states that the jurisdiction of the court includes all legal 
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Anghie has rightly argued that the ‘dynamic of difference’ is still evident in the present day 
structure of international law. He has asserted that, 
on many occasions on which international law seeks to institute a new order it reproduces, in 
effect, the colonial structures of international law. It is for this reason, I have argued, that striking 
parallels exists between the legal worlds of Vitoria and the present…as it proceeds towards an 
uncertain future. The colonial origins of the discipline are re-enacted whenever the discipline 
attempts to renew itself, reform itself.795 
 This assertion has been supported by a number of scholars including Gevers.796 It is therefore 
submitted that the ‘dynamic of difference’ will always be a part of international law, for it is 
a part of the history of international law which cannot be divorced from the present. This 
‘dynamic of difference’ is evident in the application of the principles of universal jurisdiction 
and personal immunities by European states in respect of officials from African states, and in 
the purported immunity of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, which 
has contributed significantly to the deteriorating relationship between African states and the 
ICC. 
In this regard it is submitted that the thesis has addressed the key research objectives as 
outlined in Chapter One. Each of the chapters has highlighted how the colonial history of the 
development of the sovereignty doctrine has had an impact of the present day structure of 
international law. Chapter Two critically reviewed the main jurisprudential theories on the 
development of the sovereignty doctrine and concluded that the reason why the application 
of international criminal law results in tensions between African states and European states, 
and African states and the ICC is because European states and non-European states 
historically obtained sovereignty differently. Chapter Three examined the rise and fall of 
universal jurisdiction and it was concluded that although the legality of the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction is no longer subject to debate, the misunderstandings between African 
states and European states regarding the application of the principle are likely to continue. 
This is because of the enduring effects of the colonial history of international law. 
In Chapter Four, the rise of universal jurisdiction in Africa was critically examined with a 
review of the domestic legislative instruments on universal jurisdiction in Africa and the AU 
Model Law on Universal Jurisdiction. It was concluded that the rise of universal jurisdiction 
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in Africa is part of efforts by African states to re-assert their sovereignty which they were 
previously denied. Chapter Five examined the historical evolution of the principle of 
immunities and its application in Europe. It was concluded that a review of the ICC 
implementation legislation on immunities in Europe highlights the existence of a double 
standard in the application of international criminal law. An examination of the history of the 
Ottoman Empire capitulations highlighted that African sovereignty, when granted, has 
always been deficient.  
In Chapter Six the implementation legislation on immunities in Africa was critically 
reviewed. It was concluded that the push by the AU to re-assert immunities for the Heads of 
State and officials for its member states is part of efforts by African states to reaffirm their 
sovereignty. It was also concluded that the re-assertion of immunities by African states is not 
a deviation from the norm but that African states are simply reclaiming immunities which 
have always been available at international law but which they were not able to claim due to 
the ‘dynamic of difference’. 
The broad conclusion to be drawn from the arguments made in this thesis is that African 
states are not totally opposed to international criminal justice as administered by Western 
states and the ICC, but they want their voices to be heard regarding their misgivings with the 
manner in which this international criminal justice is applied. That is why they have 
embarked on a project to strengthen their regional justice mechanisms in order to avoid 
universal jurisdiction as practised by Western states. That is also the reason why African 
states have resolved that they will not cooperate with the ICC in the execution of the warrant 
of arrest against President Al Bashir until their concerns regarding the Court have been 
addressed. The recent decision by the AU Assembly to request the ICJ for an advisory 
opinion on the contentious issue of Head of State immunity before the ICC is evidence that 
Africa is still committed to the international criminal justice project. 
It is hoped that the proposals made in this Chapter will in the future be given due 
consideration by policy makers from both African and non-African states, and by the ICC, as 
part of efforts to find a lasting solution to the problems related to the application of 
international criminal law. As Anghie has asserted, 
whether the Third World is characterized as different, similar, or a combination of the two, it 
must contend with the history of international law that is sketched here, a history in which 
international law continuously disempowers the non-European world, even while sanctioning 
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intervention within it-as when Vitoria characterizes the Indians as ‘infant’, thereby 
simultaneously diminishing the Indians and justifying their subjection to Spanish tutelage.797  
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                                                               POSTSCRIPT 
SOUTH AFRICA’S PERSPECTIVE ON IMMUNITIES BEFORE THE ICC 
 
8.1  INTRODUCTION  
The focus of this thesis was on the relationship between international criminal law and 
sovereignty in Africa as seen through the lens of the application of the principles of universal 
jurisdiction and personal immunities. The thesis examined the application of universal 
jurisdiction in selected European countries and in selected African countries in order to 
interrogate why the application of these principles has often led to misunderstandings 
between African states and European states. This chapter will examine in detail South 
Africa’s perspective on the question of Al Bashir’s immunity before the ICC. 
 It is considered that this detailed examination of the country’s perspective on Al Bashir’s 
immunity before the ICC is worthwhile because as argued in Chapter One, the confusion 
surrounding the issue of immunity before the ICC has had a significant impact on the turn to 
domestic courts and universal jurisdiction by African states. The rise of universal jurisdiction 
in Africa and efforts by the AU to re-assert the sovereignty of its member states by 
strengthening its regional justice mechanisms; arguably takes place to a larger extent, against 
the background of African states’ misgivings towards the perceived disregards of the 
immunities of their Heads of State and officials by the ICC.  
South Africa arguably plays the role of ‘big brother’ in African politics. The decisions that 
the country makes therefore have a significant policy and political impact upon the rest of the 
African continent. For instance, the attempted withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the ICC 
by South Africa signalled Africa’s growing discontent with the ICC. Although Gambia and 
Burundi also gave notice of their intention to withdraw, and Burundi actually withdrew from 
the Rome Statute of the ICC in 2017, it was the intended withdrawal by South Africa which 
shocked the world.798 
Before examining the jurisprudence of the South African Courts regarding the question of Al 
Bashir’s immunity before the ICC, this chapter shall first discuss the contradictory provisions 
in article 27 and article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, which is arguably the main factor 
                                                 
798 Du Plessis & Gevers ‘South Africa’s Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court’ 199. 
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contributing to the misunderstandings between African states and the ICC regarding the 
immunity issue. 
8.2 IMMUNITY AND THE ICC: THE LEGAL ISSUES 
 8.2.1 The debate between article 27 and article 98 of the Rome Statute 
The contradictory provisions in the Rome statute on the relevance of immunities before the 
Court have arguably been the main contributory factor in the tension between the AU and the 
ICC. One explanation which has been given for this contradiction is that article 27 and article 
98 were drafted by two different committees during the Rome statute negotiations.799Article 
27 (2) of the Rome Statute provides that ‘Immunities or special procedural rules which may 
attach to the official capacity of a person, whether under national or international law shall 
not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person.’800 In contrast, article 98 
(1) provides that, 
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the 
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to 
the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can 
first obtain the cooperation of that third state for the waiver of the immunity.801 
There is no consensus amongst scholars as to how these contradictory provisions ought to be 
reconciled. One group of scholars has argued that article 27 must be interpreted as a waiver 
of immunity by member states of the ICC of the immunity of their officials before the ICC, 
and that consequently article 98 only applies to non-party states.802 Proponents of this 
approach also argue that the removal of immunity applies not only in respect of immunity of 
state officials before the ICC, but also in respect of arrest and surrender in cooperation with 
the ICC.  Akande for instance asserts that,  
the removal of immunity from the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction contained in Article 27 
would be nullified in practice if Article 98 (1) were to be interpreted as allowing parties to rely 
                                                 
799 O Triffterer ‘Article 27’ in O Triffterer (ed) Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (1999). 
800 See article 27 (2) Rome Statute. 
801  See article 98 (1) Rome Statute. 
802 See for example Akande ‘International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court’ 425; S Wirth 
‘Immunities, Related Problems and Article 98 of the Rome Statute’ (2001) 12 Criminal LF 429,452-454. 
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on the same immunities in order to prevent the surrender of their officials to the Court by other 
states.803 
Another approach proposed by Gaeta is that the reference to third party states in article 98 
should be interpreted as referring to non-states parties. This would mean that article 98 
should be interpreted as referring to the obligation on states parties to grant personal 
immunity to officials of non-states parties.804  
 A detailed analysis as to which approach is more convincing is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. It suffices to say that from a legal perspective, the contradiction between article 27 
and article 98 has arguably been the main contributing factor to the misunderstanding 
between African states and the ICC regarding the issue of Head of State immunity before the 
Court. The merits of both approaches have been considered in detail by Gevers, who has 
convincingly argued that the article 27 waiver approach is the preferred one, although both 
approaches are not entirely satisfactory.805 
The relationship between article 27 and article 98 has been central to the question of the 
relevance of immunities before the ICC generally, and Al Bashir’s immunities particularly as 
Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute. The AU has interpreted article 98 to mean that there 
is no obligation on states to arrest and surrender Al Bashir in cooperation with the ICC, and 
the ICC insists that article 98 has no effect on the obligation of state parties to the Rome 
Statute to arrest and surrender Al Bashir. In 2009 the AU Assembly adopted a decision on 
non- cooperation with the ICC regarding the arrest warrant issued against Al Bashir by the 
Court. It was decided that, ‘…the AU Member States shall not cooperate pursuant to the 
provisions of article 98 of the Rome Statute of the ICC relating to immunities for the arrest 
and surrender of President Omar Al Bashir of the Sudan.’806 
In subsequent decisions, the Assembly reiterated the position taken on non-cooperation. In a 
decision adopted in January 2012, the Assembly stated that it, 
                                                 
803 Akande ibid 423.  
804 P Gaeta ‘Official Capacities and Immunities’ in A Cassese, P Gaeta& J Jones (eds) The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002) 975, 993-994. 
805 Gevers ‘Immunity and the Implementation Legislation in South Africa; Kenya and Uganda’ 94-105. 
806 Assembly/AU/Dec.245 (XIII) Para 10. For a detailed overview of this decision see generally Tladi ‘The 
African Union and the ICC: The Battle for the Soul of International Law’. 
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Reaffirms its understanding that article 98 (1) was included in the Rome Statute establishing the 
ICC out of recognition that the Statute is not capable of removing an immunity which 
international law grants to the officials of States that are not parties to the Rome Statute, and by 
referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC the UN Security Council intended that the Rome 
Statute would be applicable, including article 98.807 
The decision also urged member states of the AU to comply with previous decisions on non-
cooperation regarding the arrest warrants against Al Bashir.808  
The AU has also insisted that incumbent Heads of State are immune from the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. The AU Assembly noted with respect to the proceedings against the Kenyan 
President and his deputy before the ICC in its 2013 Decision on Africa’s Relationship with 
the ICC that the indictment of sitting Heads of States was contrary to the customary 
international law position on the immunities of sitting Heads of State and other senior state 
officials.809On the other hand, the ICC has issued a number of judgments on non-cooperation 
following the failure by African states to arrest Al Bashir when he visited him. In these 
Decisions the ICC reiterated that Head of State immunity is irrelevant in proceedings before 
the Court. In the Decision on non-cooperation by Malawi, the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber I 
held that, 
the principle in international law is that immunity of either former or sitting Heads of State 
cannot be invoked to oppose a prosecution by an international court. This is equally applicable to 
former or sitting Heads of State not Parties to the Statute whenever the Court may exercise 
jurisdiction.810 
As Woolaver has noted, it is highly unlikely that the AU or the ICC will change their position 
on Head of State immunity before the ICC anytime soon.811 
 
                                                 
807 See para 6 of the Decision on the Progress of the Report of the Commission on the Implementation of the 
Assembly Decisions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) Assembly/AU /Dec.397 (XVIII) (January 2012) 
808 Para 8. See also para 10 of the Decision on the Progress Report of the Commission on the Implementation of 
the Previous Decisions on the International Criminal Court (ICC) Assembly/AU/Dec.547 (XXIV) (30-31 
January 2015). 
809 See para 9 of the Decision. 
810 The Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09-139-Corr (15/12/2011) Pre- Trial Chamber 1 para 36. 
811  Woolaver ‘International and Domestic Implications of South Africa’s Withdrawal from the ICC’. 
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8.2.2 The ICC jurisprudence on Heads of State immunity  
It is regrettable that the ICC has so far not provided clarity regarding the issue of Head of 
State immunity before the Court. Although the Court has delivered a number of judgments 
on non-cooperation by African states, its jurisprudence has been inconsistent. Since the first 
arrest warrant against Al Bashir was issued in 2009, he has visited a number of countries 
including Malawi; Chad; Kenya and South Africa and he has not been arrested. The ICC has 
held in the decisions on non-cooperation by the African states concerned that article 98 (1) of 
the Rome Statute does not absolve states form  their obligation  to arrest and surrender Al 
Bashir, but gave different reasons for the decisions.  
The first was the decision on non-cooperation by Malawi which was delivered in 2011.812 
This was the first instance in which the Court addressed the issue of Al Bashir’s immunity in 
detail. The ICC’s Pre Trial Chamber I held that Malawi had failed to cooperate with the ICC 
by not arresting Al Bashir when he visited the country in October 2011.813 The reason given 
by the Chamber for this decision is that there is an exception under customary international 
law to Head of State immunity where an international Court requests the arrest of a Head of 
State for international crimes. The Court also held that article 98 (1) of the Rome statute did 
not apply because as there was an exception to the customary international law position on 
Head of State immunity ,there was no conflict between the obligation of Malawi to arrest Al 
Bashir and customary international law.814 This judgment has been criticised by a number of 
scholars for the Court’s failure to directly address the question of the meaning of article 98 
(1).815  
                                                 
812 Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09-139 CORR 915/12/2011) Decision on non-cooperation by 
Malawi. 
813 Para 12. 
814 Para 43. 
815 See for example D Akande ‘ICC Issues Detailed Decision on Bashir’s Immunity (…At long last…) But Gets 
the Law Wrong’ EJIL Talk (15/12/2011) available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-issues-detailed-decision-on-
bashir’s-immunity-at-long-last-but-gets-the-law-wrong/ accessed 30/6/2018 ( arguing that  the Chamber erred 
when it held that an exception exists in customary international law to the immunity of heads of state before 
international courts); D Tladi ‘The ICC Decision on Chad and Malawi :On Cooperation, Immunities and Article 
98’(2013)  J of Int Criminal Justice 199 ( arguing that the reasoning provided by the Court failed to address 
article 98 of the Rome Statute) . 
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The Court’s Pre-Trial Chamber I adopted the same reasoning for its decision on non-
compliance by Chad in 2011 and held that Chad had failed to comply with its obligations 
under article 86 of the Rome Statute to cooperate with the Court in the arrest and surrender of 
Al Bashir.816 
In 2014 the ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber II passed another judgment on non-compliance by the 
DRC.817 It held that the DRC had failed to cooperate with the ICC when Al Bashir visited its 
territory, but based its decision on different reasoning from that of the Malawi and Chad 
decisions. 818 In the DRC decision the Chamber held that the UN Security Council Resolution 
1593 of 2005 which obliged Sudan to fully cooperate with the Court explicitly waived Al 
Bashir’s immunity.819 This decision was also criticised as being unsatisfactory. De Hoogh and 
Knottnerus, for instance, argued that it was based on an incorrect interpretation of the text of 
Resolution 1593; and that it is only Sudan which has the power to waive the immunities of 
Al Bashir and not the Security Council as argued by the Court.820 This argument is convincing 
when one considers the wording of article 98 which specifically provides that the Court must 
obtain cooperation for waiver of immunity from a third party. The fact that the Security 
Council has directed Sudan to cooperate with the ICC does not have the effect of absolving 
the court from seeking a waiver of Al Bashir’s immunity from Sudan in terms of article 98. 
In its latest decision on non-cooperation by South Africa, issued in July 2017, the Court held 
that South Africa had failed to cooperate with the Court as it did not arrest Bashir when he 
visited the country to attend an AU summit in June 2015.821 The Court once again based its 
                                                 
816 The Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir   ICC 02/05-01/09 Pre-Trial Chamber I (13/12/2011) para 9 and 13.A 
further decision on non-cooperation by Chad was issued by Pre-Trial Chamber II in March 2013 (The 
Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09-151 (26/3/2013). 
817 The Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09-195 (9/4/2014) Pre-Trial Chamber II. 
818 Para 34 (a). 
819 Para 29 and 31. For a detailed commentary on the Chamber’s decision see A de Hoogh & A Knottnerus ‘ICC 
Issues New Decision on Al Bashir’s Immunities-But Gets the Law Wrong-Again’ EJIL Talk (18/4/2014) 
available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/icc-issues-new-decision-on-al-bashirs-immunities-but-gets-the-law-wrong-
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President Al Bashir, but  it is Wrong Again’ Opinio Juris 23/4/2014 available at 
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820 A de Hoogh & A Knottnerus ibid.  For a similar view see Gaeta ibid. 
821 The Prosecutor v Omar Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09-302 (6/7/2017) Pre-Trial Chamber II. 
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decision on a different line of reasoning from both the Malawi and Chad decisions, and the 
DRC decision. In the South Africa decision the Court held that Al Bashir does not enjoy 
immunity because the effect of the Security Council referral of his matter to the ICC was to 
place Sudan in an analogous position to that of a state party, and that article 27 (2) of the 
Statute would apply thereby rendering Bashir’s immunities before the Court inapplicable.822 
As with the Malawi and Chad; and the DRC decisions, the South Africa decision has also 
been criticised for failing to address the issue of the interpretation of article 98.823 
The ICC has missed an opportunity to clarify the meaning of article 98 in relation to the 
immunity of Al Bashir before the court, and of nationals of non-state parties in general, 
choosing instead to rely on reasons which could be interpreted to mean that article 98 is of no 
relevance to the Rome Statute. The ICC has been criticised for changing its jurisprudence in 
these decisions without providing clear and concise reasons for doing so, and for failing to 
give a satisfactory interpretation of article 98 (1) .824 Instead of bringing clarity and finality to 
the matter of Head of State immunity for non-states parties, the court has created further 
uncertainty and reignited debate on this issue   amongst scholars.  
As Gaeta has argued, ‘The highly political tension between the African Union and the Court 
on this and other matters is far from being settled and the jurisprudence of the court which is 
not impeccable certainly won’t help to alleviate this.’825True to Gaeta’s words, the 
jurisprudence of the Court did nothing to solve the impasse between the AU and the ICC 
regarding Al Bashir’s immunities. The AU continues to insist that Al Bashir enjoys immunity 
on the basis of article 98 of the Rome Statute, and the ICC has maintained that he is not 
immune. The AU Assembly in its 2013 Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the ICC 
resolved that no sitting Head of State should be indicted or stand trial before an international 
tribunal.826  It is therefore commendable that the AU Assembly has made a decision to request 
the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the issue of Head of State immunity before the ICC, as 
this may bring clarity and finality to this contentious issue. As the relationship between the 
                                                 
822 Para 88, 91-93.For a detailed Commentary on this decision see A Knottnerus ‘The Immunity of Al Bashir: 
The Latest Jurisprudence of the ICC’EJIL Talk (15/11/2017) available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-immunity-
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823 See Knottnerus ibid (arguing that the reasons given by the Court for the Decision are not legally convincing, 
and that the court still failed to clarify the meaning of article 98. 
824 Gaeta ‘The AU Changes its Mind on the Immunity from Arrest of President Al Bashir’; Knottnerus ibid. 
825 Gaeta ibid. 
826See para 9 of the Decision. 
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AU and the ICC is characterised by distrust and misunderstanding it is highly unlikely that 
either the AU or the ICC will change its position on immunities before the Court.  
8.3 SOUTH AFRICA’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE APPLICATION OF 
IMMUNITY BEFORE THE ICC: THE Al BASHIR CASE 
As explained above, South Africa’s ICC Act provides for the irrelevance of official capacity 
in section 4 (2) (a). In addition, The Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001 
(DIPA) provides for the personal immunity of Heads of State, special envoys and other 
officials.  This legislation is seemingly at odds with the ICC Act insofar as the ICC Act 
provides for the irrelevance of the immunities that an accused person might be entitled to. 
With respect to Heads of State, the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act provides in 
section 4 (1) (a) that, 
A Head of State is immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic, 
and enjoys such privileges as (a) Heads of State enjoy in accordance with the rules of customary 
international law.827 
With respect to special envoys and other State representatives, the Act provides that they 
enjoy personal immunity before the domestic courts of South Africa subject to the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs gazetting consent to such immunity before their arrival in the country.828 
As stated above, when South Africa announced its intention to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute, one of the reasons given by the Minister of Justice for the intended withdrawal was 
that the provisions of the Rome statute and that of its implementing legislation, the ICC Act, 
were inconsistent with the customary international law position on immunity. The Minister 
also argued that the provisions in the Rome Statute and the ICC Act providing for the 
irrelevance of immunities were at odds with the provisions of the Diplomatic Immunities and 
Privileges Act.829 It is submitted that the attempted withdrawal from the Rome statute by 
South Africa was not the only solution to the contradictory provisions in the Rome Statute 
and the ICC Act, and the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act. As the Diplomatic 
Immunities and Privileges Act was enacted in 2001 before the enactment of the ICC Act, this 
discrepancy could have been dealt with by amending the Diplomatic Immunities and 
                                                 
827 Section 4 (1) (a) Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001. 
828 Section 4 (3) of the Act. 
829 See the Statement by the Minister of Justice on South Africa’s Intention to Withdraw from the Rome Statute. 
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Privileges Act to bring it in conformity with South Africa’s obligations in terms of the Rome 
statute. 
The immunity of the Sudanese President Al Bashir and the obligation of states to arrest and 
surrender him to the ICC in cooperation with the court pursuant to the warrants of arrest 
issued against him, has been at the centre of the misunderstandings between African states 
and the ICC. The South African courts had occasion to deal with the matter of Al Bashir’s 
immunity in Southern African Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Others.830 The applicant, the Southern African Litigation Centre, 
approached the North Gauteng High Court on the 14th of June 2015 seeking an urgent order 
compelling the South African authorities to arrest and surrender President Al Bashir to the 
ICC pursuant to a warrant of arrests issued against him by the ICC. 831 President Al Bashir 
was in the country to attend an AU Summit.  
The Court initially granted an order directing the respondents to prevent President Al Bashir 
from leaving South Africa until a final order had been granted in the matter.832 On the 15th of 
June 2015 a final order was granted by the court as follows 
‘(1) That the conduct of the Respondents to the extent that they have failed to take steps to arrest 
and /or detain the President of the Republic of Sudan, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir 
(‘President Bashir’) is inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996, 
and invalid; 
2) That the Respondents are forthwith compelled to take all reasonable steps to prepare to arrest 
President Bashir without a warrant in terms of section 40 (1) (k) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
and detain him, pending a formal request for his surrender from the International Criminal 
Court.833 
The court made this order following repeated assurances by Counsel for the Respondents that 
President Al Bashir was still in the country. It was only after Judgment had been handed 
down that the Court was informed that President Al Bashir had already left South Africa.834 
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Notwithstanding this, Judge President Mlambo emphasised the relevance of the order and the 
judgment made by the Court.835 
The case was centred on the question as to whether or not President Bashir was immune from 
arrest and surrender to the ICC. The applicants’ Counsel argued that in terms of articles 
86,87 (1) and 89 of the Rome Statute, when the ICC makes a request for the arrest and 
surrender of an accused person, State parties are obliged to comply with such a request. In 
addition, Counsel for the applicants argued that South Africa had an obligation to comply 
with the request for the arrest and surrender of Bashir by virtue of the country having enacted 
the ICC Act.836 The Respondents on the other hand argued that Bashir was immune from 
arrest and surrender to the ICC in line with article VIII of the host agreement which South 
Africa had entered into with the AU Commission to facilitate its hosting of the AU summit.837 
The Court examined the application of the principle of immunities and noted that although 
section 4 of the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act provides for the immunity of 
Heads of State in terms of customary international law, this Act did not domesticate the OAU 
Immunities Act which has not been ratified by South Africa.838 Consequently, the only basis 
upon which President Al Bashir could be said to enjoy immunity from arrest and surrender 
would be by virtue of his status as Head of State, or in terms of the host agreement concluded 
between South Africa and the AU Commission. The court then explained in this regard that 
the host agreement did not have the effect of conferring immunity on President Al Bashir as 
Article VIII of the agreement makes no reference to Heads of State but to Members of the 
Commission and other Intergovernmental Organisations.839 The Court also held that President 
Al Bashir could not claim immunity from arrest on the basis of customary international law 
as the Rome Statute provides that Heads of State do not enjoy immunity before the 
                                                 
835 Ibid. 
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837 For Respondents’ detailed arguments see para 13-21 of the judgment. 
838 Para 28.4 
839 Para 28.10 and para 30. 
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Court.840Following the High Court Judgment the government indicated that it would consider 
withdrawing from the Rome Statute.841 
In March 2016 the South African government appealed the decision of the North Gauteng 
High Court.842 The argument advanced by the government was that the immunity enjoyed by 
Heads of State in terms of customary international law, and in terms of section 4 (1) DIPA 
abated  the obligations of South Africa to arrest and surrender a Head of State in cooperation 
with the ICC .843 The SALC  on the other hand argued that section 4 (2) and section 10 (9) of 
the ICC Act affirmed the obligations of South Africa in terms of the Rome Statute to arrest 
and surrender an accused person in cooperation with the ICC. The SALC also joined issue 
with the government on the issue of whether the customary international law rules on 
immunity could be relied upon in cases where a Head of State is charged with having 
committed international crimes by the ICC.844 
There were three main issues which the Supreme Court of Appeal had to determine. The first 
issue was whether the departure of President Al Bashir from South Africa prior to the High 
Court making its order had made the issues before the Court moot. The second issue was 
whether article VIII of the hosting agreement and the ministerial proclamation issued by the 
Minister of International Relations conferred immunity on President Bashir and if not, 
whether he could claim immunity in terms of customary international law and section 4(1) 
DIPA. The third issue was whether if President Al Bashir was entitled to immunity under 
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customary international law and section 4 (1) DIPA, this immunity could be removed by the 
provisions of the ICC Act.845 
With regards to the question as to whether President Al Bashir’s departure from South Africa 
meant that the issue before the parties had become moot, Judge Wallis ruled that the High 
Court had erred in refusing to grant the applicants leave to appeal on this basis. This was 
because although the order granted by the High Court could not be enforced, it remained 
binding and the SALC had indicated that should President Bashir return to South Africa in 
future, they would seek to have the order enforced.846 On the issue of whether article VIII of 
the hosting agreement conferred immunity on President Al Bashir, the Court concurred with 
the reasoning of the High Court that the hosting agreement did not provide for the immunity 
of Heads of State but for the AU itself and other organisations referred to in article VIII.847 
Akande has however convincingly argued that the wording of the OAU Immunities 
Convention provides for the immunities of state representatives to conferences such as the 
AU summit which President Al Bashir had travelled to attend. According to Akande, 
it is conceivable that South Africa did seek to provide for immunity of State representatives 
when entering into the hosting agreement with the AU but that it was not careful enough 
in drafting the agreement to use words that would achieve that effect.848 
This highlights the dilemma that South Africa and other African states who are state parties 
to the Rome statute are faced with when it comes to balancing their obligations as state 
parties to the Rome statute on the one hand and their obligations as member states of the AU. 
On the issue as to whether President Al Bashir enjoyed immunity from arrest in terms of 
customary international law and section 4 (1) DIPA, Judge Wallis ruled that there is no 
customary international law exception to the immunities enjoyed by Heads of State.849 He 
said, 
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the content of customary international law is not for me to determine and…I must conclude with 
regret that it would go too far to say that there is no longer any sovereign immunity for jus 
cogens (immutable norm) violations…I am unable to hold that at this stage of the development 
of customary international law there is an international crimes exception to the immunity and 
inviolability that Heads of State enjoy when visiting foreign countries and before foreign 
national courts.850 
Judge Wallis’ conclusion on the continued relevance of personal immunities under 
customary international law resonates with the argument made earlier in this thesis that 
contrary to assertions by some scholars that immunities have fallen, immunities are still a 
part of international law. The learned judge, in coming to the conclusion that there is no 
exception to the immunities accorded to Heads of State under customary international law, 
considered the ICJ’s decision in Arrest Warrant ,and a  number of cases in which national 
courts affirmed the immunities of Heads of State.851  
The Court ruled that Al Bashir would ordinarily have been entitled to immunity under 
customary international law and under section 4 (1) DIPA when he travelled to South Africa 
for the AU summit. However, as the SALC had argued that this immunity did not apply by 
virtue of South Africa having enacted the ICC Act it was necessary to consider whether the 
provisions of the ICC Act had the effect of removing the immunity that Bashir was entitled to 
under customary international law.852 The Court then concluded that the ICC Act had the 
effect of removing Al Bashir’s immunities under customary international law. Judge Wallis 
said in this respect, 
I conclude therefore that when South Africa decided to implement its obligations under the 
Rome Statute by passing the Implementation Act, it did so on the basis that all forms of 
immunity ,including Head of State immunity, would not constitute a bar to the prosecution of 
international crimes in this country or to South Africa cooperating with the ICC by way of the 
arrest and surrender of persons charged with such crimes before the ICC, where an arrest warrant 
had been issued and a request for cooperation made.853 
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This judgment has been lauded for clarifying the issue of personal immunities with respect to 
arrest and surrender in cooperation with the ICC.854 As was explained above, the ICC Act is 
silent on this matter, providing only for the procedure to be followed when South Africa 
receives a request for arrest and surrender from the ICC.It is however submitted that as the 
Court held that there is no exception to a customary international law position on personal 
immunities before domestic courts, the proper interpretation of the judgment should be that 
personal immunities become irrelevant only when there has been a request for arrest and 
surrender by the ICC. As Akande has rightly argued, as the judges concluded that there is no 
exception in customary international law to personal immunities before domestic courts, it 
would be a breach of customary international law for South Africa to arrest  Heads of State, 
except in cases where there has been a request for cooperation from the ICC.855 
It is submitted that this judgment is what strengthened the South African government’s 
resolve to attempt to withdraw from the ICC, as the Justice Minister mentioned that the 
provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC and the ICC Act requiring the country to arrest a 
sitting Head of State are at odds with the customary international law position on Head of 
State immunity. The next section shall examine South Africa’s change of attitude towards the 
ICC, from being an ardent supporter of the court during its inception to growing discontent 
with the work of the Court in Africa. 
8.4 SOUTH AFRICA AND THE ICC  
Since 2002 when South Africa enacted the ICC Act, the country has been taking steps 
towards incorporating international criminal law into its domestic legislation. This is 
evidenced by the subsequent enactment of legislation including the Protection of 
Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist Related Activities Act 33 of 2004.The 
Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act of 2012 and the Prevention and Combating 
of Trafficking in Persons Act 7 of 2013.856 All these provide for the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by South African courts. As observed by Gevers, the courts have been 
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instrumental in ensuring that South Africa applies international criminal law in line with its 
obligations under the Rome Statute.857  
South Africa therefore seems to be on course in terms of incorporating international criminal 
law into its legislation in order to meet its obligations under the Rome Statute. However, the 
attitude of South Africa towards the ICC has not always been consistent. At the inception of 
the ICC, South Africa was at the forefront of supporting the adoption of the Rome Statute, 
which it ratified in 2000.858 In 2002 the country became the first country on the African 
continent to adopt legislation to implement the provisions of the Rome Statute of the ICC and 
in 2012 it became the first African country to adopt legislation to implement the provisions 
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols.859 On this basis, it has 
been asserted that South Africa has made significant progress in the domestic prosecution of 
international crimes. Commenting on the legislation adopted by South Africa to enable the 
prosecution of international crimes, Gevers observed that, ‘These laws…are far from perfect 
but they place South Africa at the front of the trend towards domestic prosecutions of 
international crimes.’860 
Despite the significant progress made by the country in the domestic prosecution of 
international crimes and its earlier support for the ICC however, South Africa has in recent 
years taken a stance that supports the growing misgivings towards the ICC by AU member 
states. For instance, the country supported the proposed African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, which as was explained above, is part of the AU’s efforts to reaffirm the sovereignty 
of its member states by avoiding universal jurisdiction as practised by Western states, and the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. In 2014, the then Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe argued that, 
‘Africa needs its own court, vested with universal jurisdiction over the three core 
international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.’861 
In October 2016 South Africa announced that it intended to withdraw from the Rome Statute 
of the ICC. This attempted withdrawal was revoked in 2017 following a court ruling that 
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declared it unlawful and invalid, but in December 2017 the Justice Minister indicated that the 
government had not changed its position regarding its intention to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute. The Justice Minister said, 
 ‘I wish to reaffirm the Statement read out by the Government of South Africa at the 
Fifteenth Session of the Assembly of State Parties, in which it announced its intention to 
withdraw from the Rome Statute. The Government’s resolve in this regard remains 
unchanged…862 
Whether or not the Minister will serve government’s notice of intention to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute on Parliament for approval as indicated is uncertain following a change of 
leadership in the ruling ANC party and the resignation of former President Jacob Zuma in 
February 2018. 
 The fact that South Africa took steps towards implementing this withdrawal and is still 
determined to do so subject to meeting the constitutional requirements of notifying 
parliament of its intention to withdraw from the Rome Statute, is indicative of the growing 
tensions between the ICC and African states. Du Plessis and Gevers have asserted in this 
regard that, 
For Africa, the rejection of the ICC by one of its core members was a clear expression of the 
continent’s concerns with the Court. It has forced others, not always with innocent motives, to 
reconsider their own position towards the Court and to evaluate how important their membership 
was and whether remaining accorded with their own political calculus.863 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
In concluding this chapter, it is submitted that because of South Africa’s influential position 
on the continent, its policies and its application of international criminal law have a 
significant impact on the rest of Africa. As Du Plessis and Gevers observed, the attempted 
withdrawal from the Rome Statute by South Africa was a reflection of not only South 
African concerns regarding the operation of the ICC, but the concerns of Africa as a whole. 
Although Gambia and Burundi also attempted to withdraw from the Rome Statute and 
Burundi actually withdrew in 2017, it was the attempted withdrawal by South Africa which 
shocked the world. In this vein, it is hoped that South Africa will adopt a clear policy on 
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domestic application of international criminal law and its relationship with the ICC. Gevers 
has rightly argued that, 
While South Africa continues to support the ‘international criminal justice’ project at the 
international level, it does so in a manner that creates confusion and at times attracts undue 
criticism. What is needed is a clear, comprehensive statement on South Africa’s position, one 
that separates the principled wheat, from the political chaff.864 
It is therefore important for the policy makers to ensure that they adopt a clear policy in this 
regard. The domestic application of international criminal law in South Africa has to a large 
extent been enforced by the courts, with considerable resistance from the government. In the 
Zimbabwe Torture Docket Case discussed in Chapter Four the South African government 
appealed the decision by the North Gauteng High Court that South Africa had an obligation 
to investigate human rights violations allegedly committed in Zimbabwe, and in the Bashir 
Case the government argued in its appeal that it was not obliged to arrest Bashir when he 
travelled to South Africa because he was immune from such arrest. The South African 
government’s approach towards the domestic application of international criminal law is 
confusing and inconsistent in that the legislature has adopted laws enabling the domestic 
prosecution of international crimes, but the government is reluctant to act in compliance with 
these laws. 
As was explained in the concluding chapter to this thesis, the regionalisation of international 
criminal law in Africa would be ideal in addressing African states’ concerns regarding the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction by Western states and the work of the ICC in Africa. 
However, there are a number of issues which need to be addressed before the proposed 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights can be considered to be a viable alternative to the 
ICC. Therefore, it is suggested that South Africa should use its position of influence to 
address African concerns regarding the work of the ICC in Africa. Du Plessis and Gevers 
have suggested that there are a number of ways to achieve this, including working with other 
state parties to reform the referral process of the UN Security Council. It is hoped that instead 
of shunning the ICC, South Africa will take the necessary steps to engage with the Court and 
other African state parties to the Rome statute in order to address the concerns raised by 
African states regarding efforts by the ICC to prosecute African leaders for alleged human 
rights violations. 
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